Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

A Neighborhood Market with “Better” Prices

The Ayestarán location awaits its official opening this Monday while customers protest an offering they consider expensive and limited.

Inside the Ayestarán Neighborhood Market, employees were finishing placing the products because, they said, today is the opening and “Government people” are coming. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Juan Diego Rodríguez, Havana, September 28, 2026 – At the doors of the brand-new Neighborhood Market on Ayestarán Street, in Havana, customers crowded together Monday morning. Several women approached the glass, shaded their eyes with their hands to overcome the reflections and inspected the shelves, which were still only half full. The door was closed. Inside, employees were finishing placing the products because, as one of them explained to 14ymedio, today is the opening and “Government people” are coming.

The establishment, located at 207 Ayestarán, between Néstor Sardiñas and Perfecto Lacoste, in the municipality of Cerro, is part of the Neighborhood Market project, an initiative that the Ministry of Domestic Trade has promoted as a formula for recovering state-owned premises and stabilizing the retail sale of basic products. According to the regulations, state-owned establishments are awarded through bidding for management by mipymes [small and medium-sized enterprises – SMSE in English], cooperatives, self-employed workers and other economic actors.

In Ayestarán, the newly painted blue-and-white premises certainly looks more presentable than many state-run stores in the capital and is light-years away from looking like the dilapidated ration-market bodegas. On the windows, Neighborhood Market signs alternate with the name Doña Luisa and the logo of DV Alimentos Sanos Super Deliverde. Inside there are new display cases, a refrigerator and shelves that this Monday still showed large empty spaces. continue reading

The 900-milliliter bottle of oil costs 2,600 pesos; a kilogram of powdered milk, 4,500; rice, 800, and black beans, 600. / 14ymedio

The anticipation, however, began to diminish when curious customers discovered the price list. The 900-milliliter bottle of oil costs 2,600 pesos; a kilogram of powdered milk, 4,500; rice, 800, and black beans, 600. Each egg costs 130 pesos, or 3,900 per carton. A can of tomato paste costs 1,000 pesos and a can of Spam, 1,100. The 500-gram package of luncheon meat sells for 900 pesos, while soap costs 380 and each roll of toilet paper, 190.

“I don’t see many products either,” said a woman leaning on a cane as she looked through the glass. The prices, she maintained, can also be found at some mipymes. Los Mercados de Barrio [Neighborhood Markets], according to what the authorities have announced, have a limited catalog that includes products such as vegetable oil, powdered milk, chicken, ground meat, rice, sugar and coffee, as well as cleaning supplies such as detergent, soap and toilet paper.

“This isn’t a Neighborhood Market, this is just any old mipyme,” another woman shouted toward the inside so the workers could hear her. “The milk is just as expensive as elsewhere, and the toilet paper is even more expensive,” she protested.

The reaction contrasts with the project’s official presentation. Just a few hours earlier, Minister of Domestic Trade Betsy Díaz Velázquez had inaugurated another Neighborhood Market in the Sierra Maestra housing development, in Boyeros. The official station Radio Rebelde said that these establishments seek to offer food and cleaning products at prices between 10% and 15% lower than those at other stores. The Government also grants incentives to private operators, including a tax rebate and exemption from rent during the first two years.

“I don’t see many products either,” said a woman leaning on a cane as she looked through the glass. / 14ymedio

The Cuban News Agency itself joined in the enthusiasm and said that there are already 24 establishments throughout the country operating through a “service administration and commercialization contract” between the selected economic actor and the state-owned company that owns the property. The official press presents the initiative as a possibility for reducing costs and prices thanks, among other advantages, to a 5% sales tax.

None of that tax framework consoled those doing the math in front of the Ayestarán door this Monday.

“Why are they going to open this if it’s the same thing the mipymes already have?” another woman asked. A passing man intervened to point out that, at least, the oil was cheaper than at other establishments. The response came immediately, almost like a chorus: “That oil isn’t cheap for anyone.”

In Ayestarán, the newly painted blue-and-white premises certainly looks more presentable than many state-run stores. / 14ymedio

“We settle for everything; this is really a scam,” another woman insisted. Around her, the others nodded as they continued mentally comparing the prices with salaries, pensions and what they had seen in other stores.

The scene summed up the challenge facing the commercial experiment. Since this is not a subsidized bodega, and no matter how many tax benefits they receive, prices will respond to the law of supply and demand.

“This is disrespectful,” one of the women concluded before walking away from the still-closed door. “They are making fun of us to our faces every day and we allow them to do it.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Bakery That Never Goes Dark: Nighttime Lines in Guanabacoa for One or Two Pounds of Bread

Residents cross areas at high risk of muggings, such as La Cotorra, to reach the establishment

Numerous people wait at night in front of the bakery, one of the few lit spots in the area during the blackouts. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, September 28, 2026 / At eight or nine at night, when much of the Havana municipality of Guanabacoa is in darkness, the only state bakery that keeps working during the blackouts stays lit and surrounded by people thanks to a generator. The establishment is next to the well-known “Guanabacoa traffic light,” at the intersection of Vía Blanca and the Corral Falso road.

The scene repeats itself every day, and it is at sundown that the line takes on its true dimensions. Dozens of people crowd in front of the bakery, some by the door, others sitting wherever they can find a spot, while motorcycles pile up on the sidewalk. In the images taken by 14ymedio, the light from the establishment falls on those waiting and leaves the rest of the street plunged in darkness.

Many come to buy just one or two pounds of bread. For some of those in line, that will be their entire meal that night or their breakfast the next morning.

Residents from different parts of Guanabacoa, and from Regla as well, make their way to the bakery. For some, the route means crossing La Cotorra at night, at the entrance to the municipality, an area that took its name from the old water bottling plant that once operated there and that the blackouts and poor lighting have made especially unsafe. continue reading

The fear is not unfounded. 14ymedio recently documented, in that same area, the assault on a couple whose electric moped was snatched at knifepoint by two hooded men. The attack happened at night, on a poorly lit avenue at the entrance to Guanabacoa.

