Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

The Lamentable Legacy of Castro-Chavismo

The Cuban tyrant had attempted, through violence and systematic manipulation of reality, to impose governments in his own image and likeness in the hemisphere

A coalition in which their respective hatreds of democracy, freedom, and human dignity merged. / La Pupila Insomne

14ymedio, Pedro Corzo, Miami, August 9, 2026 / I don’t know if we are near the end of the regimes inspired by Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, namely Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Bolivia, not forgetting Ecuador, which was able to escape thanks to the arrogance and conceit of Rafael Correa, one of the most conspicuous clowns to have misgoverned a Latin American republic, only comparable to the coca grower Evo Morales, although very far from the lethal Daniel Ortega.

However, all the subjects mentioned are characterized by a populism that bordered on the absurd, a profound and expanded corruption, plus an ineptitude to govern their respective countries coupled with the ability to proclaim a nationalist vision, while transferring the sovereignty of the country to the most promising ally.

The Castro-Chavista proposal arose from the alliance between Castro and Chávez. Previously, the Cuban tyrant had attempted, through violence and systematic manipulation of reality, to impose governments in his own image in the hemisphere, a project that only yielded failures, given that, although Daniel Ortega came to power through terror, he had the support of some neighboring countries and others not so geographically close, such as the Venezuela of Carlos Andrés Pérez.

The Castro brothers provided their subversive, repressive, and reality-distorting capabilities, while Chávez and Nicolás Maduro contributed all of Venezuela’s wealth.

Castro, with thirty uninterrupted years in power, witnessed the arrival of Hugo Chávez to the highest office in Venezuela, a fateful coexistence that resulted, whether by prior agreement or understanding on the fly, in a coalition in which their respective hatreds against democracy, freedom and respect for human dignity were fused together with the resentful envy they professed towards the United States, forging the indecent proposal that today we call Castro-Chavismo, not without having proclaimed that they were in favor of 21st Century Socialism.

The new alliance, it must be acknowledged, was successful. The Castro brothers provided their subversive, repressive, and distorting capabilities, while Chávez and Nicolás Maduro contributed all of Venezuela’s wealth, pocketed by Chávez and Maduro who like good sharks spread the wealth to their offspring, subsidized Castro’s totalitarian regime, and bought political support with oil diplomacy that bankrupted the Venezuelan treasury.

This program quickly gained numerous supporters, among whom stood out the corrupt and deceitful Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, the most aberrant hypocrite among all Latin American politicians, and the no less nefarious Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, although to honor the truth these scoundrels never lacked allies, so much so that there was a movement called the “pink tide,” which was always ready to continue reading

support their proposals, among those who remember the former president of the Dominican Republic, Leonel Fernández.

Rafael Correa left power in 2017 and the country still suffers from his legacy

Shedding the legacy of Castro-Chavismo is not easy because it leaves deep and painful scars. Rafael Correa left power in 2017, and the country still suffers from his legacy. The clientele he cultivated during his presidency remains anxious for his return.

The example of Bolivia is even more challenging. Evo Morales attempted to perpetuate himself in power indefinitely by cloaking himself in a false legitimacy. However, the fraud was uncovered, and he had to resign, causing a complex period of ungovernability in the country until one of his most prized cronies, Luis Arce Catacora, came to power and, like a voracious piranha, sank his sharp teeth into Morales, his former protector.

However, the Andean nation remains steeped in Castro-Chavismo. Current President Rodrigo Paz Pereira has not been able to steer the country toward genuine democracy, and numerous problems continue to threaten freedom and the path to a free society.

The land of Rubén Darío suffers under a two-man dictatorship that overshadows the Somoza governments.

Venezuela is even darker. The dictator is imprisoned, but the dictatorship continues. There are numerous political prisoners, exiles have no guarantees for their return, and elections that guarantee everyone’s rights are nowhere in sight.

Cuba and Nicaragua leave us almost speechless. The land of Rubén Darío suffers under a two-man dictatorship that overshadows even the Somoza regime. Their abuses are innumerable: political prisoners, mass exiles, crimes, and the ultimatum that there will be no elections in a country where the Ortega-Murillo regime’s elections have always been fraudulent.

Finally, Cuba is ruled by totalitarianism, under an ineptitude taken to the extreme and a people who, it seems, are on the verge of annihilation by their own rulers.

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“All of Cuba is a Wolf’s Den”

A couple from Guanabacoa recounts the brutal assault by two hooded men who stole their motorcycle during a blackout.

The combination of power outages, deserted streets, and poor lighting has increased nighttime insecurity. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Dario Hernandez, Havana, August 9, 2026 / “We left because we had no other option.” That’s how a couple from Guanabacoa explains the decision that ended up costing them the electric scooter they had bought with years of savings and the support of a relative who had emigrated. She needed internet access to work as a ‘community manager’; he, a barber, used the trip to shower at a house in Regla where there was running water. They were returning home when two hooded men intercepted them and stole the electric scooter at knifepoint.

The assault occurred shortly after 11 p.m., as they were returning along a poorly lit avenue near the entrance to Guanabacoa. “They appeared from behind on a motorcycle. The passenger was carrying a knife. They slashed at them and kicked them to the ground,” a person close to the victims told 14ymedio.

When they both fell to the pavement, the aggressors seized the moped. “They already had the moped, but they still stabbed the boy in the arm. The wound was four fingers deep,” the continue reading

testimony adds.

“There’s not a soul in the street. People are waiting for the electricity or water to come back on, or they’re simply locked inside their homes.” / 14ymedio

The couple filed a police report, but say they haven’t heard anything since. “They haven’t called us, and we haven’t seen any activity,” they lamented.

The moped, bought less than a year ago for about $1,300, is now worth nearly $2,300 on the black market. “That was practically all our savings,” they explained. And, in addition, they lost their main work tool. He used it several times a week to travel from Guanabacoa to a barbershop in El Vedado and to make deliveries for coffee shops; she depended on the moped to reach places where she could still access the internet during the frequent power outages.

Now, they calculate, just the one-way trip by private transport to El Vedado will cost around 1,000 pesos.

“They were renters, they don’t have children because they were saving to emigrate and they also planned to sell their moped when that time came. In a matter of minutes they lost years of sacrifice,” the relative summarizes.

Beyond the robbery, the incident reflects a reality that many Havana residents have been describing for months. The combination of power outages, deserted streets, and poor lighting has increased insecurity at night.

“You go out at ten o’clock at night and it feels like three in the morning,” the same source says. “There’s not a soul in the street. People are waiting for the electricity or water to come back on, or they’re simply locked inside their homes. All of Cuba is like a wolf’s den.”

“After 10 p.m., run every red light,” a stranger advised a motorcyclist while riding through Havana. / 14ymedio

The victims say that, while filing the report, they learned of another case that had occurred a few days earlier. “They told us that a tricycle had been stolen using the same modus operandi in the Puente del Ahorcado area of Regla,” they stated. They also believe that “the police know these robberies are occuring, but the impression we have is that they’re doing nothing.”

Other residents consulted by this newspaper mentioned areas they consider particularly dangerous at night, including Primelles and Vía Blanca, 23rd and Paseo, and Lacret, in the Diez de Octubre neighborhood. Their accounts coincide in describing thefts or attempted thefts of mopeds and tricycles, although there are no official statistics to quantify the problem.

