Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

Inspectors and Police ‘Raid’ Cuba’s Private Businesses to Seize Their Cash in National Currency

Cuba’s banks have run out of money, and authorities are carrying out these confiscations supposedly to pay pensions

Long line to withdraw cash at the Banco Metropolitano branch located at the corner of O’Reilly and Compostela in Havana / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 28, 2026 — “Some inspectors arrived and demanded that all the cash in the register be handed over,” a witness to one of these operations told 14ymedio. Similar incidents have reportedly occurred in several provinces across the country. He witnessed it in Holguín, but other sources describe comparable situations involving private small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in Matanzas and Camagüey. “In exchange, they make a bank transfer to you, but when you go to withdraw the money from the bank, you can’t get any cash,” he said of one of the operations. “They give you a transfer, but when you try to withdraw the money, there’s no cash available.”

Authorities, who publicly accuse mipymes of hoarding banknotes, have begun forcibly removing the cash accumulated in private business registers and replacing it with bank transfers. Witnesses describe an almost identical procedure, carried out by inspectors, bank officials, and police officers, leaving businesses without money to make change, pay suppliers, or restock merchandise.

Another complaint circulated on Facebook this Friday describes a similar situation in Matanzas and attributes the measure to the inability to pay pensions. “Banks in Matanzas have run out of cash and have not been able to pay retirees,” continue reading

the post begins. It was later shared across numerous profiles and groups.

The text claims that the Provincial Government, the Communist Party, executives from Banco de Crédito y Comercio and Banco Popular de Ahorro, together with police officers and inspectors, are “invading private businesses to seize all the cash on hand at that moment.”

Businesses are left “without cash to operate, not even money to give change”

“Without prior notice to the businesses, they close them down, enter them, count all the cash in the registers, and force them to hand it over,” the complaint states. Afterwards, it adds, officials make “a bank transfer to the business’s fiscal account for the same amount of cash that was taken.”

The post maintains that businesses are left “without cash to operate, not even money to give change,” and attributes the decision to the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Matanzas and the provincial governor. It also claims that some owners who resisted were threatened with fines, the closure of their businesses, or even detention.

The account from Matanzas matches a complaint made by Katia Castello Morgade, a self-employed entrepreneur in Camagüey, who said that Finance inspectors, accompanied by police officers and bank employees, were removing money from private establishments after conducting cash audits.

“During the inspection they count the cash and immediately deposit or transfer it into the banking system, leaving businesses without liquidity,” summarizes one of the videos posted on Instagram.

The entrepreneur clarified that officials do not directly appropriate the money but instead force businesses to deposit it into the bank. The result, however, is that the business loses the banknotes it needs to operate and receives in return an electronic balance that is difficult to use in an economy where many suppliers accept only cash. Added to this are the difficulties of making electronic payments, since power outages prevent such operations for long periods.

The State requires businesses to deposit cash, but the banks do not guarantee that it can be withdrawn later

For years, Cuban authorities have been trying to force the banking of commercial operations. Resolution 111 of 2023 by the Central Bank established limits on cash collections and payments, as well as rules governing the deposit, withdrawal, and possession of cash. The regulation requires economic actors to deposit their daily income but does not explicitly state that inspectors and police officers may remove all the money found during an inspection without leaving even a cash reserve.

The problem has worsened because banking works only in one direction. The State requires businesses to deposit banknotes, but banks do not guarantee that the money can later be withdrawn. State media itself has reported complaints for years about the lack of cash in ATMs and bank branches, restrictions on withdrawing funds—including wages—and the refusal of many establishments to accept transfers.

The reported operations appear to respond to a more immediate need than fiscal discipline. Faced with a shortage of banknotes to pay pensions, salaries, and benefits, the Government appears to be turning to the cash registers of mipymes and self-employed workers as a source of immediate liquidity.

So far, neither the Central Bank, the provincial governments mentioned, nor the Ministry of Finance and Prices has publicly reported on these operations. Nor have they explained what regulation authorizes the temporary closure of a business, the counting of its cash, and the mandatory replacement of banknotes with a transfer that, in practice, cannot be converted back into cash.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The Cuban Regime Cannot Tolerate Criticism of Its Incompetence

Bruno Rodríguez demands that the German Foreign Minister and the OAS attribute the crisis on the island to the US blockade.

Image of German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul. / EFE/EPA/Flip Singer

14ymedio/EFE, Havana, June 25, 2026 / The Cuban government responded Thursday to German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul after the Christian Democratic politician attributed the island’s crisis to mismanagement by its authorities. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez accused Wadephul of being unaware of US sanctions and invited him to learn more about Washington’s policy toward Havana.

“How can we not recognize the imposition of an energy blockade in serious violation of International Law, which constitutes collective punishment, causes humanitarian damage and impedes free trade and freedom of navigation,” Rodríguez wrote on his social media.

The regime’s reaction came after Wadephul stated last Sunday, during a German government open house, that he did not see the blockade described by one of the citizens participating in the meeting. “I don’t see the kind of blockade you describe,” responded the minister, who went further by stating that a “regime of injustice” prevails in Cuba.

For Wadephul, the “decisive prerequisite” for improving the living conditions of the population is that the country be “better governed,” a direct criticism of the responsibility of the Cuban authorities in the deep economic and social crisis that the Island is going through. continue reading

“I don’t see that kind of blockade you’re describing.”

Rodríguez avoided responding to that part of the statements and focused his rebuttal on his favorite narrative: US sanctions. The foreign minister recommended that the German minister familiarize himself with the measures applied to companies and citizens of his country under the Helms-Burton Act. Passed in the United States in 1996, this legislation allows lawsuits to be filed against foreign companies that benefit from properties confiscated by the Cuban government after 1959.

The response to Wadephul comes on top of another protest issued a day earlier by Rodríguez against the Organization of American States. The foreign minister was reacting to a statement from the organization’s General Secretariat, which had expressed concern about the democracy situation in Cuba.

“The OAS General Secretariat claims to be concerned about the situation facing Cuba. However, it is scandalous that it makes not the slightest mention of the escalating US aggression against our country,” Rodríguez stated.

According to the minister, the organization should focus on the impact of US sanctions, which he described as a “ruthless and unjustified” policy and which he blamed for the deterioration of living conditions for Cubans.

Under pressure from the US, Cuban authorities approved a package of reforms aimed at easing some of the obstacles that Cubans often describe as the “internal blockade.”

Havana attributes almost all of the country’s economic problems to the US embargo and, more recently, to restrictions on oil supplies. However, the government avoids mentioning the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, the lack of structural reforms, the collapse of national production, and the economic decisions made by the regime itself.

Cuba has been experiencing a severe energy crisis for years, with blackouts that in many provinces can last for more than 20 hours. The situation has worsened due to fuel shortages and the deterioration of thermoelectric power plants, affected by decades of explotation, constant breakdowns, and lack of maintenance.

Since the beginning of this year, the Trump administration has intensified economic pressure on Havana, particularly targeting oil supplies and businesses linked to Cuban state entities. Under this pressure, authorities approved a package of reforms aimed at easing some of the restrictions that Cubans often describe as the “internal blockade.”

________________

Gaesa Transfers Its Assets in Mariel to Another State Company to Evade U.S. Sanctions

The military conglomerate has also divested itself of the joint venture that managed the Miramar Business Center in Havana.

The reorganization seeks to protect the commercial operations of the Port of Mariel from the sanctions imposed by the United States. / Canal Caribe

14ymedio, Madrid, June 28, 2026 — Terminal de Contenedores Mariel S.A. (TCM), owned by the military conglomerate Gaesa and operator of Cuba’s main commercial port, has transferred its assets to Coral Marítima S.A., a state company attached to the Maritime-Port Business Group (Gemar), which falls under the Ministry of Transportation. The move aims to remove a key piece of Cuba’s foreign trade infrastructure from the reach of U.S. sanctions.

The operation was announced through a letter sent on June 25 to the terminal’s clients, a copy of which was obtained by 14ymedio. In the communication, the company states that “Terminal de Contenedores Mariel S.A. sold its assets to the Cuban commercial company Coral Marítima S.A., which established the subsidiary Terminales Portuarias CORAL S.A. to take over the business previously conducted by TC Mariel,” and specifies that the operation is “in the final stages of the corresponding legal procedures.”