Even so, the lack of alternatives drives many to make the trip. The chance of finding bread in the middle of a blackout outweighs the risk of crossing dark, isolated streets. And if the bread runs out before they reach the counter, there is not much leeway: come back the next day, look in another municipality or wait for the power to come back.

Residents say that “fights” are common and that on occasion the Police have had to intervene

Nor is the wait at the bakery by any means peaceful. Residents say that “fights” are common and that on occasion the Police have had to intervene. In a line where it is unclear whether there will be enough bread for everyone, any dispute over a place in line can end in shouting or shoving.

Scenes like this are repeated in other parts of the island. In the municipality of Regla, after more than 26 hours without electricity, numerous people were already standing in line at daybreak in front of a bakery, a bank and other basic services. In Matanzas, another line formed in front of a bakery in the Versalles neighborhood where only ten trays of long loaves had been baked: there, seeing people waiting was itself the sign that there was still something left to buy.

Translated by GH.

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A Family Tree to Help Cuban Families Rediscover Their Roots

Cuba Research Project launches a collaborative tool that makes it possible to trace ancestors among more than 600,000 historical records from the island

The database also includes the official register of 74,000 mambí fighters from Cuba’s War of Independence. / Public domain

14ymedio, September 28, 2026, Madrid/Cuba Research Project, the free online resource devoted to the island’s genealogy and demography, announced this week the launch of Árbol Genealógico de Cuba [Cuban Family Tree], a collaborative tool that allows users to build and document their family roots, connect their ancestors with the records available in the archive and find possible links with other families’ public trees.

The new tree expands the search tools the project already offered, which currently brings together more than 600,000 records distributed across 30 collections. Users can search, free of charge, databases of civil and parish records, cemeteries and burials, censuses, passenger lists, naturalizations, school records and documents related to military service.

The tool allows users to build a family tree directly on the site or import an existing one using a GEDCOM file – a format used to exchange genealogical information. People added to the tree can be linked to the archive’s records, while users can also consult the trees that other families have decided to make public.

Among the most notable collections is a historical list of passengers on ships that arrived in Cuba or left the island, with almost 340,000 records. The oldest date from the 16th century, although most are from the 19th. continue reading

The tool makes it possible to build and document family roots, connect ancestors with the available records and find links with other families’ public trees

The archive also includes 47,824 names from death notices published in the newspaper Diario de La Marina between 1868 and 1960, compiled by Lydia E. Reyes, as well as more than 18,000 names from burial notices for Havana’s Colón Cemetery published between 1920 and 1921.

Another collection brings together more than 15,000 records of people from the Canary Islands who emigrated to Cuba during the 19th century. The material was originally compiled from data held by various town councils and by the now-defunct Emigrant Museum of Teguise, in Lanzarote.

The database also includes the official register of 74,000 mambí fighters from Cuba’s War of Independence, naturalization certificates issued between 1904 and 1939, and records from various cemeteries on the island. Among the latter is that of the Centro Macabeo, in Guanabacoa, considered the oldest Jewish cemetery in Cuba, established in 1910.

The project has also added reference works for family research, such as the nine volumes of Historia de Familias Cubanas [History of Cuban Families], by the Count of San Juan de Jaruco, which gathers genealogical information on 841 Cuban surnames.

“If enough people do it, this will become the largest collection of Cuban genealogy ever assembled, and it will have been built by Cubans themselves”

“Half a million records took us three years and dozens of volunteers working name by name,” said the project’s founder, Richard Villalba, in a statement in which he also encourages more people to contribute. “Families hold far more than we will ever have,” he said. “If enough people do it, this will become the largest collection of Cuban genealogy ever assembled, and it will have been built by Cubans themselves.”

The project accepts contributions of documents, photographs, parish or civil records, passenger lists and other materials that may help expand the archive. Users can also flag errors in existing records and submit corrections directly from each person’s entry. Cuba Research Project says its goal is to gather, preserve and index these materials so that they can be searched in a single, free digital archive.

Translated by GH

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Instead of Oil, Cubans Will Get a $9 Million Mosque Funded by Saudi Arabia

The Portuguese construction company Engimov, in charge of the project, has fenced off the land next to the Tallapiedra thermoelectric plant in Havana

After nine years of announcements, the perimeter of the complex has finally been fenced off. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Darío Hernández, Havana/Madrid, September 28, 2026 / The perimeter of the former Tallapiedra thermoelectric plant, in Old Havana, has finally been fenced off so that work announced almost ten years ago can begin. Over this decade, the plant’s old smokestacks have gone dark for good; one day they will stand in contrast to the minarets of the King Salman Mosque. The complex is expected to have prayer halls with capacity for some 500 people, a public library, a dining hall, green spaces and community rooms.

According to official sources, the estimated budget is $9.3 million, provided by Riyadh through the Saudi Fund for Development, although the investor is formally the Office of the Historian, which manages the funds.

The site has recently been marked with signage, as this newspaper was able to verify, and a sign displays the name of the project – King Salman Mosque – the construction permit number and the names of the companies carrying out the project. The design is by Restaura, the specialized entity of the Office of the Historian of the City of Havana (Ohch) that carries out the main conservation, restoration and urban development work in the capital’s Historic Center. The construction itself is being carried out by the builder Engimov Caribe. continue reading

The company is headquartered in the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZEDM) and its capital is 100% Portuguese, as the builder states on its own website. In addition to civil works – including industrial and logistics buildings – it collaborates on residential buildings and hotels, and it also sells – through its own website – kitchen furniture and building materials.