“After ten o’clock at night, run every red light,” a stranger advised a motorcyclist as he rode through Havana. “If you stop, you become very vulnerable.”

On social media during recent months reports of stolen motorcycles and electric tricycles have multipled, along with posts from family members and neighbors trying to locate stolen vehicles or identify the perpetrators. While some of these cases have been solved by the police, many victims maintain they never received any updates on the progress of the investigations.

Without public figures from the Ministry of the Interior on these types of crimes, it is impossible to determine whether robberies have increased. What does seem to be growing is the fear of those who depend on a motorcycle to work, get around, or simply survive in a city where the lack of electricity, water, and transportation forces more and more people to travel through dark and nearly empty streets at night.

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The Sun is Also Quoted in Dollars in Cuba

On a street in Sancti Spíritus, solar panels at $320 each put a price on the dream of escaping blackouts.

How much does it cost to escape, even partially, from blackouts? The sign reads: ‘Panels for Sale’ / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Mercedes García, Sancti Spiritus, August 9, 2026 / On a street in Sancti Spíritus a solar panel is on display. It is not behind a shop window, nor under the lights of a specialized store. It rests directly on the sidewalk, leaning against the facade of a house, with a piece of cardboard in the center that announces, in improvised calligraphy: “Panels for sale.”

In a country where every day people have to calculate the cost of rice, eggs, oil, transportation, and even phone credit, Cubans now have another figure to add to their mental calculators. How much does it cost to escape, even partially, the blackouts? The answer starts, in the case of Sancti Spíritus, with a price that this Saturday reached $320, but it can continue to rise with batteries, inverters, controllers, cables, and other components needed to convert a rectangle of sunlight into a few hours of domestic autonomy.

“Soon they’ll be more expensive than batteries,” a neighbor complains as she walks past the panel. She doesn’t linger. She glances, asks a question, and continues on her way with that familiar expression of someone who has just confirmed that something they need is far beyond their budget.

The energy crisis has even changed the landscape of Cuban cities.

Others slow down. They examine the dark panels the way people used to look at an electric motorcycle or an air conditioner behind a shop window. Each person seems to place their own wish list before them: keeping the refrigerator running so the food doesn’t spoil, recharging a fan to relieve continue reading

the sweltering nights, turning on some lights, or making sure their cell phone still works the next morning.

The energy crisis has even changed the landscape of Cuban cities. Electric generators, so-called power stations, batteries, and solar panels have gone from being specialized equipment to becoming part of the domestic vocabulary. Watts, amperes, and storage capacity are discussed with the same naturalness as discussions about pounds of rice or shared taxis. Necessity has resulted in a crash course in electricity nationwide.

But learning the theory doesn’t mean being able to afford the practics. The $320 per panel represents a huge fortune for someone who earns their salary in Cuban pesos. And they don’t even solve the problem on their own: they’re just one piece of the puzzle that allows for some independence from an increasingly unstable national energy grid.

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Does Communist Cuba Deserve a Priority 1 Intelligence Threat Classification?

The CubanAmerican Voice, Julio M. Shiling / The elevation of communist Cuba to “Priority 1” status within the National Intelligence Priority Framework places the island on the same plane as China, Iran, and Russia. Some will scoff at the decision. They will measure Cuba by the size of its navy, the range of its missiles, or the volume of its GDP, and declare the ranking absurd. That metric is the wrong one. National security priorities are not a ranking of conventional military mass. They are a ranking of the threats that can most effectively wound the United States—through subversion, intelligence penetration, ideological warfare, and the cultivation of domestic radicalism. By those measures, Castro- Communism has earned its place.

Cuba does not confront America with carrier groups. It confronts America with a doctrine refined over six decades: the deliberate export of Marxist revolution and the systematic penetration of the institutions that shape American political, academic, economic, and cultural life. The State Department’s recent report, “Cuba: The Capital of 21st Century Communism,” maps this strategy with clinical precision. Havana long ago abandoned any pretense of merely defending an island fortress. It positioned itself as the operational and ideological hub of a global project aimed at the internal erosion of Western societies. That project did not end with the Soviet collapse. It adapted, mutated, and found continue reading

new hosts among the far left in the United States itself. It should not be forgotten that the Cuban communist revolution geometrically fortified what we today know as the “New Left” and cultural socialist precepts.

From the 1960s onward, Cuban intelligence cultivated symbiotic relationships with domestic communist and terrorist networks inside the United States. These were not romantic gestures of solidarity. They were operational partnerships. Training, funding channels, propaganda coordination, and intelligence sharing created durable pipelines between Havana and American radicals. The result is not ancient history. It is a living architecture of influence that continues to shape narratives, recruit cadres, and erode institutional trust. When a foreign power maintains decades-long access to the domestic far left—supplying it with ideological oxygen, tactical experience, and a sense of international legitimacy—that power becomes a force multiplier for America’s adversaries. China, Russia, and Iran understand this. They cultivate Cuba precisely because Havana offers something they cannot easily manufacture: intimate, long-cultivated access to the American radical ecosystem.

Communist Cuba’s value to those powers is not limited to rhetoric. The island hosts sophisticated signals-intelligence facilities operated by Russia and China. These installations sit ninety miles from Florida and are designed to intercept sensitive American communications. Hosting such capabilities is not neutrality. It is active participation in the intelligence war against the United States. Add to this Cuba’s alignment with Iran, its support for transnational terrorist groups, and its role as a logistical and ideological node, and the picture clarifies. Havana, as a matter of fact, functions as a force-projection platform for America’s principal enemies, one that operates below the threshold of conventional conflict yet above the threshold of mere nuisance.

The sophistication of Cuban intelligence itself has been underestimated for too long. The services provided by the Castro regime have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to run agents inside American institutions, to harvest sensitive information, and to shape cultural and academic discourse. Their tradecraft is patient, culturally fluent, and ideologically disciplined. They punch far above the island’s economic weight because they are not constrained by the need to produce consumer goods or maintain a modern industrial base. Their product is influence and information. In an era when information and internal cohesion are decisive, that product is strategically lethal.

The Trump administration’s decision to raise communist Cuba to Priority 1 and the subsequent creation of a dedicated CIA task force simply align resources with reality. The unit—staffed with case officers, analysts, cyber specialists, and covert influence experts—exists to generate the intelligence and operational options necessary to exploit fractures inside the Cuban dictatorial elite and to pressure for the collapse of the kleptocratic Marxist dictatorship. Increased intelligence assets on and around the island are not theater. They are the minimum required to understand a regime that has spent 67 years perfecting the arts of secrecy, denial, and asymmetric warfare. Without current, granular knowledge of Castro-Communist intentions, capabilities, and internal dynamics, any policy—diplomatic pressure, economic isolation, or contingency planning—operates in the dark.

Critics will claim this is overreach, a revival of Cold War paranoia, or a distraction from “real” threats. The opposite is true. Ignoring a dedicated revolutionary state that systematically cultivates domestic subversion, hosts adversary intelligence bases, and serves as a transmission belt for anti-American ideology is the true strategic malpractice. Priority rankings exist to force the intelligence community to allocate scarce resources against the most consequential dangers. Cuba’s military is modest. Its capacity to damage the American body politic from within is not.