The company indicates that the new corporation will assume contractual relationships with clients and that they will be invited to sign new contracts, “ensuring commercial continuity.” It also seeks to reassure customers by stating that “the terminal will continue operating fully throughout this process” and that daily activities will proceed “with complete normality, guaranteeing the execution of the services normally provided.” continue reading

The reorganization is a response to efforts to protect the operations of the Port of Mariel and prevent international companies from being exposed to sanctions

Coral Marítima S.A. develops investments and operations related to maritime transport and port activities. Unlike Terminal de Contenedores Mariel S.A., the company is not part of Gaesa’s corporate network. The reorganization is specifically intended to protect the commercial operations of the Port of Mariel and prevent international companies operating there from being exposed to U.S. sanctions.

Gaesa also recently divested itself of the joint venture that managed the Miramar Business Center in Havana. British investment fund CEIBA Investments Limited announced on June 5 that it had acquired 100% control of Inmobiliaria Monte Barreto S.A., which operates the Miramar Trade Center. Until then, the real estate company had been jointly owned with Cimex S.A., Gaesa’s largest commercial and financial conglomerate. Negotiations for the transaction began in 2017 and were finalized in April 2026.

The decree signed by Trump on May 1 expanded U.S. sanctions on trade with Cuba to include “any foreign person” operating in the sectors of “energy, defense and related materials, metals and mining, financial services, or the security of the Cuban economy, or any other sector of the Cuban economy.”

The consequences of the sanctions began to be felt just weeks after they took effect. Two of the world’s largest shipping companies, the French CMA CGM and Germany’s Hapag-Lloyd, suspended their services to Cuba in May. The decision paralyzed a significant portion of international cargo traffic and forced many operators to review or cancel contracts. The latest transfer appears intended to facilitate the resumption of operations by removing the terminal from Gaesa’s corporate structure.

“The situation in Cuba continues to deteriorate while the Island’s corrupt, brutal, and anti-American communist regime continues to prioritize its absolute control over freedom”

The U.S. sanctions package against the economic pillars of the Cuban regime has also prompted the withdrawal of foreign companies such as the Canadian mining firm Sherritt International and the Australian company Antilles Gold. The tourism sector also suffered a major blow with the departure of foreign hotel chains associated with Gaviota—the tourism group controlled by Gaesa—including Blue Diamond Resorts, Iberostar, Meliá, and Archipelago International.

The measures also affected Financiera Cimex S.A. (Fincimex), another Gaesa-affiliated entity, with the suspension of Visa and Mastercard operations on the Island. On June 11, the inclusion of the state-owned oil company Cupet on the list of sanctioned entities maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) derailed plans by Florida-based Vanguard Energy, which had hoped to complete one of the largest private fuel sales to Cuba in recent years.

On June 23, OFAC added five more Cuban companies belonging to the military conglomerate to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List: Almacenes Universales S.A., Banco Financiero Internacional (BFI), Geominera S.A., Empresa Siderúrgica José Martí (Antillana de Acero), and Rafin S.A.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio then posted on X: “The situation in Cuba is devolving as the island’s corrupt, brutal and anti-American Communist regime continues to prioritize its own total control over the freedom, opportunity and basic wellbeing of the Cuban people.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Confusion in Cuba Over the Yo-Yo Effect in the Dollar Exchange Rate

The dollar went on a wild run in June, climbing from 600 to 700 pesos before falling back to 660 this Friday.

Long lines at the Banco Metropolitano branch on Galiano Street in Havana

14ymedio, Madrid, June 26, 2026 / The informal foreign currency market is going through turbulent times. Just three days ago, the dollar hit 700 Cuban pesos [CUP], crossing a new psychological threshold and triggering an immediate rise in prices of goods denominated in national currency. The celebrations among currency traders were short-lived: within hours, a sharp drop was recorded, followed by several more, bringing the exchange rate down to 660 CUP this Friday.

It is not the first time the currency market has acted like a yo-yo in response to the extreme volatility of supply and demand in an economy devastated by crisis and producing almost nothing. The energy crisis and the absence of any prospect of improvement have contributed to accelerating the fall of the national currency while simultaneously generating sharp recovery movements driven by cautious behavior on the part of currency buyers.

“A few days ago, when it was rising fast, I had a hard time making exchanges, because the MSMEs [Micro, Small, Medium Enterprises] had put buying on hold,” a Havana-based seller told 14ymedio. “Along with the dollar’s rise in recent days, food and other products also went up. Now I’m seeing they say it’s come down – I hope essential goods come down a bit too,” he added, trying to find a silver lining in his trade.

“The bad thing about this is that now the dollar falls and prices stay where they were when it was at 700.”

Most people are skeptical. “The bad thing about this is that now the dollar falls and prices stay where they were when it was at 700,” one social media user commented. Speculation is keeping the conversation very much alive. Some argue that the speed of the drop is due to the 176 economic reform measures announced by the Government. Others mock the very idea that the regime’s proposals could have any effect. “Nobody invests their money without guarantees. There can be 15,000 measures for change, but if you don’t change the law where it needs to be changed nobody comes. Nobody is going to put their money somewhere where continue reading

the judge is also a party to the case,” another user replied.

Just 24 days ago, the dollar reached what was then seen as an unthinkable record: 600 CUP. Looking back even further — though not that far — it is easy to confirm the relentless depreciation of the national currency. On May 2, one dollar was exchanging for 535 CUP.

US economist Steve Hanke, who frequently updates informal inflation rates and currency depreciation figures for various countries, placed the Cuban peso three days ago as the third most devalued currency in the world at present, having lost 45% of its value over the past year. Although the ranking is volatile — as recently as June 16, the CUP was in fourth place — a persistent presence in the top five has been maintained for some time. On that same day, the expert noted that inflation reached an annualized rate of 84.5%, the third highest rate of price increases in the world. “Socialism and Uncle Sam’s sanctions have proved to be a lethal cocktail,” the expert stated.

“Socialism and Uncle Sam’s sanctions have proved to be a lethal cocktail.”

The official market, meanwhile, continues to operate in its parallel world, today buying the dollar at 585 — a price at which few, if any, are willing to part with a currency that has become far too precious.

In December 2025, the Government launched a floating rate in an attempt to compete with the informal market rate, which had established itself through sheer economic reality among the population. After years of open war with El Toque for publishing an exchange rate far higher than the State’s, the official buying and selling price was set at 410 pesos to the dollar — in addition to the other existing rates of 24 pesos, for state enterprises, and 120, for entities capable of generating foreign currency. Beyond being an attempt to recapture the lost currency market, the regime was trying to contain inflation that continues to climb, albeit more slowly than in 2023 and 2024 — not because the economy has improved, but due to widespread poverty and the scarcity of goods at affordable prices.

At the time the initial rate was approved, the authorities noted that it was not going to please anyone, and so it proved — the US dollar was trading on the informal market for around 440 pesos, a far closer relationship than the current one. The regime’s efforts to contain monetary instability have proved futile, as economists had already warned. To achieve that, they noted, five factors difficult to bring about on the Island would need to be in place, starting with a better macroeconomic environment that today is much further away than it was just a year and a half ago.

Translated by GH.

______________________

The 176 Reforms Are Not ‘a Return to Capitalism,’ the Cuban Government Tells the Single Trade Union

The Cuban Workers’ Federation wants to bring private-sector workers into its ranks and is studying the draft of the new Labor Code, which the minister responsible described as “revolutionary, novel, and up to date”

The Government wants private actors to invest, generate wealth, and take on risks, but does not appear willing to legally limit the power that determines who may operate and under what conditions / Facebook / CTC

14ymedio, Havana, June 27, 2026 / “It is not a neoliberal package, nor is it a return to capitalism.” With that warning, Deputy Prime Minister – and great-grand-nephew of Fidel and Raul Castro – Oscar Perez-Oliva Fraga presented the 176 economic and social reforms to the 22nd Congress of the Cuban Workers’ Federation (CTC) this Friday. The CTC is the island’s only legal trade union and one of the Communist Party’s main transmission belts.

The Government needs to expand the space for private business, attract foreign capital, decentralize decision-making, and allow new financial operations, while insisting that none of this alters the political foundations of the system. According to Perez-Oliva Fraga, the reform does not require amending the Constitution either.