The project’s file number indicates that the permit was obtained in 2020, although talk of this construction began almost four years earlier. As early as 2014, initial plans were circulating to build a mosque in Havana whose look would recall that of Ortaköy, in Istanbul.

The initiative came from Turkey, which was prepared to put up sufficient capital, and from the insistence of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who at the end of that year insisted on a pre-Columbian Muslim presence on the island. “Muslims’ contact with America dates back to the 12th century. Muslims discovered America in 1178. It wasn’t Christopher Columbus. Islam spread across the American continent even before Columbus arrived,” he said. The president, who remains in office, stated: “Columbus recounts that there was a mosque on a hill on the coast of Cuba. I am going to talk with my Cuban brothers about how fitting it would be to build a mosque on top of that hill.”

It is not very clear why the plans came to nothing, since the Cuban government, which had initially given a flat no, later backtracked and gave the green light to a project that never materialized. At the time, the number of Muslims living on the island was estimated at about 5,000; their meeting and prayer place in the capital was the Abdallah Mosque, on Oficios Street. In 2016, the first plans for the new construction project began to circulate, by then financed by Saudi Arabia.

The idea was to build a large complex that could hold some 10,000 worshippers, the largest in Latin America. According to the ambassador in Riyadh, Vladimir González, the island had “a small Muslim community in the country; very organized. I feel honored to make life easier for them as Muslims in Cuba,” he said in 2022.

In 2016, the first plans for the new construction project began to circulate, by then financed by Saudi Arabia. / 14ymedio

In recent years, the Saudi fund has financed seven projects on the island related to health, sanitation and infrastructure, with a total value of some $193.3 million, in addition to the amount earmarked for the mosque. Furthermore, in 2021, a source from the Office of the Historian of Havana told 14ymedio that there was a loan of $26.6 million for the Program for the Rehabilitation and Construction of Social Works, but that resources had been taken from it for the Fidel Castro Ruz Center, in El Vedado, which opened in December of that year.

“The loan was supposed to be for housing, but they took part of it for the Center and for the Capitol too,” said that source. This made it possible to raise the pharaonic building dedicated to Fidel Castro. In addition, part of the money went to the project for the future King Salman Mosque, which even now, in 2026, does not yet have its foundations laid.

Translated by GH.

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Havana Chronicles: The ‘Chemical’ Adds Collapsed Bodies to the Havana Landscape

In San Lázaro, a young man slumped against a wall barely manages to attract the attention of passersby.

On the wall, of the mutilated street name, only one word survives: “Persevere”. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, Yoani Sánchez, September 27, 2026 / In San Lázaro, you have to look both up and down at the same time. Up, to avoid the sight of gutted balconies, exposed beams, and pieces of buildings that seem to be calculating when to collapse. Down, to avoid tripping over the holes in the sidewalk and discovering, from time to time, someone else who has also fallen.

Next to a tree and against the blue wall of a house, a young man sits on the ground. He is strong, wearing a black T-shirt and shorts, but his body is slumped, his head bowed on his chest, in a posture that Havana residents have come to recognize. Lacking a diagnosis, those who pass by the area have a street word for situations like this: “on drugs.”

Life goes on just a few meters away. Pedestrians, classic cars, and tricycles pass by. No one seems too surprised. Perhaps that is the most unsettling thing: these scenes have ceased to be exceptional in some areas of Havana.

In the absence of a diagnosis, those who pass through the area already have a street word for situations like this: “enchemicado” (‘chemicaled’).

In the absence of a diagnosis, those who pass through the area already have a street word for situations like this: “enquimicado” [‘chemicaled’]. / 14ymedio

In a few years the “chemical,” as several synthetic cannabinoids are popularly known, has gone from being an issue that the authorities rarely spoke of, to become a problem even official television recognizes. In May 2025 , the Ministry of the Interior reported 342 people accused of drug trafficking and use in Havana and 810 cases opened by the Public Prosecutor’s Office related to these crimes. The police had identified 74 “complex environments” in the capital at that time and highlighted eight particularly problematic areas. continue reading

The list included neighborhoods in Playa, Marianao, La Lisa, Boyeros, Old Havana, San Miguel del Padrón, and Cerro. Central Havana needed no introduction: there, as even the official spokesman Humberto López admitted at the time, “drugs exist, everyone knows it, and they’ve existed for years.” Authorities also acknowledged their concern about drug use among minors.

Since then, the geography seems to have become less precise because the problem is now occurring in broad daylight and on busy avenues. Just a few weeks ago, at the corner of Reina and Galiano, two young men were collapsed under the influence of the drug. While they were incapacitated, a man took advantage of the situation to steal one of their backpacks and disappeared into the crowd. The incident happened the day after a drug raid on that same street.

San Lázaro Street looks like an open scar that runs through the city from Old Havana to Vedado. / 14ymedio

Now the scene repeats itself, with different coordinates: San Lázaro. Few avenues could offer a more fitting backdrop for this young man paralyzed by the drug, because the entire street resembles an open wound that cuts through the city from Old Havana to Vedado. On both sides, are buildings surviving with amputated balconies, walls without plaster, boarded-up windows, and supports that long ago ceased to aspire to elegance, focusing instead simply on not collapsing.

On a corner, an old yellow car drives past a facade riddled with rubble. On the wall, bearing the street name, also mutilated, only one word survives: “Persevere.” A little further on, the young man will remain, for hours, slumped against a wall.

The Jibacoa Campgrounds, Between Shortages and Abandonment

Only some rooms at Los Cocos and a few cabins at Las Caletas remain in use amid overgrowth, ruins, and lack of fuel.

The pool at Los Cocos, one of the few areas still usable, also shows the general deterioration. / 14ymedio

Darío Hernández, Mayabeque, September 27, 2026 – What for years was one of the most affordable options for taking a family vacation in Cuba now survives amid overgrowth, dismantled cabins, and recreational areas in ruins. A tour of the popular campgrounds near Jibacoa Beach –Los Cocos, Las Caletas, El Abra, and La Laguna– reveals the deterioration of facilities that once had to be reserved at least a week in advance and now show clear signs of abandonment.