Communist Cuba has never been a status-quo power. It has been a permanent revolutionary project directed against the United States and the civilization that produced it. Elevating it to Priority 1 is not an exaggeration. It is overdue recognition that the threat Havana represents is measured not in divisions and warheads, but in the depth of its penetration, the durability of its ideological networks, and the strategic value it provides to America’s most determined enemies. The classification is correct. The only remaining question is whether the resources and resolve that accompany it will be sustained long enough to make the regime confront the consequences of its own history.

Author Julio M. Shiling

Petro Returns from Cuba with an Openly Coup-Mongering Speech

The outgoing president refuses to recognize Abelardo de la Espriella’s victory, encourages “resistance,” and erodes the legitimacy of the presidential handover

Colombia’s outgoing president, Gustavo Petro, in a file photograph. / EFE/Carlos Ortega

14ymedio, Clara Riveros, Bogota, August 7, 2026 / Gustavo Petro closed out his international agenda as president and head of state of Colombia with a visit to Cuba. That trip brought his total to 85 international trips. He was in Cuba for barely 48 hours – a trip with no apparent relevance for Colombia, but one that will hold some significance for the Colombian politician given the regard he holds for the Castro regime.

This Friday, August 7, President Abelardo de la Espriella takes office, with a foreign-policy program markedly different from the one carried out by the Historic Pact, Petro’s political movement, which prioritized the Colombian president’s ideological affinities, even at the expense of the country’s traditional diplomatic interests and guidelines. Among the new government’s foreign-policy announcements, it stands out that it will break relations with the dictatorships of Cuba and Nicaragua and will repair the damage Petro inflicted on the bilateral relationship with Israel.

In the twilight of his term, the outgoing president remains convinced that he plays a leadership role in what progressivism calls the Global South. Hence his call to fraternize with the Havana regime when he urges that “humanity show solidarity with Cuba.” Petro’s has not been a call for solidarity with the Cuban people, who suffer poverty and repression and who are demanding change, openness, rights, and freedoms – the kind of call Yotuel made on Saturday night in Bogota during the 7th Concert of Hope. Hollman Morris must have taken little pleasure in that dose of reality from the Orishas vocalist. Morris is the widely questioned manager of the Public Media System, which has been turned into a propaganda apparatus for the Historic Pact and, further still, into a conveyor belt for the populisms and autocracies aligned with it.

The soon-to-be former president of Colombia is addressing his base with the aim of keeping the spark alive and generating chaos, “civil disobedience,” and insurrection once he leaves power

Petro also said from Havana that he had asked the Trump Administration to “respect the diversity of peoples” and that “by coming here I’m getting myself into trouble,” a reference to his inclusion, since 2025, on the list of those sanctioned by the United States. Since returning from Cuba, the Colombian president has kept up a tone even more inflammatory and continue reading

authoritarian than the one he had struck in recent weeks and throughout the election process.

Petro never acknowledged Abelardo de la Espriella’s victory and continues to declare his own candidate, Ivan Cepeda, the winner – a man who has been unable to break from his boss and who has named him leader of the opposition. Petro is stirring up delirious accusations of fraud, all of them theories and speculation with no foundation whatsoever.

The soon-to-be former president of Colombia is addressing his base with the aim of keeping the spark alive and generating chaos, “civil disobedience,” and insurrection once he leaves power. On Tuesday night, Petro openly refused to recognize the president-elect while addressing his supporters in a public square. It can be inferred from his words that he is urging them to form a kind of Chavista-style militia – that is, paramilitary groups – to defend his legacy and to refuse to recognize the new government.

The president’s words have been rejected by public opinion, though not by his fellow party members and militant intellectuals. “How long will the effects of that fraud last? They’re already saying, in Marco Rubio’s offices, ‘Abelardo the brief’ – they already sense that he won’t even last the full four-year term, that the Colombian people will force him to resign,” Petro declared. His crowd then chanted in response: “Cepeda for president. Resistance.”

“Petro is a coup-monger. He’s no longer just talking about fraud and refusing to recognize the president-elect – now he’s openly calling for him to be removed from power before his term even ends”

Santiago Velez, a columnist for El Espectador, noted on X this week that despite governing badly, lying, and improvising, Petro “completely dominates the public conversation” – proof of this being that nine of the ten most-liked tweets in Colombia over the past 30 days are his. Following the president’s inflammatory remarks, Velez stated in a couple of tweets that “Petro is a coup-monger. He’s no longer just talking about fraud and refusing to recognize the president-elect – now he’s openly calling for him to be removed from power before his term even ends. He is practically calling for a coup d’etat. That cannot be normalized.”

In another tweet he expanded on his observation: “Petro calling for the formation of paramilitary groups and calling for the president-elect to be brought down doesn’t surprise me. After all, he has always been an insurgent who took up arms against the State and never stopped holding legality and institutions in contempt. What is truly terrifying, to paraphrase Martin Luther King, is not the shouting of bad people, but the silence of good ones: the silence of so many important, educated, influential, and supposedly institutional people who today prefer to say nothing. In two days Petro has called for the formation of paramilitary groups and for a coup d’etat. And I am not exaggerating,” the lawyer stated.

This state of tension and uncertainty toward which the outgoing president is pushing the country – unprecedented until now in the recent history of Colombian politics – no longer merely reflects a bad loser and an antidemocratic politician, but confirms the enormous damage Gustavo Petro has caused to the dignity of the office he holds, in addition to using that position to damage and erode trust in institutions, as well as the forms, customs, and practices governing the transfer of political power in Colombia – practices that, until his arrival at the Casa de Narino, had been respected regardless of the sitting president’s political and ideological leanings.

The widespread suspicion is that Petro does not act this way because he genuinely believes all the outlandish claims he makes, without evidence or any real basis, but because he needs to distract from and downplay the multiple corruption scandals that have erupted around him in recent months, adding to those that have been piling up since he took office.

Translated by GH.

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New US Sanctions Against Those Who ‘Facilitate Arms Shipments to the Cuban Regime’

The State Department penalizes five entities and eight senior Cuban officials, including the Minister of the Armed Forces, Álvaro López Miera

The Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, Álvaro López Miera, in a file photograph. Luong Thai Linh / EFE/EPA/Luong Thai Linh

14ymedio, Madrid, August 7, 2026 / Two weeks later, following the last wave, the United States has once again announced sanctions against five state entities and eight senior Cuban officials, including the Minister of the Armed Forces, Álvaro López Miera. Those affected are accused of facilitating military cooperation with adversaries of Washington and the acquisition of weaponry destined for the island’s Army.

“Today, the Trump Administration is taking new measures to protect our national security by imposing sanctions on entities and individuals that facilitate Havana’s military relations and arms shipments to the Cuban regime,” said Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a statement this Thursday.

These new sanctions are another turn of the screw in the US government’s pressure to force economic and political change on the island, and are directed against the company Tecnoimport, the commercial company Duna S.A., the Military Industry Union (UIM), and the military-industrial company Yuri Gagarin. Also included on this list is the Cuban Export-Import Company for Specialized Services, Articles and Technical Products (Tecnotex), a subsidiary of the military-business conglomerate Gaesa, previously sanctioned and a primary US target.