The official, who also heads the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment, stated that “if wealth is not generated, we cannot build the just society we want.” The statement amounts to an acknowledgment that the State no longer has sufficient resources to sustain its social policies, while avoiding any examination of the internal causes of the country’s productive collapse.

Among the standing priorities are control of the fiscal deficit, inflation, price regulation, and banking. The state plan projects a deficit of 74.5 billion pesos for 2026, of which 29.219 billion had already accumulated by the end of May. The Government has also authorized 91 foreign-currency self-financing schemes – a succession of exceptions that benefits companies able to generate hard currency without resolving the broader exchange-rate chaos. continue reading

The state plan projects a deficit of 74.5 billion pesos for 2026, of which 29.219 billion had already accumulated by the end of May. / Cubadebate

Some of the reforms will begin to be implemented within the next 30 days. The timetable includes measures covering economic actors, the Central State Administration, the energy sector, agriculture, prices, wages, trade, catering, services, and the partial dollarization of the economy.

The program also envisages expanding private-sector participation in tourism, foreign trade, and the real estate sector, as well as facilitating foreign investment by Cubans living outside the island. Cooperatives will be permitted to import and sell fuel for their operations, seek external financing, and open bank accounts abroad.

The fine print will depend, however, on numerous regulations still pending. The Government has created a legal working group headed by Esteban Lazo, President of the National Assembly, and a separate “political and communications support” group led by the Party. While the former will be tasked with accelerating the drafting of implementing provisions, the latter will manage the public explanation of measures that may prove unpopular.

Perez-Oliva summed up the philosophy of the process as “unified direction with decentralization of responsibilities.” Havana will retain political command and strategic decision-making, while businesses, municipalities, and workers will be required to generate income and be held accountable for results.

The union, which represents 2,069,285 members, also aims to extend its presence into private-sector companies.

“The implementation of these reforms will not achieve the results we aspire to if our workers are not actively involved,” President Miguel Diaz-Canel told the delegates. The CTC will be expected to transform the government’s program into a political movement, explain it in workplaces, and accompany processes of “labor reorientation” – a term that may encompass layoffs, reassignments, workforce reductions, and the closure of unproductive entities.

The union, which represents 2,069,285 members, also aims to extend its presence into private-sector companies. The unionization of their employees was among the issues debated, alongside wages, productivity, support for retirees, and protection of workers’ rights. No explanation has been offered as to what capacity the CTC would have to stand up to a state or private employer, but it seems clear that workers will not be able to organize outside the Party-controlled federation.

The energy crisis even left its mark on the organization of the congress itself. Of the 759 delegates, 561 participated via videoconference and only 198 gathered in person at the Havana Convention Center. Nearly three in four union members were unable to attend in person the gathering convened to debate the country’s economic recovery.

Delegates also reviewed the draft new Labor Code, which will be submitted to the National Assembly in July. The Minister of Labor and Social Security, Jesus Otamendiz Campos, described the proposal as “revolutionary, novel, and suited to the present day.”

Monreal noted that the verb “to permit” appears 29 times in the document.

Among its new provisions are the exceptional admission to employment of adolescents aged 15 to 18, multiple job-holding, so-called “combined work,” and the possibility of setting workdays of less than eight hours with proportional pay. The authorities did not specify what types of work minors would be permitted to carry out, nor what safeguards would prevent poverty and family breakdown from pushing young people prematurely into the labor market.

Cuban economist Pedro Monreal questioned whether the list can be regarded as a coherent reform at all. The 176 measures are a “monster,” or “perhaps more of a misshapen hybrid,” he wrote on X. In his view, the Government is attempting to incorporate elements of a market economy without recognizing private property as a right protected against state power.

Monreal noted that the verb “to permit” appears 29 times in the document. “‘To permit’ is a permissive stance of power,” he observed, because it preserves the notion that private activity is a concession that the authorities can modify or withdraw.

“Nowhere in the 176 measures is it possible to identify any substantive recognition of the right to private property,” he added. Nor do any clear guarantees appear regarding commercial arbitration, claims, compensation, or dispute resolution.

The Government wants private actors to invest, generate wealth, and take on risks, but does not appear willing to legally limit the power that determines who may operate and under what conditions. The CTC will now be charged with bringing those entrepreneurs and workers into its ranks, while ensuring that the economic opening is not mistaken for a return to capitalism.

Translated by GH.

______________________

The Castroist “Reforms”: The Potemkin Façade

A free society does not emerge from a totalitarian system simply because private companies are allowed to exist.

The Cuban tragedy lies in the fact that prosperity has been subordinated to a system that denies freedom and accountability. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Julio Shiling, Miami, June 27, 2026 / The Cuban dictatorship’s announcement of 176 economic and social “transformation” proposals should not be mistaken for a historic opening or a genuine abandonment of the failed system that has governed the island for more than six decades. Behind the language of modernization, private enterprise, market mechanisms, and economic renewal lies a carefully calculated strategy of political survival. The Castro-Communist leadership is attempting to construct a Potemkin façade: the appearance of change without the substance of transformation.

The regime understands that the economic model it invented in the 1990s is collapsing. Cuba is facing a profound national crisis marked by prolonged blackouts, inflation, shortages, declining production, financial instability, institutional decay, and an increasing wave of public protests and social unrest. Yet rather than acknowledge that these failures are the inevitable consequences of totalitarian rule and centralized control, Havana has chosen a different narrative: Cuba’s problem, it claims, is primarily economic.

This is the first and most immediate purpose of the announced reforms. The communist government seeks to persuade the United States and the international community that the Cuban crisis is the result of external pressure rather than internal political failure. The regime seeks to shift the debate away from dictatorship, repression, and institutional destruction and toward sanctions, the Helms-Burton Act, and Executive Order 14404. In doing so, it hopes to transform a political legitimacy crisis into a technical economic dispute.

The goal is not to dismantle the power structure but to preserve it under new economic arrangements.

This strategy is not accidental. It is designed to buy time. By presenting itself as a government capable of adaptation and reform, Havana seeks to reduce international pressure, influence continue reading

foreign policymakers, and avoid consequences that could threaten its survival. The objective is not necessarily to resolve Cuba’s crisis but to manage it long enough for political circumstances to become more favorable. The Cuban people, however, do not suffer because there are too few market mechanisms. They suffer because the tyrannical state eliminated independent institutions, destroyed economic freedom, concentrated power, criminalized dissent, and subordinated the entire national economy to political control.

The second purpose of these reforms is to replace the economic structure that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The system developed during the Special Period was never a transition toward capitalism. It was a survival strategy built upon military control, privileged access, and selective foreign investment. Out of that environment emerged a model of state capitalism in which politically connected actors controlled the most profitable sectors of the economy. The rise of GAESA and similar structures created a military-commercial apparatus that dominated tourism, logistics, finance, commerce, and strategic industries. This system allowed the ruling elite to accumulate wealth while the broader population endured scarcity and dependency. It was not free enterprise. Instead, it was a system of controlled privilege.

The current proposals must therefore be understood in this context. They are not simply an attempt to liberalize the economy. They represent an effort to replace an increasingly exposed and internationally criticized model with a more flexible and acceptable one. The goal is not to dismantle the power structure but to preserve it under new economic arrangements. The language of reform serves as a mechanism of adaptation, allowing the regime to respond to its crisis without surrendering the privileges and networks of control that sustain it. Rather than producing a genuinely free economy, the proposals seek to modernize the instruments through which political power exercises economic influence and expands the kleptocratic apparatus.

Rather than producing a genuinely free economy, the proposals seek to modernize the instruments through which political power exercises economic influence

This explains the third objective of the reforms: to move beyond the GAESA brand while protecting the interests that GAESA represents. The name itself has become associated internationally with the fusion of military authority, political power, and commercial control. It has become a symbol of how the Cuban communist system operates and a mechanism through which foreign companies can be evaluated regarding their relationship with the regime. By introducing joint-stock companies, private entities, new investment structures, and expanded market mechanisms, the government can attempt to obscure these relationships. A new economic architecture allows the same elite networks to continue operating with less visibility and fewer avenues for accountability. It is a barefaced attempt to circumvent the sanctions.