According to what 14ymedio was able to observe on site, in Santa Cruz del Norte, Mayabeque, only the rooms and the pool at Los Cocos were operating, along with a few cabins at Las Caletas. The rest of the facilities were in very poor condition: structures surrounded by brush, common areas without maintenance, and recreational areas that barely retain traces of their former use.

The Jibacoa campgrounds, between shortages and abandonment. /14ymedio

A worker in the area explained to this newspaper that one of the main problems is the inability to cover the cost of some services. “It is becoming very difficult to maintain them, especially because of the brush cutting,” he commented. Because these are large areas, clearing the overgrowth depends on brush cutters that operate with fuel, an increasingly scarce and expensive resource on the Island. According to his testimony, the last time the work was done it cost 25,000 pesos, an amount that is now almost impossible to afford. continue reading

The lack of clearing is visible at a glance. Around many of the cabins, grass grows unchecked and reaches the entrances. Some structures have lost their doors and windows, while others retain little more than their framework. The deterioration of the accommodations is compounded by the condition of the communal spaces. Play areas, cafeterias, open-air structures, and other recreational facilities show obvious deterioration and give the impression of having gone a long time without repairs or attention.

Where there were once spaces designed for leisure and rest, abandonment and lack of maintenance now predominate. / 14ymedio

In several areas, the pavement appears cracked, dirty, or overrun by vegetation. Where there were once spaces designed for leisure and rest, abandonment and lack of maintenance now predominate. The scene contrasts with the natural beauty of the Jibacoa surroundings, one of the best-known beach destinations in the western part of the country.

The pool at Los Cocos, one of the few areas still usable, also shows the general deterioration. Although it remains open, part of the facility is out of service and dirty, confirming the campground’s partial operating condition. Even in the best-preserved complex in the area, the abandonment is evident.

The difference from previous years is notable. According to testimonies gathered in the area, at this time of year it was customary for the cabins to be in high demand, even though conditions were already poor back then. Now, however, demand appears to have collapsed at the same pace as the condition of the facilities. “Except for the first cabins at Los Cocos, this looks like a Resident Evil movie,” one camper says during the tour.

The scene contrasts with the natural beauty of the Jibacoa surroundings, one of the best-known beach destinations in the western part of the country. / 14ymedio

Beyond the extreme appearance of some areas, the underlying problem is the same one affecting almost all services in Cuba: lack of resources, fuel shortages, and accumulated deterioration. In the case of the campgrounds, this deterioration also has symbolic value. For many years, popular camping was presented by the Young Communist League as an affordable leisure alternative for Cubans, especially students and working families who could not aspire to hotels or more expensive destinations.

Today, in many of these enclaves, the official promise has been reduced to a handful of rooms in use and facilities that are barely holding together. The case of the Jibacoa campgrounds also illustrates a deterioration that does not appear to be temporary. It is not merely a lack of paint or an isolated breakdown, but a deep deterioration of the infrastructure and basic maintenance services. It is no longer only food, transportation, or electricity that is in short supply: the few places where generations of Cubans could afford a modest vacation near the sea are also falling apart.

Some structures have lost their doors and windows, while others retain little more than their framework. / 14ymedio

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Public Health Acknowledges Deterioration of the Epidemiological Situation in Cuba

The vice minister links the increase in infections to problems with sanitation, water treatment, and waste collection.

Mientras continúan las dificultades para garantizar el agua, el saneamiento y la recogida de residuos, el deterioro de los servicios sanitarios tampoco ayuda a contener las enfermedades. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, September 27, 2026 / The Ministry of Public Health acknowledged concerns surrounding the epidemiological situation in Cuba and pointed to an increase in cases of various diseases, which it attributed to deficiencies in sanitation, water treatment, and waste collection, amid the serious water and health crisis affecting the Island.

Deputy Minister of Public Health Carilda Peña García admitted this Friday on Cuban television that there has been an increase in acute respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, and hepatitis, as well as a notable rise in arboviruses, including dengue and chikungunya. She also acknowledged the relationship between the deterioration of sanitary conditions and the increase in diseases, linking it to poor hygienic conditions and problems with water supply and treatment.

Regarding respiratory diseases, the official explained that endemic coronaviruses are circulating in the country, in addition to SARS-CoV-2 –with a predominance of Omicron subvariants–, as well as the influenza virus and other agents. The vice minister noted, however, that no severity comparable to that of the COVID-19 pandemic is being observed, although she also did not provide precise figures.

Endemic coronaviruses are circulating in the country, in addition to SARS-CoV-2 –with a predominance of Omicron subvariants–, as well as the influenza virus and other agents

The greatest cause for alarm, however, is arboviruses. Peña García confirmed the circulation of chikungunya, although she rejected the idea that there is an “excessive” increase in the disease and specifically denied the unofficial reports circulating on social media, again without providing precise data to contradict them. According to the vice minister, cases are concentrated mainly in territories where the incidence of the disease was lower during the previous period, while those who became ill then now have lower susceptibility. continue reading

Regarding dengue, the vice minister confirmed that all four serotypes of the virus are circulating, with serotype 2 predominating. She attributed the increase in the vector population to “high temperatures, rainfall, and humidity,” but acknowledged that these factors are joined by “other avoidable and controllable factors, fundamentally linked to existing conditions inside and around homes.”

Peña García said that the increase in dengue cases “corresponds to the seasonal rise also being recorded in other countries in the region,” but the Ministry of Public Health has not publicly updated its data on the disease since June. At that time, it had reported 298 cases, while the Global Dengue Observatory estimated 2,173 infections in July and 3,214 in August.