Among the officials are, in addition to the Minister of the Cuban Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff, Roberto Legrá Sotolongo, the head of Foreign Relations for that ministry, José Antonio Remón Rodríguez, and its economic director, Oscar Enrique Biosca Gallego. Also included are the Cuban military attachés in Russia, Mónica Milián Gómez, and in China, Waldo Pérez Cortés, as well as the directors general of the UIM, Roberto Jesús Viciana Mousset, and of Tecnoimport, Heriberto Sánchez Alleyne.

Also included are the Cuban military attachés in Russia, Mónica Milián Gómez, and in China, Waldo Pérez Cortés, as well as the directors general of the UIM, Roberto Jesús Viciana Mousset, and of Tecnoimport, Heriberto Sánchez Alleyne

Rubio insisted that “the Cuban communist regime is a state sponsor of terrorism that uses its military and intelligence apparatus to spy on the United States,” in addition to “serving as a platform” for adversaries of Washington “such as continue reading

Russia, China, and Iran to carry out operations against the country.”

The designation comes in the same week that several US media outlets have reported an increase in CIA operations on the island, presumably aimed at updating their information on the capabilities of the Cuban Army, as well as creating friction within the leadership to force a revolt of pragmatists against hardliners.

The Secretary of State added that “Cuba’s military and intelligence institutions are also the main instruments of internal repression and hubs of kleptocracy, primarily through Gaesa.”

The measure places the assets and property of the entities and individuals mentioned under US jurisdiction and prohibits transactions between US persons or institutions and them. Minister López Miera had already been sanctioned since 2021 – for the repression of July 11 – under the Magnitsky Act, which allows Washington to freeze financial assets and ban travel for those who violate human rights in any country in the world. Now, the sanctions fall under Trump’s order establishing the secondary route, also affecting those who facilitate transactions with those sanctioned.

Washington’s siege against the island’s political and economic leadership has increased to unprecedented levels to directly strike even the family circle of the regime’s leaders. Among the most prominent names to be added to this Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) are Miguel Díaz-Canel, his wife, Lis Cuesta Pedraza, and his stepson, Manuel Anido Cuesta.

Also included are most of the visible – and not so visible – figures of the Castro clan, beginning with former president Raúl himself, and continuing with all his children, Mariela, Alejandro, Déborah, and Nilsa Castro Espín, as well as his grandson Raúl Alejandro Castro Calis, specifically designated, in contrast to the exceptional situation of Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, El Cangrejo, who is spared despite being a visible figure – or, precisely, because of it, since he is an interlocutor with Washington -. The rest of the grandchildren simply inherit their parents’ visa restrictions.

In addition to individuals, the battery of sanctions focuses on the Gaesa military conglomerate and any other entity serving as a front for it. Also targeted are several ministries, especially the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and other support bodies, such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) and the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP).

In Havana, which has already accumulated many “black Thursdays,” they did not even bother to react this time

In Havana, which has already accumulated many “black Thursdays,” they did not even bother to react this time. Although the activity of its senior officials was significant on social media yesterday, there were no statements on the matter, and they focused instead on highlighting the condemnation of the previous US sanctions issued by several UN rapporteurs.

The rapporteurs – independent experts appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Council for specific issues – stated that the measures adopted by the United States are “an attempt to alter the constitutional order of a sovereign state through threats and coercion” and urged the Security Council and the General Assembly to “urgently address these threats as a matter of international peace and security.”

Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez thanked the experts for their statement, as did his deputy, Carlos Fernández de Cossío, but they remain silent on the extension of the sanctions. Which will probably not be the last.

Translated by GH

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A New Beating of a Minor Imprisoned for the Protests in Morón, Cuba, is Denounced

Cubalex reports a “visible deterioration” in the physical and mental health of Lizandra Góngora, the political prisoner from the 11J attacks.

Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez was arrested for the protests that took place in Morón, Ciego de Ávila, last March / Facebook

14ymedio, Havana, August 4, 2026 / Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez, 16, the only minor still detained for the protests that took place in Morón, Ciego de Ávila, in March, was allegedly beaten by prison officials at the Canaleta prison after refusing to eat the prison food in protest against its poor quality. The complaint was filed this Monday by the legal advice center Cubalex, which indicated that the minor’s family does not know his current state of health following the assault.

The organization also stated that the teenager is at serious “physical and psychological” risk because he was transferred to a corridor of the prison where adult prisoners are held, “as retaliation for an escape attempt.”

Furthermore, the minor is facing health problems during his time in prison. In June, he was diagnosed with hepatitis, “and instead of transferring him to a hospital for specialized medical care, prison authorities kept him in the prison infirmary.”

This is not the first time Crespo Álvarez has suffered abuse in prison. Last May, the same organization reported that even the food his family had brought him to jail was taken away. When the teenager complained about the disappearance of his belongings, he was beaten. Afterward, he was threatened with being sent to solitary confinement. continue reading

When the teenager complained about the disappearance of his belongings, the response he received was a beating.

Christian was one of the minors arrested after the protest on March 13 in Morón, a demonstration caused by blackouts, shortages and accumulated frustration in a city that ended up becoming the scene of a new repressive operation.

Along with Crespo Álvarez, Jonathan David Muir Burgos, also 16, was arrested and released on June 24, as well as Kevin Samuel Echeverría Rodríguez and Yohasnel Estrada Rodríguez, both 17. All were trapped in the penal system after participating in the protests: first the arrests, then the incommunicado detention and, later, the charges.

According to Cubalex’s verification, at least seven teenagers under the age of 18 are currently deprived of their liberty in Cuba for acts related to protests or criminal proceedings in a context of repression for political reasons.

In this regard, the most recent report from Prisoners Defenders documented the imprisonment of 10 new political prisoners “very young, of whom six are minors (15 to 17 years of age) and four are between 19 and 21 years old.”

“These cases demonstrate the continued criminalization of children and adolescents, as well as a pattern of serious violations of due process.”

According to Cubalex, “these cases demonstrate the continued criminalization of children and adolescents, as well as a pattern of serious violations of due process, restrictions on contact with their families, lack of information about their situation, and detention conditions incompatible with the State’s international obligations regarding children’s rights.”

The legal aid center also reported on Monday the “visible deterioration of the physical and mental health” of Lizandra Góngora Espinosa, a political prisoner from the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021. According to the report, she was able to reunite with her children last Sunday for the first time in seven months during a supervised family visit at the Los Colonos women’s prison on the Isle of Youth.

According to information received by Cubalex, during a visit, her family members observed that she is suffering from “mental health problems, blemishes on her face, and evident physical deterioration.” They also confirmed that prison authorities are keeping the opposition member in solitary confinement, despite complaints about the impact this measure has had on her condition. The opposition member has also been waiting for just over two years to have a uterine fibroid removed, but prison authorities have not yet allowed her to undergo the procedure.

Góngora Espinosa, sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment for her participation in the protests of 11 July 2021 in Güira de Melena, in Artemisa, has been separated from her family environment by being imprisoned on the Isle of Youth, after being transferred in 2023 from the El Guatao prison, in Havana, where she initially served her sentence.