The danger is that the international community, particularly the United States, may confuse economic adaptation with genuine political transformation. History demonstrates that totalitarian systems can introduce markets without embracing liberty. China’s model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” Vietnam’s Đổi Mới reforms, and Russia’s post-Soviet oligarchic system all demonstrate that economic liberalization can coexist with political repression. These examples prove that markets alone do not create freedom. A government can permit private businesses while maintaining political monopoly. It can encourage investment while denying citizens basic rights. It can improve material conditions for certain sectors while preserving a system of privilege based on proximity to power.

A free society does not emerge from a totalitarian system simply because private companies are permitted to exist

If the United States accepts a Cuban version of this model as the solution to the island’s crisis, the result would be deeply damaging. It would mean accepting, not the liberation of Cuba, but the permanent adaptation of a Leninist state into a more efficient totalitarian structure. It would represent an accommodation far more consequential than previous Cold War compromises such as the infamous Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact because it would legitimize the continuation of the political system itself.

The final and most important point is that economics cannot be separated from politics and morality. The economic model of a nation must reflect the values of its political and ethical order. A free society does not emerge from a totalitarian system simply because private companies are permitted to exist. Economic freedom requires institutions that protect property, enforce contracts, limit government power, guarantee transparency, and place rulers under the same law as citizens. A dictatorship cannot manufacture liberty through economic regulation. It cannot edify democracy through administrative reform. It cannot erase decades of political repression by changing the structure of business ownership.

The Cuban tragedy is not merely that the island lacks prosperity. It is that prosperity has been subordinated to a system that denies freedom and accountability. The solution is not a redesigned totalitarianism with market features. The solution is a democratic transformation in which economic freedom becomes the consequence of political liberty rather than a substitute for it. The announced reforms should therefore be judged not by the promises they make, but by the system they preserve. They are not the dismantling of Castro-Communism. They are its attempt to survive by changing its appearance.

Editor’s Note: This text was originally published on the Patria de Martí website.

______________________

‘If We Lose Total Control of Power, They Will Annihilate Us,’ Is How the Cuban Regime Thinks

A former Obama advisor, Ricardo Zúñiga, believes that frustration with Havana’s intransigence will “probably” lead the US to a military operation.

File photo taken on May 22, 2026, of Alejandro Castro Espín, son of Raúl Castro, in Havana. / EFE / Ernesto Mastrascusa

14ymedio, Havana, June 25, 2026 / For the Cuban leadership, relinquishing power doesn’t mean losing an election or giving up certain privileges, but rather risking everything. This is how Ricardo Zúñiga, one of the main negotiators of the thaw promoted by Barack Obama, interprets the regime’s resistance to undertaking reforms and reaching an agreement with the United States.

The members of the small ruling group see things this way: “Either they stay in power or they’re likely to be annihilated.” They’re not going to risk losing everything, “but they also don’t have any internal solutions to improve the country’s situation,” the former diplomat stated in an interview with journalist Gloria Ordaz, broadcast Wednesday on Telemundo 51.

Zúñiga, who served as Obama’s senior advisor for the Western Hemisphere, paints a grim picture if the economic pressure exerted by the Trump administration does not lead to concessions from Havana. In his view, American frustration could ultimately trigger military action against the island.

The former official presented this possibility as a personal assessment, not as information about a plan already approved by Washington. He also questioned whether an air operation—since he ruled out a ground invasion—could bring about a political transition, especially because the Cuban system does not depend exclusively on a single leader nor does it exhibit the internal continue reading

divisions seen in other regimes.

They are not going to risk losing everything, “but they also don’t have internal solutions to improve the country’s situation.”

The former advisor believes Trump already has sufficient leverage after tightening sanctions against military companies and the Castro family’s associates. “The Trump administration already has the lever. They already have the means to persuade,” he noted. In his opinion, the next step should be to use that power to achieve concrete changes, instead of continuing to punish an already severely damaged economy.

Zúñiga has firsthand knowledge of the Castro regime’s negotiating style. During the secret contacts that led to the announcement of the restoration of diplomatic relations in December 2014, his main interlocutor was Alejandro Castro Espín, son of Raúl Castro and a high-ranking official in the Ministry of the Interior, now sanctioned by Washington.

“He was a very orthodox person, with an education from Fidel Castro’s government and with a worldview that we never shared and that we were never going to share,” he recalled.

Despite these differences, the two delegations were able to make progress because they were acting under the direct instructions of Obama and Raúl Castro and had clearly defined operational objectives. Those talks led to the reopening of embassies and a broad rapprochement process that Havana failed to use to undertake profound economic or political reforms.

“We are talking about a moment where the situation in Cuba is considerably worse than in 2016,” Zúñiga warned. “They already made the wrong decisions after the opening initiated by President Obama. Now they have to improve conditions for the population with measures they previously resisted and which today are probably not even sufficient.”

Zúñiga’s diagnosis, however, questions both the effectiveness of a military intervention and the possibility of repeating the ‘thaw’ negotiation model.

Regarding Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, alias ” El Cangrejo” (The Crab), Zúñiga asserts that his appearances in spaces linked to the talks should not be interpreted as proof that he is Raúl Castro’s political heir. “He doesn’t rule Cuba,” stated the former advisor, for whom real power is divided among “a consortium” made up of leaders of the Armed Forces—including the military conglomerate GAESA—the Ministry of the Interior, the Communist Party, and “some important bureaucrats in the economic sector.” Therefore, he rules out the possibility of any eventual agreement being negotiated with a single interlocutor.

Referring to Josefina Vidal—Cuba’s Deputy Foreign Minister and one of the main negotiators of the thaw in relations —Zúñiga presents her as a “very capable” official deeply identified with the regime’s official position. He describes her as a firm and experienced negotiator who knows the United States well and can navigate complex conversations effectively, although he emphasizes that “she represents a viewpoint that is no longer appropriate for Cuba.”

Zúñiga’s assessment, however, questions both the effectiveness of a military intervention and the possibility of repeating the negotiation model of the thaw. Unlike then, Washington now faces an exhausted Cuban economy, an entrenched political leadership, and a power structure that perceives any opening as an existential threat. Nor does he believe that the current leadership of the regime is capable of implementing successful reforms.

“I fear there will be frustration in the talks and they may decide to attack (…), but that wouldn’t bring about a change in the situation. I think it’s likely that’s how it will end, although I don’t think that would be the end; it will be much slower, because Cuba is not Venezuela.”

______________________

Seven Arrested, Including Four Minors, After Protests Against Blackouts in Santiago de Cuba

Cubalex warns of escalating repression in the lead-up to the anniversary of the 11 July 2021 protests, ’11J’

Fire at the Olo Pantoja Museum in Contramaestre, which intensified the police pursuit in Santiago de Cuba. / Social media

14ymedio, Madrid, June 26, 2026 / The NGO Cubalex confirmed this Thursday the arrest of at least seven people in the municipality of Contramaestre, four of them minors, after the incidents that occurred on June 21 around the Orlando “Olo” Pantoja Tamayo Memorial House, known as the “Maffo Museum”.

According to a statement released by the organization, while the building burned, neighbors gathered nearby demanded “electricity and freedom,” amid growing discontent over blackouts, food shortages, and the severity of the crisis facing the population. Following the fire, police and state security forces launched a large-scale operation in the La Cuba neighborhood and other areas of Maffo, where arrests began.

Cubalex has managed to confirm the identities of four of those arrested: José Ángel Borrero Zorrilla, 17; José Jorge Menéndez Vázquez, also 17; Luis Alberto Leyva, around 20 years old; and Yordi Daniel Gómez Aguilar, 21. The organization warns that the number is an undercount and does not rule out the possibility of more arrests. continue reading

According to information gathered and disseminated by the NGO, several of these people were transferred to the Versalles Criminal Operations and Instruction Center in Santiago de Cuba, where they remain incommunicado and without official information about their legal status.

In recent weeks, several young people have been subjected to citations, threats, temporary arrests, and other acts of intimidation.

The organization also warned that the arrests are occurring amidst a climate of increasing persecution in Santiago de Cuba. In recent weeks, several young people have been subjected to citations, threats, temporary arrests, and other acts of intimidation—a trend that Cubalex links to the approaching fifth anniversary of the 11 July 2021 protests.