The organization, which gathers information from government sources and international health organizations, estimated that as of September 18 there had been 7,133 cumulative cases in Cuba, about 7.4 times more than expected for this date, thus placing the Island among the countries in the region with the highest relative incidence. The figure is concerning because October is usually the month with the highest incidence of dengue in Cuba.

The situation is occurring in a “context marked by limitations in environmental sanitation systems, water treatment, and wastewater collection”

Another concern acknowledged by the Ministry of Public Health is the increase in acute diarrheal diseases and hepatitis. “Various microorganisms associated with these conditions are circulating, including viruses and bacteria,” said the vice minister, who added that the situation is occurring in a “context marked by limitations in environmental sanitation systems, water treatment, and wastewater collection.”

At the beginning of September, the U.S. Embassy in Havana issued a health alert over the increase in diarrheal diseases and recommended taking extra precautions with water, food, and ice.

The Spanish Government also currently maintains a health warning for Cuba and notes that outbreaks of hepatitis A are occurring on the Island.

A report published this week by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention added another warning sign: between June 2024 and February 2026, 249 cases of hepatitis A were recorded in Florida, 76 of which were associated with recent travel to Cuba. Among the cases genetically studied, 15 of 18 shared the same strain, consistent with a common origin.

In May, the Ministry of Public Health had ruled out the existence of an epidemic of this disease, but acknowledged a “very complex” health situation and cases in several provinces.

While difficulties in guaranteeing water, sanitation, and waste collection persist, the deterioration of health services is also doing little to contain the diseases. According to testimonies collected by 14ymedio, some Havana residents with suspicious symptoms have chosen not to go to health centers and instead self-medicate with drugs purchased on the informal market, making it even more difficult to record official figures.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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“The ‘Guajiro’ Who Doesn’t Have a Three-Wheeled Vehicle or a Mare Loses His Food in the Countryside”

The lack of fuel and state transportation affects passengers, students, and farmers in Guantánamo alike.

“People depend on this because state buses no longer leave from here to get to those little towns.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Dayamí Rojas, Guantánamo, September 26, 2026 – Outside the Guantánamo bus terminal, where travelers once looked for a bus route that would take them closer to their municipality, they now wait for an electric three-wheeler, a private car, a motorcycle, or, if the destination and distance allow, even a horse-drawn carriage. There are passengers asking questions, drivers negotiating, and small vehicles where every seat counts.

“The price of a liter of gasoline here is above 2,500 pesos and diesel is 1,900, so that drives up all the prices for these vehicles,” a driver of an old Ford that travels from the station to other towns in the province explains to 14ymedio. “People depend on this because state buses no longer leave from here to get to those little towns.”

The transportation crisis, severe within the city of Guantánamo, takes on another dimension when one looks toward the municipalities and rural communities. There, it is not simply a matter of arriving late to work or walking several stops: the lack of vehicles affects school attendance, a medical appointment, and even the possibility of getting a harvest out of the countryside before it spoils.

“There is no pocket that can withstand it”: the daily ordeal of getting around Guantánamo.

Juan Carlos, 59, has been doing the math for days. His daughter is hospitalized in a hospital in the provincial capital and he needs to visit her every day. “A three-wheeler costs you 500 or 600 pesos,” he laments. In addition to visiting her, he has to bring her food. “Every day you have to bring her food, so that’s 500 pesos there and 500 pesos back; there is no pocket that can withstand that.” continue reading

On the streets of Guantánamo, electric three-wheelers have become an essential means of transportation. Some are blue, some black, with canopies to protect passengers from the sun and modifications made on the fly. Small groups gather around them, waiting for a seat or asking the price before getting in. The scene is repeated as state bus routes have practically disappeared and mobility has been left in the hands of private transport operators.

For those who live outside the city, the problem begins much earlier. Ramona lives in Cuneira, a rural community in the municipality of El Salvador located 23 kilometers from Guantánamo, and she must regularly travel to the provincial capital to receive treatment related to her diabetes. Each trip has become an operation requiring money, time, and luck.

“I have a horse-drawn carriage with a mare and I pick up passengers, but I also transport root vegetables and fruit to Guantánamo, where my brother has a pushcart for selling them”

“We used to have the train, but now not even that; we depend on the three-wheelers all the time,” she says. For students in those areas, especially those who must travel to schools far from their homes, the transportation shortage also turns the school day into an obstacle course. Getting to the classroom often depends on finding a vehicle, having money to pay for it, or walking part of the way.

But the crisis does not only affect the transportation of people. It also leaves products stranded in the fields that should end up in the city’s markets.

“I have a horse-drawn carriage with a mare and I pick up passengers, but I also transport root vegetables and fruit to Guantánamo, where my brother has a pushcart for selling them,” explains a resident of El Salvador. The animal-drawn vehicle, associated for decades with short trips and rural areas, is once again gaining prominence because of the lack of fuel.

“The guajiro who doesn’t have something like this or hasn’t bought an electric three-wheeler has his food rotting in the field because there is no fuel to get it out,” he sums up.

The consequence ultimately reaches the consumer as well. If transporting a sack of produce costs more, that expense ends up incorporated into the selling price. Expensive fuel, the lack of state transportation, and the need to resort to private alternatives form a chain that begins in the furrow and ends in the consumer’s pocket.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Cuban Regime Complains That U.S. Sanctions Are Hindering Economic Reforms on the Island

Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío rejects the possibility that Cuba could cede its mineral wealth to the United States, as Venezuela did with its oil.

The Cuban deputy foreign minister ruled out the possibility that economic pressure alone could bring down the Government and advocated a negotiated solution. / Granma / Dunia Álvarez Palacios

14ymedio, Havana, September 26, 2026 – The Cuban Government now maintains that U.S. sanctions are preventing the economic reforms it is attempting to implement from succeeding, reforms intended to give greater space to the private sector and the market. Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío made the statement in an interview with Bloomberg This Weekend (Bloomberg) , in which he also rejected the possibility that Havana could offer Washington access to its mineral resources by following the path taken by Delcy Rodríguez’s Venezuela.