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The Daughter of a Castro-Era Diplomat Expelled From the US in 2003 Is in ICE Custody

Attorney Ahymed Socorro taught at the Ministry of the Interior’s institute and has resided in Miami since 2021.

Ahymed Socorro Rodríguez is at the Broward Transition Center in Pompano Beach / LinkedIn

14ymedio, Havana, Augut 5, 2026 /Ahymed Socorro Rodríguez, a Cuban lawyer and daughter of Roberto Socorro García, a diplomat of the Havana regime, is being held in the custody of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Broward Transition Center located in Pompano Beach, awaiting trial for her possible deportation.

The woman’s entry in the agency’s locator does not reveal the date or circumstances of her arrest, nor any possible immigration violations. It also does not indicate whether she appeared before an immigration judge, if there is a deportation order, or if she can request release on bond. ICE only permits the location of individuals in immigration custody, and the appearance of a name in its database does not, in itself, imply the commission of a crime or confirm imminent deportation.

The lawyer was a member of the Union of Young Communists and graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of Havana in 2013. That same year, she began working at the Eliseo Reyes Rodríguez Higher Institute, the university of the Ministry of the Interior. There, she taught for a full academic year before working as a lawyer at the Specialized Services Office (legal advice for foreigners and companies) for six years and nine months, according to her LinkedIn profile. continue reading

She was a member of the Union of Young Communists and graduated from the Faculty of Law of the University of Havana in 2013

Since 2021, she resided in Miami, where she arrived with a visa. Starting in 2023, she began working at the law firm Harper Meyer, which focuses on business matters, particularly those involving Latin American companies in the U.S. market.

In Miami, she also worked as part of the legal team of the prestigious immigration lawyer Willy Allen, which was confirmed to this media outlet by several activists.

In addition, her name appeared among the candidates to receive a Master’s degree in International Law from the University of Miami in December 2025, according to her academic profile on LinkedIn.

The Cuban Foreign Ministry described these accusations as “a blatant lie and a gross manipulation of reality.”

The lawyer is the daughter of Roberto Socorro, who served as third secretary of the Cuban mission in Washington in the early 2000s. However, in December 2003, he was expelled from the United States and declared persona non grata for associating with criminals and supporting the Wasp Network spies. “This measure differs from previous expulsions of Cuban diplomats and those of other nationalities for activities incompatible with their diplomatic status,” a U.S. State Department official said at the time, giving him 10 days to leave the country.

At that time, the Cuban Foreign Ministry described those accusations as “a blatant lie and a gross manipulation of reality.”

Currently, Socorro García is part of the mission headed in Guatemala City by Ambassador Nazario Alfredo Fernández Biosca. His position is that of Minister Counselor, the second most important according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ own website.

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Cubans in Uruguay Who Paid up to $746 To Fake Landlords Are Evicted

The migrants report that the police gave them only 30 minutes to collect their belongings before removing them from the building.

Police knocked on, and in some cases broke down, the doors of rooms occupied by dozens of migrants. / La Diaria Newspaper

14ymedio, Havana, Agusut 5, 2026 / Families of Cuban and Dominican migrants who paid 30,000 Uruguayan pesos (US$746) for the key to an apartment were evicted this Tuesday from a building in the Old City of Havana, Uruguay. According to Valeria España, director of the Social Protection Division for Migrants, Asylum Seekers, and Refugees at the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES), “the human rights of these people were violated.”

The testimonies of the okupas — squatters — reveal more figures about the costs of the apartments. Yani, from the Dominican Republic, paid 40,000 pesos (US$995) in 2024 to “buy” two rooms. Another immigrant who arrived from Santo Domingo in 2022 paid 60,000 pesos (US$1,493) for a room and a living room, to the supposed Uruguayan owners.

España told the newspaper La Diaria that 35 families, including 11 minors, lived in the building located at the corner of 25 de Mayo and Treinta y Tres streets. According to the official, the eviction was arbitrary because the Judiciary “has the authority to prevent evictions during the winter months, and also when there are children and pregnant women present, as in this case.”

They were given 30 minutes to gather their belongings and leave the place or “they would throw everything out the window”.

The police knocked and in some cases broke down the doors of the rooms occupied by dozens of migrants. They gave them 30 minutes to gather their belongings and leave, or else “they would throw everything out the window,” a Dominican man told the newspaper El Observador.

“It cannot be that evictions take place without considering basic aspects of human rights and the protection of children, leaving the procedure on a level of extreme discretion,” España insisted.

The owners’ lawyers told the same media outlet that squatters have occupied the building for years. The first complaint for illegal continue reading

occupation was filed in 2019. “On that occasion, the squatters were evicted and the building was boarded up, but it was quickly reoccupied,” they said.

In 2022, they filed another complaint for usurpation. The case was delayed, and after several extensions, the second eviction took place this Tuesday.

The place, the lawyers argued, “was used as a hideout for several criminals and a place to sell drugs. In addition, it was common to see users entering with stolen goods.”

The Ministry of Social Development (MIDES) moved some 20 people, including migrant mothers and children, to a shelter. “Other people will go to a center,” said the National Director of Social Protection, Daniel Gherard. “We will provide assistance in all cases,” and he pledged that “no one will be left out in the open. No one will be left on the street.”

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The Sugar King is Dead: Alfonso Fanjul and the Character of the Cuban

The businessman turned the destitution of exile into an empire and left as his legacy the ability of Cubans to rebuild themselves far from their country

He didn’t fight with a rifle, but with the tool he knew best: the capital and influence he had built with his own hands. / Social Networks

14ymedio, Rolando Gallardo, Madrid, August 5, 2026 / Alfonso Fanjul remembered with perfect clarity the day his world crumbled. He was sitting in the family office in Havana, yellow notepad and pencil in hand, when Fidel Castro’s men entered to discuss the fate of the company. They sat down with the lawyers, talked for a while, and then the leader of the delegation picked up a machine gun, placed it on the table, pointed to the map where the family’s properties were marked, and declared: “We’re going to dismantle everything.” Fanjul was barely 22 years old. He had just graduated from Fordham University, ready to inherit an empire of ten sugar mills, three distilleries, and properties scattered throughout the island. Instead, he inherited exile.

His story, told in this cold way, might seem exceptional. And in a sense, it was: few Cubans ended up building one of the largest sugar fortunes on the planet. But at its core, Fanjul’s story is the story of tens of thousands of Cubans who, in 1959 and the years that followed, saw the work of generations—a house, a business, a farm, a workshop—vanish overnight under the same pretext: the revolution claimed everything. What distinguishes Fanjul is not having lost more than others, but having demonstrated, with the force of six decades of success, that that confiscation had a limit that not even machine guns could cross.

They took away his land, his sugar mills, his mansions, but they couldn’t confiscate his knowledge. The Fanjul family had been in Cuba since the mid-19th century, when a small group of farmers of Asturian origin set out to extract sugar from sugarcane. A century of experience, of trial and error, of knowing how to read a harvest and negotiate a loan, couldn’t be contained by any expropriation decree. That knowledge traveled with Alfonso Fanjul to Florida, and with a mere $640,000 raised among several exiles, he rebuilt a sugar mill by Lake Okeechobee in Palm Beach County. With his three brothers, he founded Florida Crystals and started from scratch, but they weren’t starting from nothing: they were building upon generations of entrepreneurial acumen that no regime can nationalize. continue reading

The talent dispersed around the world in the Cuban diaspora, often forged in exile and against all odds, remains an undiminished asset, waiting for a country where it can be reinvested.