Cubalex emphasized the situation of detained minors. It noted that in Cuba, criminal responsibility begins at age 16, allowing adolescents to be tried in ordinary courts, subjected to initial interrogations without the mandatory presence of lawyers or family members, and sent to pretrial detention—a practice criticized by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child.

Reports of increased repression in Santiago de Cuba had already begun circulating days earlier. The leader of the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), José Daniel Ferrer, reported on his social media accounts on June 22 that among those arrested was 16-year-old Cristian Fernández Sarmientos, who was being held at the Versalles detention center.

Ferrer also identified other detainees: Adrián Planché Hierrezuelo, Yodelkis Jay Ramírez, and Alexander Castañeda Alarcón, an X-ray technician at the Southern Children’s Hospital in Santiago de Cuba. The opposition leader, in exile since October 2025, added that the arrests continue and the police are targeting those “suspected of protesting against the blackouts.” He also added that the families of other detainees are refusing to provide information for fear of reprisals.

The arrests come after several consecutive nights of pot-banging protests in various neighborhoods of Santiago de Cuba. Residents of Micro 7, Altamira, Veguita de Galo, Mármol, Antonio Maceo, Chicharrones, and other areas have taken to the streets to demand the restoration of electricity service, in some cases after receiving only two hours of power per day.

The escalating repression coincides with the approach of the fifth anniversary of 11J, a date that keeps State Security on high alert.

Cubalex maintains that, in addition to physical repression, authorities have intensified communication restrictions and internet outages coinciding with citizen demonstrations. This repressive escalation coincides with the approach of the fifth anniversary of July 11—the largest wave of anti-government protests in Cuba since 1959—a date that keeps State Security on high alert, as evidenced by the recent enforced disappearance and death threats against opposition leader Manuel Cuesta Morúa for expressing his support for the protests.

The Cuban Observatory for Freedom of Expression (ICLEP) also denounced the repression of a protest that took place on June 19 in the Barbosa neighborhood of the Playa municipality in Havana, where residents took to the streets after more than 30 hours without electricity. According to the organization, riot police dispersed the demonstration using force. Regarding this protest, Cubalex confirmed the arrests of Yoan Arévalo Álvarez, Yosvan Arévalo Álvarez, Dayron Chamizo, and Héctor Ramón Aroche Olivero. The whereabouts of the four remain unconfirmed.

ICLEP maintains that the operation involved the deployment of several trucks with members of the Rapid Response Brigades and that the total number of detainees could exceed 16, a figure not yet independently verified. The organization also reported that one of those detained, Arévalo Álvarez, sustained significant injuries following the police intervention, and his current health status and whether he has received medical attention or legal representation are unknown.

______________________

Mourning for the Death of Ramiro Valdés Delayed San Juan Celebrations in Matanzas by One Day

Residents took part in a ritual that perfectly reflects the desire of all Cubans: to burn the old and make way for the new.

The effigy burned beside the river, following tradition. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Matanzas, Pablo Padilla Cruz, June 26, 2026 — The official mourning period decreed following the death of General Ramiro Valdés postponed the traditional burning of the San Juan effigy in the Pueblo Nuevo neighborhood of Matanzas. The population, exhausted by the lack of electricity and water, the heat, and the mosquitoes, had eagerly awaited a few hours of escape from their grim daily reality and the chance to celebrate one of the festivities that best represents the longing of all Cubans: to burn the old and make way for the new.

“I’ve lived here for 65 years, and the burning of the effigy is a ritual that had disappeared but was revived years ago,” says Ania, a resident of the Callejón de las Tradiciones. “I’m the first to say these aren’t times for celebration, but these little moments are what make everyone equal: the person who has food and the one who doesn’t, the person who has solar panels to watch television during blackouts and the one who doesn’t. People deserve to forget how hard life is,” she argues.

The debate is out in the streets. Not everyone feels like celebrating, and many believe this is more a time for anger than rituals, but Ania sees no contradiction. “Still, one day people may decide to demand what they deserve, but just because they dance a little, even if afterward they don’t have water in their homes, you can’t force them to do what others think is right,” she insists.

Callejón de las Tradiciones, where the San Juan Day procession passes. / 14ymedio

“There isn’t much time for celebrating,” laments Yudania, another resident passing through the Alley, where the procession begins. The San Juan celebration originates in European pagan rites marking the summer solstice, which welcomed the warmth and, with it, good harvests after the cold winter. Fire was used for two reasons: it was believed to strengthen the sun and to purify, driving away evil spirits.

Today, Yudania needs fire for something else. “While some people enjoy themselves, I had to go get charcoal, and now I have to light it to cook. That doesn’t mean I’m against the tradition. It’s just that every year we ask for bad things to leave, but everything gets worse,” she laments. “Fortunately continue reading

, we have our health, and that’s important. Everything else has to improve someday,” she concludes as she heads home carrying a bag of charcoal in her hands.

In Matanzas, where the pagan celebration later Christianized and blended with local culture, the ritual consists of making an effigy symbolizing all the bad things accumulated during the year. At nightfall, residents carry it in procession to the riverbank and set it ablaze in an act of collective purification: a bonfire in which everyday frustrations are burned with the hope that the flames will clear the way for renewal, health, and prosperity.

Along Calzada de Tirry, toward the riverbanks, walks Antonio, an elderly teacher who has spent more than twenty years waiting for a Cuban perestroika and has grown tired of celebrating. “I don’t go many places anymore, not even to the nearby danzón dances, much less to burn an effigy,” he comments.

The debate over whether it was time for celebration was out in the streets. / 14ymedio

“I have nothing against the celebration, but I became disillusioned with the divine a long time ago, although I’m not going to judge anyone. Yesterday I was one of those people dancing to the beat of the conga procession, and although I knew what should be asked of the effigy, I let it pass, just like my generation and the one that came after it. Now it’s up to you to decide what to do: stay beside the conga or bring it to a halt,” he says with an obvious double meaning.

On the night of the 24th, because of the general, the effigy was burned while residents recited:

Fire of San Juan, drive away all evil.

Fire of San Juan, take away all negativity.

Fire of San Juan, bring health and prosperity.

So it is and so it shall be.

Ania smiles when asked what she wishes for.

“I’m sure it’s the same thing you wish for, but instead of saying it aloud, let’s ask San Juan for it. Next year we’ll see whether he listened to us.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Havana: When the Water Comes, the Waste Begins

After several days without service, some Havana households leave their faucets running, while neighboring districts depend on sporadic water trucks

In a street in Guanabacoa, Havana, several children were spraying each other with jets of water this Wednesday. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, Dario Hernandez, June 25, 2026 / In a street in Guanabacoa, Havana, several children were spraying each other with jets of water this Wednesday and jumping barefoot on the wet pavement. For a few minutes, the return of service looked like a neighborhood party in the middle of June’s suffocating heat. When the water comes back* after so many days of absence, everything changes pace. Buckets, hoses, and basins appear. Floors are scrubbed, clothes are washed if a few hours of electricity happen to coincide, and families take the chance to bathe, fill their tanks, and take care in one go of everything that has piled up during the domestic drought.

“The waste that happens in those hours is like making up for all the days you had nothing,” a resident of the area tells 14ymedio. He understands his neighbors’ euphoria. With the blackouts, the high temperatures, and the long supply interruptions, he admits, “all you want is to stand under the tap and not move.” Yet he confirms that some people leave their faucets running even after filling their tanks or finishing their household chores.

When the water comes back after so many days of absence, everything changes pace. / 14ymedio

“I have some neighbors who just let it run for no reason. They’re not bathing, not cleaning, not watering the plants. They just leave it open for the pleasure of watching it flow,” he laments. In Centro Habana, Regla, and parts of Guanabacoa itself, many families depend on water tanker trucks or go several days without receiving a single drop. This week, residents of Regla took to the streets to protest the water shortage while demanding the arrival of a tanker. continue reading

The problem is not simply one of individual waste. On top of the power outages that shut down pumping stations, there are breakdowns and the deterioration of a water network incapable of holding the water it carries. “Every block has at least two or three leaks,” the resident says.

In earlier times, another neighbor recalls, inspectors would fine anyone who let water run needlessly.