“If the United States reduces the pressure, those transformations in Cuba can advance significantly and become truly irreversible, which is our objective and, in theory, what the United States wants to happen,” the diplomat said in a conversation with journalist David Gura of Bloomberg.

De Cossío was referring to the package of 176 measures with which the Government intends to modify some of the pillars of an economy that has been in crisis for years, giving more space to the private sector, decentralizing some decisions, and expanding certain foreign-currency operations. The deputy foreign minister himself had admitted days earlier that Havana does not know what the outcome of those transformations will be. “We cannot know what the final outcome will be, but we must do something to change the current reality,” he said at the time.

“Cuba’s resources belong to the people,” he said. “Our Government has no right to deprive them of those resources and hand them over to another country”

On this occasion, however, he blamed Washington for making the process more difficult. According to De Cossío, the reforms cannot reach their full potential while the United States maintains what he described as a policy of “oppression and suffocation” against the Cuban population.

The deputy foreign minister also responded to Donald Trump, who this week described Cuba as a “failed state” during his address to the United Nations. “He said that Cuba is a totally failed state, but in the same sentence he says that the United States is exerting more pressure than ever. In other words, he acknowledges that U.S. pressure is the cause of the failure,” De Cossío replied. continue reading

One of the most significant moments of the interview came when Bloomberg asked the official about the possibility that Cuba could follow the Venezuelan model and offer the U.S. privileged access to its natural resources. De Cossío flatly ruled out a similar formula for Cuban deposits. “Cuba’s resources belong to the people,” he said. “Our Government has no right to deprive them of those resources and hand them over to another country.”

“Ally is too strong a word”

The statement comes at a particularly sensitive moment for Cuban mining. Canadian company Sherritt International suspended its direct participation in its nickel and cobalt joint ventures on the Island in May and is currently negotiating a recapitalization with U.S. firm Gillon Capital, which could end up controlling 55% of the company. The transaction remains subject to regulatory approvals and to longstanding claims involving properties nationalized after 1959.

The diplomat also distanced himself from Venezuela, for decades Havana’s main political and energy partner. Asked by Bloomberg whether Cuba still considers the South American country an ally, he replied: “Ally is too strong a word.”

De Cossío also expressed misgivings about another apparently contradictory phenomenon: while Washington is tightening sanctions against the Cuban Government, U.S. shipments destined primarily for the Island’s emerging private sector have increased.

Havana, the deputy foreign minister said, welcomes those goods, although it considers their volume insufficient to meet demand. He then attributed a political intention to the trade. “It is evident that the United States seeks to create a situation of dependency,” he said. “We do not want to be dominated by any other country.”

The statements coincide with a notable increase in commercial traffic from U.S. ports to Cuba. Some 45 vessels have made more than 200 trips to the Island during 2026, carrying nearly 327,000 tons of goods through the end of August. Between January and July, U.S. exports to Cuba reached approximately $674 million, 61.8% more than during the same period in 2025.

“We want to reach a solution with the United States as soon as possible”

Despite the deterioration in relations, De Cossío said that Havana does not want to wait for a possible change in the U.S. political balance after the November midterm elections to alter policy toward the Island. Some Cubans, he acknowledged, hope that a Democratic victory in Congress will reduce pressure from the Trump Administration, but he described that possibility as an “illusion.”

“We cannot sit idly by,” he said. “We want to reach a solution with the United States as soon as possible. And what happens internally in the United States will not have a real impact on Cuba.”

Talks between the two governments are, according to the deputy foreign minister, virtually at a standstill. Even so, he ruled out the possibility that economic pressure alone could bring down the Cuban Government and advocated a negotiated way out.

“We would welcome a solution,” he said. And he acknowledged that such a formula could be “far from what we want, but less than what some people in the United States might expect.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Canadian Diplomats Affected by “Havana Syndrome” Were Sharing Information with the CIA

The intelligence operations would have been of special value to the US because of the close relationship between Canada and Cuba

The US sent satellite equipment to the Canadian embassy in Havana in diplomatic containers at the end of 2016. / OnCuba

14ymedio, Madrid, September 26, 2026 – When the mysterious symptoms of the so-called “Havana syndrome” began to appear among US and Canadian diplomats in Cuba, between 2016 and 2018, officials from both countries were collaborating on intelligence operations, the Canadian outlet The Globe and Mail revealed this Saturday.

A Canadian diplomat was sharing information with US agents, and Canada was using satellite equipment smuggled onto the island by the US, according to two sources close to the operations, who are not identified by The Globe since they could face serious charges for revealing government secrets.

One of the sources said that a diplomat assigned to the Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) at the Canadian embassy in Havana gathered information for Canada and its allies. The data were sent to the security and intelligence division of Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and to Canada’s partners in the Five Eyes alliance: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

“At times they could be asked to send the information directly” to a CIA agent at the US embassy, the source told The Globe. continue reading

“At times they could be asked to send the information directly” to a CIA agent at the US embassy

The information gathering would have been of special value to the US because of the close relationship between Canada and Cuba. Canadian diplomats had better access to Cuban officials and could travel outside Havana, while the US mission was then headed by a chargé d’affaires rather than an ambassador.

The second source revealed that the US sent satellite equipment to the Canadian embassy in Cuba in diplomatic containers by sea at the end of 2016. As these were diplomatic pouches, the Cuban authorities could not open the containers under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

According to this source, the equipment was installed on the roof of the Canadian embassy and in the homes of some of that country’s diplomats. The antennas, the source explained, “could be used for anything: you could use them to access the internet, you could use them for whatever you wanted.”