With that reconstruction came wealth, and with wealth, the ability to finance his own dreams and those of others. For decades, Fanjul was one of the main financial backers of the anti-Castro movement in exile, channeling resources to organizations and causes that sought to pressure the Havana regime. He didn’t fight with a rifle, but with the tool he knew best: the capital and influence he had built with his own hands.

He was, above all, a pragmatic man. This pragmatism led him, in the final stage of his life, to explore a possible opening toward Cuba, a stance that generated discomfort and even ruptures with some of the more militant members of the exile community. Pragmatism, by definition, is not guided by sentimentality, and this—like every decision that prioritizes calculation over nostalgia—generates misunderstandings. But it is also, probably, that same quality that allowed him not to be paralyzed by loss and, instead, to construct something new.

Therein lies the most profound lesson of this story for the Cuba to come. Fanjul was not only a successful businessman: he was living proof that the Cuban character—builder, insatiable, lover of prosperity—survives dispossession. Wealth can be confiscated; the instinct to create it cannot. That is precisely the promise that should underpin any project of national reconstruction: that the talent scattered around the world in the Cuban diaspora, forged often in exile and against all odds, remains an intact asset, waiting for a country in which to reinvest it.

Alfonso Fanjul died at 89, as all men die. It is the natural course of life, and in that sense, his death is nothing exceptional. But for Cubans who still dream of a prosperous island, his passing is also a reminder: the Cuba that Alfonso Fanjul left behind in 1959 remains, six decades later, held hostage by the same people who one day placed a machine gun on a table and decided to dismantle everything. The sugar king is dead. But the character that made him king lives on in every Cuban who insists on building a better future outside of Cuba, while waiting for the day they can do so at home.

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Cuban State Security Conducts Operations on the Anniversary of the Maleconazo

The Cuban Observatory for Human Rights documented 356 repressive actions in July, including 109 blockades of homes.

Wednesday’s repression coincides with the 32nd anniversary of the Maleconazo, the popular protest that shook Havana in 1994. / Wikimedia Commons

14ymedio, Havana, August 5, 2026 / The 14ymedio newsroom woke up this Wednesday under the surveillance of State Security, which deployed an operation in the lower levels of the building where the newspaper operates, in Havana’s Nuevo Vedado district, to prevent the departure of its director, Yoani Sánchez, and the journalist Reinaldo Escobar.

The date coincides with the 32nd anniversary of the Maleconazo, the popular protest that shook Havana in 1994 and ended with hundreds of arrests and the subsequent opening of the so-called Balseros [Rafter] Crisis.

Independent journalist Camila Acosta also confirmed to this newspaper that she was under surveillance. Contacted at midday on Wednesday, she said she had just noticed the presence of agents in the vicinity of her home. “Yes, I just found out,” she replied. “Anniversary of the Maleconazo, right?” she added, linking the deployment to the anniversary.

This is not the first time this year that State Security has prevented Sánchez, Escobar, and Acosta from leaving their homes. The three were subjected to similar operations on 20th of May, the anniversary of the founding of the Republic, and on the 11th of July, the fifth anniversary of the largest anti-government protests on the island since 1959.

“Two police patrol cars and several State Security officers outside my home,” Acosta reported. / Facebook / Camila Acosta

The political police’s calendar has become filled with “dangerous” dates. May 20, July 11, August 5, and December 10, International Human Rights Day, are often accompanied by house raids, summonses, threats, internet outages, and preventive detentions of journalists, opposition members, and activists. Surveillance is also intensified during official holidays, international summits, visits by heads of state, and diplomatic activities organized by the U.S. Embassy.

Official concern increases, especially during the summer. High temperatures amplify the impact of power outages, water shortages, and food scarcity, while families spend entire nights unable to sleep, preserve food, or protect themselves from mosquitoes. Under these conditions, a power failure or continue reading

a prolonged interruption of supply can quickly escalate into a pot-banging protest, a street blockade, or a mass demonstration.

This was the context for numerous demonstrations recorded during the month of July. A significant portion of the arrests documented by human rights organizations were related to peaceful protests sparked by prolonged power outages, water shortages, and deteriorating living conditions.

“The social climate is unbearable: on the one hand, blackouts, hunger and lack of medicine; on the other, the excessive police presence to repress and control.”

The Cuban Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH) reported on Wednesday that at least 356 repressive actions were recorded in the country last month. Of these, 54 were arrests and 302 corresponded to other abuses, including interruptions of communications, harassment, threats, and police summonses.

The most widespread method was surveillance of residences, with 109 cases. The report mentions among those monitored in July Sánchez, Escobar, and Acosta, as well as journalists Henry Constantin, Vladimir Turró, Yunia Figueredo, Ángel Santiesteban, and Boris González Arenas.

Opposition members Óscar Elías Biscet, Manuel Cuesta Morúa, Berta Soler, Ángel Moya, and María Cristina Labrada were also surrounded, along with relatives of political prisoners from the July 11th uprising, religious leaders, and human rights defenders. Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Camagüey saw the highest concentration of repressive actions.

According to the OCDH, these operations sought to prevent the participation of members of civil society in public activities, commemorations of the fifth anniversary of the 11th of July attacks, and other events considered sensitive by the authorities. The Madrid-based organization also noted an increased presence of police and special forces on the streets, primarily in provincial capitals.

“The social climate is unbearable: on the one hand, blackouts, hunger and lack of medicine; on the other, the excessive police presence to repress and control,” summarized Yaxys Cires, strategy director of the Observatory.

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In Cuba a Liter of Oil Now Costs More Than Two Months of the Minimum Wage

Despite the high price, some drivers use it in diesel vehicles when they can’t find fuel.

The 4,500 pesos verified by this newspaper don’t even represent the extreme end of the escalation. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Juan Diego Rodríguez, Havana, August 5, 2026 / Two bottles of sunflower oil, placed on plastic crates on a Havana sidewalk this Wednesday, encapsulate much of the Cuban crisis. The street vendor was asking 4,500 pesos for each, while also selling canned goods, packages of spaghetti, and packs of cigarettes. The price, verified by 14ymedio, has turned one of the most basic ingredients in the island’s cuisine into a luxury.

To buy that liter, a worker earning the minimum monthly wage of 2,100 pesos would have to hand over two months’ salary plus another 300 pesos. At Wednesday’s informal exchange rate, the bottle was equivalent to about $6.67 or €5.70.

The conversion, however, barely allows us to measure the chasm. In Spain, where incomes are much higher, a liter of refined sunflower oil costs between €1.75 and €2.85 in chains like Dia or Carrefour. For a Cuban living on their salary, on the other hand, the price seen in Havana represents more than 60 full days of work.

The 4,500 pesos verified by this newspaper doesn’t even represent the extreme of the price increase. Social media posts show bottles being offered for 6,000 pesos, demonstrating the extent to which speculation can go with a product that until recently had a maximum retail price of 990 pesos per liter.