The authorities call on people to save water, but the state’s own pipes pour out for hours quantities of water far greater than any household could waste. In earlier times, another neighbor recalls, inspectors would fine anyone who let water run needlessly. Now, she says, “there’s no oversight anymore.” The absence of enforcement combines with the erosion of a civic culture that can barely survive when every family has to fend for itself when it comes to food, electricity, garbage, and water supply.

The woman insists she is not trying to directly blame those who make the most of the brief water supply. “With this heat and no power, when the water comes it’s only natural to enjoy it,” she repeats. What she is denouncing is the loss of empathy toward those living a few blocks away who have been waiting for days.

“It hurts, because there are people who only see water when a truck comes,” she sums up. For her, the images speak to something that goes far beyond a leak or an open faucet. “In Havana, nobody lives in a community anymore. It’s every man for himself.”

*Go to the link to watch a movie, which refused to load here.

Translated by GH.

______________________

Cuba Needs a Real Capitalist ‘Shock’

It is a fantasy to believe that the new measures pave the way for the Vietnamese or Chinese model

The conditions for this do not exist without changes to the political regime, the author argues / sohu

14ymedio, Luis R. Luis, Boston, June 25, 2026 / The 176 measures recently announced by the Cuban Government are intended to bring about a liberalization of the economy through the supposed privatization of companies, openness to investment and foreign trade, energy and agricultural reforms, and the opening up of banking and currency exchange agencies, among many other elements.

However, this is far from being a genuine liberalization of the economy, since no credible framework of conditions is being established to allow markets to function properly or to guarantee legitimate property rights – central elements of a free-enterprise system. The measures do not create the conditions for the investment needed to rebuild and return the economy to healthy functioning. Nor is it clear that the necessary fiscal and monetary adjustments will take place to ensure financial stability and control of the inflation that is decimating families’ purchasing power.

The primary condition required by a free-market economy is the subsidiary role of the State in the productive apparatus and in investment decisions. The new measures do not establish the mechanisms for this to happen. Transparent mechanisms for the assignment of state-owned enterprises that guarantee their autonomy are missing. Genuine financial decentralization is missing. A sound private banking sector requires diversified shareholders who are independent of the State.

In the Chinese case, the size of its market and the very high savings rate were highly favorable conditions for the economy’s takeoff. Vietnamese agriculture had propitious conditions for its reform

Talk has it that the new measures pave the way for the Vietnamese or Chinese model. That is a fantasy. Cuba does not have the structural characteristics of those two countries at the outset of their major reforms. In the Chinese case, the size of its market and the very high savings rate were highly favorable conditions for the economy’s takeoff. Vietnamese agriculture had propitious conditions for its reform and contributed greatly to the country’s initial boom. Cuba appears to be aligning itself more with the new Venezuelan model, in which the State retains control of the productive apparatus without genuine reforms, but with a partial continue reading

opening to foreign capital.

An ideal productive shift toward the free market requires consolidating the subsidiary role of the State, as has occurred in many Eastern European countries. This is not visible in Cuba. It is clear that changes implying a new political regime are needed. There are various modalities for regime change, whether through internal dynamics, system collapse, or popular pressure. This is not predictable.

External pressures such as US sanctions and the energy blockade alter the internal dynamic, but it is not possible to discern the trajectory ahead in terms of political conditions. Again, the example of Venezuela inspires limited confidence that external pressure will provide the crucial impetus for the implementation of economic and political reforms. Perhaps the US Administration will learn a great deal from the recent Venezuelan experience.

External pressures such as US sanctions and the energy blockade alter the internal dynamic, but it is not possible to discern the trajectory ahead in terms of political conditions

Real reforms require an overarching design. The most important point is the role of the State in enabling reforms to be carried out. The realities of various elements of influence within society alter the possibilities for reform and, thereafter, their sequencing. It is possible and healthy to design some optimal sequence of reform, but the most important thing is to create the conditions for its success. Above all, opportunities for opening should not be discarded even when their sequencing is not optimal. The moment of food price reforms is generally not a good one for families. Private funds such as remittances, as well as public funds, will be needed to maintain basic consumption levels on the Island.

In sum, Cuba needs a genuine capitalist shock. What is underway with the 176 measures is the appearance of a major move toward the free market. The conditions for this do not exist without changes to the political regime that guarantee the limited function of the State. This capitalist shock can happen. Perhaps Cuba will achieve it.

———-

Editorial note: The author has served as Chief Economist at the OAS and Director for Latin America at the Institute of International Finance in Washington.

Translated by GH.

______________________

Miami Doctors and Business Leaders Prepare a Healthcare Plan for a Cuba in Transition

The 911 Cuba initiative brings together several exile organizations, but it still lacks public funding, government agreements, and a known operational structure.

Cuban healthcare professionals gathered at La Colonia Medical Center in Hialeah to evaluate the plan. / El Nuevo Herald / SSF

14ymedio, Havana, June 26, 2026 — A network of doctors, humanitarian organizations, and healthcare-sector business leaders in Miami has begun preparing a plan to address the healthcare emergency and rebuild Cuban hospitals in the event of political change on the Island. The initiative, called 911 Cuba, was presented on June 17 at La Colonia Medical Center in Hialeah, according to a report published Thursday by El Nuevo Herald.

The project is led by Solidaridad Sin Fronteras and Cruz Verde Internacional, with support from La Colonia Medical Center and Miami Medical Team Foundation. Its organizers envision an initial phase of free humanitarian assistance, followed by hospital rehabilitation and the creation of a model that combines private healthcare with subsidized services for vulnerable populations.

Its organizers envision an initial phase of free humanitarian assistance, followed by hospital rehabilitation and the creation of a model that combines private healthcare with subsidized services for vulnerable populations

“In Cuba, not only are the hospitals in ruins, but primary care is completely at zero,” Julio César Alfonso, president of Solidaridad Sin Fronteras, told the Miami newspaper. The physician stated that the organization includes 58,000 healthcare professionals among its members and believes that between 15,000 and 20,000 could participate as volunteers in an emergency continue reading

situation.

Solidaridad Sin Fronteras is a nonprofit organization founded in Florida in 2004. Its regular activities have focused on training, certification, and workforce reintegration of healthcare professionals who have arrived in the United States, as well as aid campaigns and advocacy for Cuban doctors who left official overseas missions in third countries.

Cruz Verde would be responsible for the logistics of medicines and first-aid supplies. Taimy Alfonso told El Nuevo Herald that the organization has spent years sending healthcare products to the Island, some donated by U.S. pharmaceutical companies, but that its network has lost capacity because volunteers have been targeted by State Security. The organization describes itself as a humanitarian entity founded by medical professionals in 2013 and dedicated to providing healthcare assistance in vulnerable communities.

The most tangible business support comes from La Colonia Medical Center, directed by Cuban physician Jorge Acevedo. The company operates 12 healthcare centers in Miami-Dade and Broward counties, from Pompano Beach to Homestead, and provides primary care, diagnostic services, pharmacy services, medical specialties, and patient transportation. La Colonia therefore has clinics, healthcare personnel, and experience managing medical services.

The company operates 12 healthcare centers in Miami-Dade and Broward counties, from Pompano Beach to Homestead, and provides primary care, diagnostic services, pharmacy services, medical specialties, and patient transportation

Miami Medical Team Foundation, led by orthopedic surgeon Manuel Alzugaray, has also joined the effort. The organization, registered in Florida since 1989, has participated for decades in medical and humanitarian missions throughout Latin America and other countries affected by disasters or crises.

Alfonso suggested that a potential emergency operation could include field hospitals and U.S. hospital ships such as the USNSComfort, on which he worked after the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

“These ships have burn units and facilities for patients with respiratory conditions, as well as ambulances and helicopters,” he explained.

The second phase of the project calls for evaluating healthcare facilities, rebuilding hospitals, and establishing a private healthcare system for those who can afford it, alongside care subsidized by a future government for vulnerable sectors of the population.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Teenager Jonathan Muir Released After More Than Three Months in an Adult Prison in Cuba

International pressure increased amid the deterioration of his health and the risks to his safety.