A former senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said there was a conviction within the department that Russia was behind the sonic attacks

This situation began precisely during the so-called “thaw,” after US President Barack Obama began in 2015 to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba, broken off since 1961. In early 2017, Canadian and US diplomats in Havana began to present a set of unexplained symptoms – nosebleeds, nausea, migraines, blurred vision and memory loss. The exact causes of these ailments have not been determined to this day, despite multiple investigative efforts in different countries – mostly in the US – and have been a source of controversy for years.

A former senior official of Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited by The Globe said there was a conviction within the department that Russia was behind the sonic attacks, although Ottawa could not say so publicly because it lacked evidence. According to this source, some Canadian officials believed that Russia sought to obstruct the rapprochement between the US and Cuba, in which Canada had played a role. The targets, according to this interpretation, would have been Americans and Canadians linked to intelligence-gathering activities.

The hypothesis coincides with investigations in the US that have pointed to a Russian military intelligence unit as possibly responsible for some of the so-called “anomalous health incidents.” But this explanation has not been unanimously accepted.

The GSRP, for which the Canadian diplomat in Havana worked between 2016 and 2018, is a specialized unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially tasked with obtaining open-source information on political and security matters. The Ministry denied to The Globe that the diplomats in Cuba shared information with US spies.

The department also denied that the GSRP is an intelligence-gathering program. According to the official version, the officials in that program are accredited diplomats who carry out their activities openly and legally and comply with the Vienna Convention.

However, a Canadian parliamentary investigation cited by The Globe had pointed to problems with the program’s oversight. A 2023 report by the body responsible for reviewing Canada’s security and intelligence activities described the GSRP as sitting in a “clearly gray zone.” The report noted that some of its officials had maintained contacts with foreign intelligence agencies and appeared to have obtained classified information from certain sources.

The revelations by ‘The Globe’ coincide with a legal battle between the Canadian Government and diplomats who were working in Havana when the symptoms began

The revelations by The Globe coincide with a legal battle between the Canadian Government and diplomats who were working in Havana when the symptoms began, which has been kept secret since last year, when new information was submitted in the proceedings.

This Friday, Canada’s Department of Justice confirmed to The Globe that the Government invoked a rule restricting the disclosure of information whose publication could harm national security, national defense or international relations. The Government has not explained what information it seeks to keep secret because the case is still before the courts.

The lawsuit was initially filed in 2019 by ten diplomats and their family members. The plaintiffs accused the Canadian Government of failing to provide them with sufficiently advanced medical care, withholding relevant information from them and minimizing the severity of the brain injuries they attributed to the attacks.

In a statement released on Friday, Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that there is no “definitive common cause” for the illnesses that affected officials posted at its embassy in Havana and declined to comment further on the litigation because it is before the courts.

In a report published in February 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that its officials’ unexplained ailments were not the result of a malicious act by a foreign power. For its part, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police investigated the cases after Canadian officials began reporting symptoms in 2017. Six years later, the police force published a heavily redacted report that did not reach definitive conclusions.

Translated by GH

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Cuban Consulates Are a Gold Mine for the Regime, According to an Investigation by ‘El Toque’

Internal documents from the Embassy in Washington reveal revenues of more than $270 million between 2019 and 2025

How much money does the entire network of consular services really contribute to the Cuban State, and what does it end up being spent on? / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, September 26, 2026 /Cuban consular services in the United States have for years functioned as an extraordinary source of foreign currency for the Havana Government. An investigation published this Friday by El Toque, based on thousands of leaked internal documents from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, reveals that the diplomatic mission collected more than $270 million between 2019 and 2025, a figure that could be even higher because the records obtained are incomplete.

The investigation, by journalist Ernesto Eimil, draws on 4,713 files from the institutional email accounts of the ambassador, the consul and an administrative assistant. El Toque obtained the documents at the end of 2025 through a collaboration with Systema, the investigative unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and says it verified and cross-checked them before publishing them.

More than the amounts collected, the documents show that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set specific financial targets for its consular services. In 2019, for example, the target set for the Embassy in Washington was close to $96 million. By July of that year, approximately 67% of the plan had already been met.

In the first seven months of 2019 alone, according to the records analyzed, the Consulate processed 64,480 passport applications, which then cost $350, and 86,104 extensions, at $160 each

The money came mainly from issuing passports, legalizations and notarial procedures, and the sale of tourist cards. Until July 2023, fees were also charged for the mandatory extensions of the Cuban passport.

In the first seven months of 2019 alone, according to the records analyzed, the Consulate processed 64,480 passport applications, which then cost $350, and 86,104 extensions, at $160 each. On top of this came 486,965 tourist cards sold at $50. Those three items alone accounted for around $60.7 million. continue reading

The pandemic caused travel to plummet, but did not completely dry up the source of income. In 2021, up to July 30, the Cuban mission had brought in $27.1 million, 63.12% of its annual plan. According to the documents cited by El Toque, that year Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez congratulated the consular staff for “overfulfilling the established plan.”

With the recovery of travel, the money came back too. By September 2022, the Embassy had collected $52.2 million, 121.49% of the target set for the entire year. In the same period of 2023 it had taken in $44.9 million, although in that case it had reached only 72.42% of what was planned.

In 2023 the Government lowered the price of the passport abroad, extended its validity from six to ten years for those over 16 and eliminated the extensions every two years

The migration reform of July 2023 later reduced a significant part of that income. The Government lowered the price of the passport abroad, extended its validity from six to ten years for those over 16 and eliminated the extensions every two years. As a result, Washington’s revenue plan fell to $36 million in 2024 and to $30 million in 2025.

Even that more modest target makes it possible to gauge the economic weight of the consular services. Another of the leaked documents puts the total budget of the Cuban Embassy in Washington for 2025 at $2,442,423. Of that amount, a maximum of $468,025 was earmarked for salaries and just over a million for renting housing for its officials. In January, about 50 people worked there.