The government eliminated that price cap in July, after the measure led to shortages, black market sales, and a widening gap between official prices and the actual cost of imports. Without enough stock to meet demand, the administrative limit ultimately drove the oil out of regulated stores, but it did not reduce its price on the black market. continue reading

The practice is technically possible on certain older engines and can keep them running temporarily, but it involves risks.

Now some local governments are trying to curb the uncontrolled price increases through inspections and “agreed-upon prices.” The Guantánamo Municipal Administration Council, for example, set the retail price of a bottle of oil at 2,200 pesos after studying the prices reported by local merchants. Without an increase in supply, these decisions risk repeating the history of previous price caps.

In addition to the demand for cooking oil, another unusual and revealing aspect of the energy crisis has emerged. Videos posted on social media show drivers pouring vegetable oil into the fuel tanks of diesel vehicles as a desperate alternative to fuel shortages.

This practice is technically possible in certain older engines and can keep them running temporarily, but it carries risks. Cooking oil is not biodiesel, and its higher viscosity can clog injectors, leave deposits, and ultimately damage the system.

In Cuba, plagued by blackouts and empty gas stations, the liter of fuel a family needs to fry an egg competes with the liter a truck driver pours into his tank to complete a trip. On the makeshift platform of that Havana sidewalk, the yellowed bottles encapsulated the scale of the disaster. This staple food is also an emergency fuel and a commodity whose price exceeds the minimum wages of two months work.

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The Cuban Government Eases Vehicle Imports, Especially Electric Ones

High-end cars will pay a 35% tax, standard combustion cars 25%, while hybrids will be charged 15% and electric vehicles 5%

Although it is possible to own as many vehicles as one wishes, there will be temporary limits on acquisition through import.

14ymedio, Madrid, August 5, 2026 / Private individuals will be able to manufacture or assemble vehicles under the new regulations for the sector, published this Tuesday in the Official Gazette and explained to the official press by the minister in charge, Eduardo Rodríguez Dávila. The package includes two sets of rules – with several decrees and resolutions – that ease the import and sale of these products, establish tax exemptions for those that run on renewable energy, and regulate transfers of ownership with the aim of renewing Cuba’s aging vehicle fleet and promoting the energy transition.

Despite the many liberalizations, there is one restriction to keep in mind: non-resident foreigners will not be able to buy vehicles in Cuba. Those who hold temporary, real-estate-based, or humanitarian residency will be able to do so, as will private, state, and foreign companies.

Although it is possible to own as many vehicles as one wishes, there will be temporary limits on acquisition through import. In the case of electric cars, only one is allowed per lifetime, while for electric motorcycles or mopeds the limit is two as unaccompanied baggage and one if sent as a shipment. For combustion or hybrid motorcycles and tricycles, the cap is one every five years, and for light trailers, one unit per trip or shipment.

For combustion or hybrid motorcycles and tricycles, the cap is one every five years, and for light trailers, one unit per trip or shipment

Another change applies to those posted abroad. Doctors, diplomats, aid workers, and other state employees who must spend more than two years outside the island may buy a vehicle of any type, with up to eight seats, one time only.

Another new feature concerns the transfer or sale of vehicles between private individuals, including transactions from individuals to private companies or vice versa. These transactions are permitted but must be properly formalized, which includes registration before a notary and payment through the bank – in any authorized form – in either foreign or national currency. Cash is completely excluded as a method of payment, in a country that largely continues to operate outside the banking system. continue reading

Among the notable points in this section is the creation of a legal avenue for acquiring the vehicle of an emigrant who had not completed the transfer of ownership on the island. Until now, the cars of people who left the country were left at the mercy of the State, which could confiscate them if the owner had not formally transferred them beforehand. Now, a special provision opens a path for family members or other interested parties to regularize the situation through a proxy or, in the event of death, in accordance with inheritance law.

On the tax side, there are also new provisions to encourage vehicles that do not require diesel, in addition to a full tariff exemption for electric cars. Luxury or high-end automobiles (both combustion and hybrid) will carry the highest import rate, at 35% of the sale price, followed by standard combustion vehicles (cars, pickup trucks) at 25% and heavy combustion or two-wheeled vehicles at 20%. By contrast, the lowest taxes are reserved for the more sustainable options: 15% for hybrids, 5% for imported electric vehicles, and 3% for electric vehicles assembled locally on the island.

Another extensive section covers public transportation. To facilitate the import of vehicles intended for mass transit, a 12% rate applies to combustion buses and minibuses – compared with the 35% or 25% for cars – which drops, if assembled in Cuba, to 7% or 5% for hybrids and electric vehicles.

According to the official press, in the first half of 2026, 35,494 motor vehicles were sold on the island, 65% of which were combustion-powered

Additionally, the minister noted that the Public Transportation Development Fund remains in place, funded by special taxes on vehicle sales, through which several major acquisitions have been made to date. These include 15 electric hearses for Havana, a catamaran for Isla de la Juventud, 300 electric tricycles for passengers and health care workers, 110 minibuses for bus routes, 20 buses for the National Bus Company (Empresa de Ómnibus Nacionales), and ten for Vía Azul, as well as electric vehicles for transporting hemodialysis patients, bicycles, trucks, and others.

According to the official press, in the first half of 2026, 35,494 motor vehicles were sold on the island, 65% of which were combustion-powered, 5% hybrid, and 30% electric. Moreover, 70% of them were mopeds, motorcycles, and tricycles, making clear the predominance of this type of vehicle.

As for imports, data from the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council show that the value of sales from the U.S. rose to more than 148 million dollars through May. Now, according to figures from Minister Rodríguez Dávila, it is known that 41,963 motor vehicles have been brought to the island – without specifying from where, although it can be assumed that most came from the neighboring country and from China – as unaccompanied baggage or shipments, of which 19,443 are electric mopeds and motorcycles and 22,520 are the same but combustion-powered.

Translated by GH.

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Cuba to Have Wholesale Markets for Products Sold by State and Private Companies

Neighborhood markets are also being created, which may be run by private operators, for the sale of 16 basic foodstuffs and five hygiene products

The new markets put an end to the state monopoly on wholesale trade. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, August 5, 2026 / The overwhelming shortages in Cuba’s markets have forced another novelty through which the Government is seeking to include private operators in a mixed trade model that puts an end to the state monopoly over bodegas and wholesale markets. The legislative package, published this past Tuesday in the Official Gazette, does not resolve the question of access to foreign currency and goods, and also creates an additional problem: the coexistence of two currencies in supply establishments.

Of the set of regulations, three are intended for the creation of the “neighborhood markets,” as these outlets will be known, for the sale of a series of basic necessity products listed in the law itself, namely powdered milk, ground meat, hamburger, chicken, sausage, eggs, vegetable oil, tomato puree, pasta, noodles, grains, rice, sugar, wheat flour, instant soup, coffee, detergent, soap, toilet paper, deodorant, and toothpaste.

The establishments will be state-owned commercial premises that until now have been empty or semi-empty and that will be put out to tender

The establishments will be state-owned commercial premises that until now have been empty or semi-empty and that will be put out to tender so that MSMEs, cooperatives, foreign investors, and self-employed workers can operate them. As an incentive, the private operator is exempt from paying rent during the first two years, and if they invest money in fitting out the property, that amount will be deducted from the percentage of profits they must contribute to the state owner.