The teenager slept on mattresses infested with bedbugs, suffered from hypoglycemia, and did not receive adequate medical care. / Facebook

14ymedio, Havana, June 24, 2026 — Cuban teenager Jonathan David Muir Burgos was released from prison this Wednesday after spending more than three months deprived of his liberty for participating in the protests last March in Morón, Ciego de Ávila. CubaNet confirmed his release through a phone conversation with the young man himself, who turned 17 while incarcerated at the Canaleta provincial prison.

In a brief phone conversation with journalist Camila Acosta, Jonathan confirmed that he was already out of prison. 14ymedio attempted to contact his father, evangelical pastor Elier Muir Ávila, but his phone remained switched off or out of service range. It is common for State Security to try to prevent released political prisoners and their relatives from speaking with the independent press, denouncing the conditions of their imprisonment, or publishing their testimonies on social media.

So far, the Cuban authorities have not announced the release or specified under what precautionary measure Muir Burgos was freed. It is also unknown whether the Prosecutor’s Office has withdrawn the sabotage charge against him or whether the criminal proceedings will continue while he remains out of prison.

The young man was arrested on March 16, three days after the March 13 protest in Morón, which was sparked by prolonged blackouts, food shortages, and deteriorating living conditions. Jonathan appeared, accompanied by his father, evangelical pastor Elier Muir Ávila, in response to a State Security summons. Both were detained, but the pastor was continue reading

released a few hours later.

The release comes after an intense international campaign on behalf of the teenager, whose health and safety had generated concern

The teenager, who was then 16 years old, was later transferred to Canaleta, an adult prison in Ciego de Ávila, where he remained in pretrial detention. He was being prosecuted for sabotage, a criminal offense that can carry lengthy prison sentences.

The release comes after an intense international campaign in favor of the teenager, whose health and safety had raised concerns among family members, human rights organizations, and foreign officials. Amnesty International called for his immediate release in May and denounced the fact that he was being held with adults.

The organization recalled that the deprivation of liberty of minors should be used only as a last resort and for the shortest possible period. It also demanded that, while he remained detained, Jonathan be protected from violence, receive medical care, and have regular access to his family and a lawyer of his choice.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted precautionary measures in favor of the teenager on April 24, considering that his life, personal integrity, and health were at risk of suffering irreparable harm while in the custody of the Cuban State.

Jonathan was not the only minor detained after the protests in Morón

The family repeatedly reported that Jonathan suffered from dermatological and immunological problems, as well as episodes of weakness that required treatment. After a visit in May, his father said he found him very weak, without the necessary medication, and deeply affected by confinement.

Prisoners Defenders later reported that Muir Burgos slept on mattresses infested with bedbugs, suffered from hypoglycemia, and did not receive adequate medical care. The organization also stated that the minor had been assaulted and harassed inside the prison.

Jonathan turned 17 on May 28 at Canaleta. In the weeks before his release, his case received renewed attention from the United States. The U.S. Embassy in Havana noted on June 16 that the young man had been imprisoned for three months, while Cuban-American Congressman Mario Díaz-Balart demanded his immediate release this Wednesday.

Jonathan was not the only minor detained after the protests in Morón. The imprisonment at Canaleta of 16-year-old Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez, also accused of sabotage, has likewise been documented. Human rights organizations maintain that both youths were prosecuted without the special safeguards required for minors. Muir Burgos’s release brings an end, for now, to his stay in an adult prison, but it does not remove the uncertainty surrounding his legal future.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Havana Chronicles: Under the Shadow of a Giant Syringe, Cuba Remains the Land of Waiting

Mosquitoes continue to bite near the monument to the scientist who fought yellow fever

From the sidewalk, I look at the obelisk again and think of Finlay, the scientist who dedicated his life to fighting mosquito-borne diseases. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Yoani Sánchez, Havana, June 25, 2026 / Some monuments take on a different meaning over time. This Wednesday, I was walking near the Marianao Obelisk, that stone needle erected in homage to Dr. Carlos J. Finlay, and I couldn’t help but notice the irony. The structure stands elegantly, with a shape reminiscent of a giant syringe, but in its shadow, in Cuba in 2026, obtaining a simple hypodermic needle or an antibiotic often depends on having relatives abroad or venturing into the informal market.

It was mid-morning when I arrived at that large area where several healthcare facilities are concentrated: the Pando Ferrer Hospital, which many still call the League Against Blindness; a polyclinic; and the popular Workers’ Maternity Hospital. A little further on is also Ciudad Libertad, formerly Camp Columbia. It’s a fragment of the city where the constant flow of patients, their companions, and healthcare workers puts to the test transportation networks that long ago ceased to function normally.

I see a woman with a bandaged eye approach an old Chevrolet that has just stopped to pick up passengers. To take her to Infanta and San Lázaro, in Central Havana, the driver tells her the trip costs 1,000 pesos. The price is enough to dissuade her. She takes a step back and returns to the sidewalk. A few meters away, a young pregnant woman tries to convince the driver of a beat-up Ford to take her to the bridge over the Almendares River. “I can’t give you more than 300,” she explains. The man shakes his head and drives off.

The thieves also took “the yellow outfit the boy was going to wear when he left the hospital, in honor of the Virgin of Charity”

The true protagonists of the avenue are the electric tricycles. They’re so overloaded they can barely move. Their narrow seats carry recently discharged patients, nurses finishing a 24-hour shift, relatives laden with bags of toiletries, doctors trying to make their shift change on time, and elderly people returning home after appointments they waited months for. Some are so tired or so old they can barely manage the high step to get on the tricycle.

A few surviving classic cars and a handful of motorcycles are still circulate. The rest of the traffic seems to have vanished along with the fuel. The nearby bus stop has the aspect of a medical observation room. Exhausted faces, improvised fans fashioned from X-rays, and conversations that inevitably lead to blackouts, gasoline, or hospitals. A woman recounts how her cell phone was stolen while she was caring for her newborn daughter at the maternity ward. “I went to the bathroom, and when I came back continue reading

, it was gone.” The thieves also took “the yellow outfit the baby was going to wear when she left the hospital, in honor of Our Lady of Charity.”

The line outside the nearby Banco Metropolitano is so long it spills over the sidewalk and almost reaches the roundabout at 31st and 100th streets. Customers crowd together under the flowering flamboyant trees while they wait for the electricity to return so the branch can resume paying out pensions and salaries that will lose much of their value before the week ends. Some elderly people have brought folding chairs; others, bottles of water; one even a book. Waiting has become the activity that occupies most of our time.

A friend says she wakes up every morning gazing at the horizon, convinced that one day she’ll see a huge silhouette approaching from the sea. A neighbor on Tulip Street says he’s been waiting for three years for one of his two sons to send him a package with frozen chicken, oil, and those soda crackers he sees advertised online but hasn’t tasted in decades. My old history teacher lives anxiously awaiting her email, hoping one day she’ll get the news that her visa has been approved, allowing her to travel to one of those countries that serve as the first step on the journey south, the same route thousands of Cubans continue to travel every month.

It’s not just the mosquitoes. The relentless heat during the blackouts bites; the endless lines bite; the prices bite, the uncertainty bites, the shortages bite, and that unmoving clock that seems to have settled over the country bites.

We have become a country of waiting, a nation of suspended rhythm. Some wait for the electricity to return; others, for water to flow through the pipes; many await the bus that never arrives, the medicine that never reaches the pharmacy, the call from abroad, the permit, the package, the money, the news that will change the course of their lives. We wait so much that the verb has ceased to be an action and has become a place we inhabit.

From the sidewalk, I look anew at the obelisk and think of Finlay, the scientist who dedicated his life to fighting mosquito-borne diseases. As I walk past the monument, I feel a couple of bites on my ankles. I hop around to shoo the insects away, hit my legs with my closed umbrella, and scold myself for forgetting to put on insect repellent before leaving home.

A nurse witnesses my outlandish dance and laughs. “Mosquitoes don’t just bite anymore, they sting now,” she jokes.

She’s right. It’s not just the mosquitoes. The relentless heat during the blackouts bites; the endless lines bite; the prices bite, the uncertainty bite, the shortages bite, and that unmoving clock that seems to have settled over the country bites. Reality as a whole has become an insatiable mouth that tears away small pieces of us every day. We are fragments of people trying to get somewhere while we long for the vaccine against so much national paralysis to finally appear.

Previous Havana Chronicles:

The Time For Reforms Has Passed

Surrounded by Garbage, Miramar Is No Longer the Glamorous Neighborhood It Once Was

A Circus Facing Off Against Power, and a City Growing Increasingly Lonely

Chronicle of a Monday That Feels Like Wednesday

“We Used to Complain About the ‘CUC’, But Now We Miss It”

The Roar of Despair of a Cuban Woman Returning to Her Country After Many Years

The Tulipán Market Closed: “They’ve Given the Order To Go to the March for Raúl”

Along Carlos III Street and towards Ethiopia

Sleeping Is Also a Privilege in Havana

A Desperate Plea in the Middle of the Dark Havana Night: ‘Light!’

The Refuse of Disenchantment

Under a Picture-Postcard Blue Sky, the Country is Crumbling

Fatigue Barely Allows One to Enjoy the ‘Lights On’ in Havana

Dollars, the Classic Card, and a Havana Without Tourists

A Journey Through the Lost Names of Havana

The Shipwreck of a Ship Called “Cuba”

Havana Seen From ‘The Control Tower’

In Havana, the Only Ones Who Move Are the Mosquitoes

Reina, the Stately Street Where Garbage is Sold

Searching for Light Through the Deserted Streets of Havana

The Death Throes of ‘Granma’, the Mouthpiece of a Regime Cornered by Crisis

The Anxiety of the Disconnected Cuban

One Mella, Three Mellas, Life in Cuba Is Measured in Thousands of Pesos

It Is Forbidden To Leave Home in Cuba Today Because It Is a “Counter-Revolutionary Day”

Vedado, the Heart of Havana’s Nightlife, Is Now Converted Into a Desert

Havana, in Critical Condition

_________________

‘Trump Does Not Rule Cuba,’ Says Díaz-Canel in an Interview with a Dominican Media Outlet

The president admits that U.S. pressure contributed to “accelerating” the reforms aimed at “perfecting socialist construction, not restoring capitalism.”

Díaz-Canel was interviewed by journalist Roberto Cavada, a Cuban exile in the Dominican Republic, where he is a leading television news anchor. / Presidency of Cuba

14ymedio, Madrid, June 25, 2026 — Miguel Díaz-Canel rejected in an interview broadcast this Wednesday the idea that the economic reforms he announced last week were adopted because of U.S. pressure. “Trump does not rule Cuba, nor does the U.S. government rule Cuba. Cuba is sovereign,” he told Cuban journalist Roberto Cavada, anchor of Telenoticias in the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, the president admitted that the current “situation of maximum pressure” also “leads us to accelerate a bit, to decide more quickly, to have to do something.”

The centerpiece of the interview was those reforms, whose legitimacy Díaz-Canel spent a long introduction defending. The president cited Fidel Castro’s dollarization measures in the 1990s and Raúl Castro’s 2011 economic guidelines as previous turning points in the Cuban economy. “Things were approved that today seem very normal to us, but that under those conditions had a tremendous impact,” he said. Having established that foundation, he justified the current shift. “These are times of transformation.”

The president maintained, lest there be any doubt, that the inspiration has been China, though adapted to the particular circumstances created by the sanctions on Cuba. He also noted that economists have been consulted and emphasized that the process remains open to new contributions, in addition to the foundations that still need to be established. This became evident when Cavada asked him what guarantees exist for potential investors. Díaz-Canel could only offer generalities and ultimately admitted that they have yet to be defined. “It is one of the areas where I believe we need to make more progress,” he said. When pressed again about the legal framework, he stated that one exists but that “it needs to be expanded in terms of concessions,” referring primarily to usufruct rights.

The president argued for going even further in providing flexibility and incentives for investment by Cubans living abroad—Cavada himself emigrated from Ciego de Ávila to Havana and later to the Dominican Republic—and left behind a statement that calls into question the policies of his predecessors, especially continue reading

the most recent one. “If you support foreign investment, it makes no sense not to support investment by your own nationals in any of its forms.”

“If you support foreign investment, it makes no sense not to support investment by your own nationals in any of its forms”

Díaz-Canel also raised a fundamental issue. The approved measures may run into limitations imposed by the United States, a point also highlighted by independent economist Pavel Vidal in his latest analysis for the Observatory of Currencies and Finance (OMFi). “The second executive order of May 1 restricts companies from trading with Cuba or doing business with Cuba. And that part is never discussed,” he pointed out.

Cavada further pursued the issue of Washington and reminded the president that only days ago Donald Trump’s vice president, JD Vance, indicated that there were conversations with the Cuban regime. “If they make smart decisions, we’ll have a much better relationship,” Vance said. Díaz-Canel cast doubt on the possibility of improved understanding because, in his view, “they will never understand what we do nor accept what we do because what they aspire to is a different Cuba. They aspire to a Cuba that is completely dependent on the U.S. and completely privatized.”

Nevertheless, he again acknowledged that conversations are taking place and that a communication channel remains open, without providing new details, but he insisted that there can be no pressure and that if Cuba yielded to it, the demands would never end. “There is room for U.S. entities and entrepreneurs to invest. There is every possibility of working together on issues of common interest in terms of cooperation,” he said.

Díaz-Canel did not appear to view an invasion as the most likely scenario, but he admitted it was entirely possible and cited two recent precedents, close both in time and political distance: Venezuela, where the United States interrupted talks in an attempt to capture Nicolás Maduro, and Iran, where negotiations were halted by a bombing campaign. “There is a whole combination of media warfare and psychological warfare aimed at intimidating us,” he argued, adding that Cuba is preparing not to attack, he emphasized, but to defend itself. He also left a message: his rhetoric is not threatening but intended “to ensure we are respected and that they understand the cost of a military adventure.”

Another large portion of the interview focused on the daily drama of the energy crisis. Díaz-Canel tried to dispel what he called the “myth” of subsidies. “They have said that we refused to pay for fuel and that we went around begging for fuel. That is not true,” he began, explaining the barter mechanisms Cuba used with the Soviet Union—sugar in exchange for fuel—and with Venezuela, through medical services. Later, because of sanctions on Caracas, Cuba had to “go out into the international market.”

“And nobody gave us fuel for free,” he repeated three times. Now, he complained, those who used to sell fuel to Cuba are prohibited from doing so. He added that there have even been ships headed to Cuba that were prevented from arriving.

Even so, he defended his administration’s work on renewable energy. “If that were not in place, we would be living from one blackout to another because the system would be completely unstable, and during daylight hours it would not be capable of supplying electricity to even 20% of the population,” he argued. This despite the fact that solar parks remain underutilized, largely because the thermoelectric plants are so fragile that photovoltaic output must be restricted to avoid destabilizing the grid, as Cuban authorities themselves have explained.

Particularly striking was his reference to withholding data on domestic oil production, framing it almost as a matter of national security. “I’m not going to give figures because I don’t want anyone calculating our needs or determining how far we can or cannot go. But it is crude that is being produced. It has always been said that it is heavy crude with a high sulfur content, but during the Special Period our thermoelectric plants were adapted to process it,” he said when asked about production levels.

Díaz-Canel admitted that the companies working to drill wells and increase crude oil and natural gas production have had to leave because of sanctions, referring to the Canadian company Sherritt and the Australian company Melbana

He also insisted that scientific advances have made it possible to refine Cuba’s extra-heavy crude and that it is being used, although production volumes remain limited. Regarding fuel imported by private actors, he said that no more than 40,000 tons have entered through that route, equivalent to “one ship out of the many ships Cuba needs in a single month.”

Another reference to the U.S. arose in the context of humanitarian aid. Here the president did provide some concrete figures, stating that of the initial $3 million announced by Marco Rubio after Hurricane Melissa and distributed through Caritas, between $2.6 million and $2.8 million has been spent so far, reaching about 8,000 families. “Then they announced an additional $6 million in aid that is only now beginning to be implemented,” he added.

As for the subsequent $100 million package, Díaz-Canel questioned the State Department’s plan to begin distributing it after September. “Why? We don’t know,” he said. He also noted that food and medicine would not be included. “Then what is the aid for? We’ll have to see, because they haven’t defined it, they haven’t clearly said what it’s for,” he protested, while also insisting that the cooperation is appreciated and accepted, though he still described it as “hypocritical.”

“It means nothing compared to the damage the embargo has caused Cuba,” he reproached.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________