The products sold at these markets will receive a 5% discount on the sales tax, in order to prevent prices from skyrocketing, something that has been happening in recent days precisely with oil, which last week was selling for around 3,000 pesos and is already being seen in some stores at double that price.

The monetary issue remains less clear. Neighborhood markets will operate in Cuban pesos, although electronic commerce is authorized, with payments from abroad in foreign currency. This would allow the Government to obtain foreign currency if relatives abroad continue reading

begin making use of online purchases with dollars, although it also deepens the gap that already exists between those who have access only to the national currency and the privileged few who do not depend solely on their salary or pension.

A side effect of this duality could be the tendency of the private merchant to set the product price – now that it is not capped – according to the informal dollar exchange rate, in order to be able to import as they have done until now.

In an attempt to prevent this, the Government has simultaneously created the wholesale market abasto.cu. Through these establishments, individuals and businesses will be able to buy wholesale in different formats. The Official Gazette defines these warehouses as an “area where sellers and buyers converge, maintaining commercial relationships with multiple transactions, under the principle of supply and demand,” one of the pillars of capitalism.

The Official Gazette defines these warehouses as an “area where sellers and buyers converge, maintaining commercial relationships with multiple transactions, under the principle of supply and demand”

The wholesale markets will be open primarily to companies, private operators, national and local producers, importers, marketers, and foreign investors. In addition, a membership system is being introduced that is very similar to the membership cards found in the large wholesale markets of any city in the world, with discounts for regular buyers and other benefits.

As with the neighborhood markets, these too will be able to operate in national and foreign currency, something that will also have repercussions for import possibilities. At a time when domestic production is at rock bottom, imports of these products from the US, which are exempt from the embargo, are almost the only option for filling the warehouses, especially since major shipping lines have ceased operations to Cuban ports because of sanctions from the State Department.

This limitation has resulted, according to two experts cited by Reuters, in the loss of 60% of maritime traffic for the island. However, for US exporters, who can take advantage of licenses for the sale of food, an opportunity is opening up.

Translated by GH.

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Discontent Within a Sector of the Cuban Regime Over the 176 Reforms and the Prominent Role of ‘The Crab’

While Díaz-Canel insists that socialism is not being abandoned, some members of the single party and intellectuals warn against “the country’s return to a pure and hard capitalist regime.”

A man rests outdoors a block from the Government headquarters in 24 de Febrero. The wall reads: “All for the Revoution” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, August 4, 2026 / Although for more than six decades the main decisions of the Cuban leadership have been accepted with the same “unanimity” and vertical discipline, without public debate or democratic consultations, the new economic reforms promoted by the regime and the recent prominence of Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro – grandson and protégé of Raúl Castro, known as El Cangrejo, The Crab – have revealed the discontent of sectors within the communist apparatus itself.

In the recent session of the National Assembly, where a package of 176 measures restructuring the economy and state administration was approved, top leaders insisted that the changes do not represent a renunciation of the political and economic model the regime has defended for more than six decades. Faced with critiques that interprets them as an opening to the market, President Miguel Díaz-Canel reiterated during the closing session: “The transformations we are implementing today are not for more capitalism, but to defend and advance socialist construction.”

“The transformations we are implementing today are not for more capitalism, but to defend and advance in the construction of socialism.”

That does not appear to be the interpretation of some sectors within the official regime itself. Some political figures, intellectuals, and activists believe that the opening implied by the reforms breaks with historical tenets of Cuban socialism or that, at the very least, it will favor new power groups over the population. Díaz-Canel himself had already admitted in an interview with the Puerto Rican newspaper Claridad that there are “divided opinions” within the Communist Party regarding these measures. “These are measures that have contradictions, that have risks.”

Very severe criticisms have come from sectors of the official left. The digital media outlet Punto y Aparte [literally ‘period, new paragraph’], which presents itself as an alternative left-wing platform comprised of members of the Communist Party and the Union of Young Communists, denounces in an editorial that some reforms “imply the country’s return to a pure and simple capitalist regime, that will accentuate inequalities.”

“Today the nation walks a tightrope: on one side, imperial voracity and the promise of invasion and death; on the other, the arrogance and pettiness of a group of officials and continue reading

businessmen who have already shown too many times that they are not up to the historical moment,” Punto y Aparte publishes.

The media outlet demands that, in order to “redirect this period of change towards a horizon of equity,” popular participation must be called for “with a demand for even further review and modification for all those measures that threaten to plunge the people into poverty, precariousness and defenselessness…”

These preoccupations had already been raised by critics of the regime from other perspectives. Cuban economist Pedro Monreal qualified the package of measures as “anti-worker” because, he argued, “it does not balance the rights of workers and employers within an economy governed by market rules. Nor does it recognize democratic mechanisms of checks and balances for workers in the workplace.”

Furthermore, a document obtained by the EFE news agency, signed by members of the Communist Party and titled “Promoting Socialism from People’s Power,” states that some measures “far exceed what has historically been considered acceptable and even contradict the traditional representations of socialism among our people.” The text also demands that these transformations be openly debated within the communities.

Another of the critical voice within the ruling party itself has been that of Alejandro Sánchez, secretary of the Union of Young Communists at the University of Havana. “The necessary discussion is who will be the real beneficiaries of these transformations. If the answer is ‘everyone,’ that would be false,” he wrote. Sánchez also calls for greater popular participation in these decisions: “That power cannot be exercised solely from above; it must also come from greater popular participation and oversight. This latter point remains a shortcoming of the Cuban political system.”

“That power cannot be exercised solely from above; it must also come from greater popular participation and oversight. This latter point remains a shortcoming of the Cuban political system.”

Some of the reforms have also been criticized by the scientific community. Among the measures approved was the Law on the Organization of the Central State Administration, which, as part of the reduction of the government apparatus, led to the elimination of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (CITMA) and the redistribution of its institutions between two new ministries. The head of the National Seismological Service, Enrique Diego Arango Arias, described the agency’s elimination as a “grave error” and criticized the fact that the measure was adopted without consulting the workers or presenting any supporting studies.

“More than a few specialists, including many founders, have opposed this dismantling. We opposed it because this decision was never preceded by an explanation or an analysis with the workers and directors of these institutions; the reasons were never explained to us,” he wrote. He also warned that the disappearance of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (CITMA) amidst the country’s current crisis jeopardizes the stability of internationally recognized scientific institutions and undermines the morale of their professionals.

The other element of controversy for these sectors is the role that Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro has been assuming. Raúl Castro’s grandson and bodyguard acknowledged in an interview with USA Today the privileges he enjoys and presented himself as one of the Cuban side’s interlocutors in contacts with the US, despite not holding any known public office. This position has drawn criticism even from within the government.

Michel Torres Corona, presenter of the program Con Filo, publicly questioned Rodríguez Castro and Sandro Castro about the privileges that both grandsons display on social networks and in public spaces: “There is no harangue or complaint that calms the indignation caused by these fruits of ‘socialist’ nepotism: what justifies their impunity?”

In statements to EFE, Torres Corona defended the existence of “very heterogeneous” positions within the Island and affirmed that these can be expressed “even from critical or divergent positions,” as long as unity is not broken.
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