The consular revenue target for that same year – $30 million – was therefore equivalent to more than 12 times the entire budget of the diplomatic mission. The comparison does not make it possible to establish the net profit obtained by the Cuban State, since all the costs associated with providing these services are unknown, but it shows the enormous gap between the volume of revenue and the mission’s budgeted expenses.

Starting this coming October 1, the passport for those over 16 will rise – once again – from 180 to 200 dollars or euros, while that for minors will go up from 140 to 160

The publication of the documents also coincides with a new increase in consular fees. Starting this coming October 1, the passport for those over 16 will go from 180 to 200 dollars or euros, while that for minors will rise from 140 to 160. Civil Registry certifications, academic documents, legalizations and numerous legal procedures will also go up.

The Foreign Ministry justified the price increase by citing the “complex international macroeconomic outlook” and “sustained global inflation,” and claimed that the new prices will make it possible to improve the quality, security and efficiency of the services.

If a single diplomatic mission, the one in Washington, was able to gather more than $270 million in seven years, the question the files leave open is much bigger: how much money the entire network of consular services really contributes to the Cuban State, and what it ends up being spent on.

Translated by GH

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More Sanctions and More Trade: The US Is Now Cuba’s Main Supplier

It went from tenth to first place among the island’s trading partners, leaving behind Spain and China, which previously topped the list

The volume accumulated by the United States in just seven months is already approaching the total of Spain’s exports to Cuba for all of 2025. / Facebook/ ZED Mariel

14ymedio, Havana, September 26, 2026 / In just three years, the United States has gone from occupying a secondary place in trade with Cuba to becoming its largest supplier, ahead of Spain and China, at the same time as the Trump Administration is tightening sanctions against Havana. In 2023, the US ranked only tenth among the island’s trading partners.

Between January and July 2026, US exports to Cuba reached $674 million, above those recorded by Spain and China over the same period. The comparison confirms the turnaround: the US, which just three years ago ranked tenth among the island’s trading partners, now heads the list, although it only sells to the island and buys almost nothing from it.

On another level, the volume accumulated by the United States in just seven months is already approaching the total of Spain’s exports to Cuba for the whole of 2025 (682.4 million euros) and the $684.2 million that China had shipped between January and August of that same year. continue reading

In the first seven months of the year, the US had already exported the equivalent of 83.2% of everything recorded in 2025

The US surge has been dizzying. In July alone, exports reached $148.9 million, the highest monthly figure since the U.S. Census Bureau began tracking them in 1992. In the first seven months of the year, the US had already exported the equivalent of 83.2% of everything recorded in 2025.

Between 2021 and 2025, US exports to Cuba grew by 148%, from about $327 million to more than $809 million.

The growing exchange is also visible in the ports. Some 45 cargo ships have made more than 200 trips from the United States to Cuba this year. By the end of August they had transported nearly 327,000 tons of goods from Miami, Houston, New Orleans, Jacksonville, Wilmington and other US ports.

The shipments include food, automobiles, motorcycles, solar power systems and petroleum products, which have gained weight amid Cuba’s severe energy crisis. In June, the US sent Cuba 778,000 barrels of fuel, 63.4% more than in May and the largest monthly volume recorded up to then in 2026.

While the United States exported $674 million to Cuba through July, it imported barely half a million dollars’ worth of goods from the island (exactly $515,550) over the same period

During the first half of the year, shipments totaled 1.67 million barrels. Washington authorizes these exports of fuel when they are destined for the Cuban private sector, although 14ymedio has documented numerous illegal sales to the state apparatus.

Between January and September 2025 alone, the island imported $355 million in agricultural products from the US, 15% more than in the same period of the previous year. Among the purchases that grew the most were pork, sugar, coffee, grains and animal feed.

Trade, moreover, flows in only one direction. While the United States exported $674 million to Cuba through July, it imported barely half a million dollars’ worth of goods from the island (exactly $515,550) over the same period. Of the total, $459,543 corresponded to works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques (90%); $52,319 to machinery and mechanical appliances, and $3,688 to plastics and plastic products, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

Bloomberg noted that, as a result of the restrictions imposed by Washington on the large European shipping companies, some exports from third countries must pass through US ports.

Translated by GH.

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Raúl Castro’s Son-in-Law Owns Three Tourist Apartments in Barcelona

The Spanish newspaper ‘El Confidencial’ claims that Paolo Titolo managed the investments of Portuguese magnate Américo Ferreira Amorim in Spain for years.

Paolo Titolo’s apartment on Viladomat street in Barcelona’s Eixample district, according to information published by ‘El Confidencial’. / Google Maps

14ymedio, Madrid, 25 September 2026 / Paolo Titolo, Mariela Castro’s second husband, owns up to three tourist apartments in Barcelona, according to a report published Friday by El Confidencial. Citing sources in the Property Registry and people close to Raúl Castro’s son-in-law, the Spanish online newspaper indicates that he purchased them in 2015, 2017, and 2019, respectively.

The first property is a 155-square-meter [approximately 1,700-square-feet] apartment near Plaza de España and the Las Arenas shopping center, which, as El Confidencial points out, “is beyond the reach of the average citizen.” According to real estate websites, the price per square meter in this area is over €6,600, leading the Spanish online newspaper to estimate its market value at between €950,000 and €1,250,000.

On June 9, 2017, the publication details, he acquired his second property, an apartment in La Barceloneta, the old fishing neighborhood by the sea. Measuring 32 square meters, its value is estimated between €160,000 and €210,000, according to El Confidencial, “although the price could be higher, as the building has an elevator.” These types of apartments, the newspaper says, “were highly sought after in past decades by investors who, after renovating them, converted them into studio lofts and rented them out to tourists.” continue reading

Titolo, an Italian national and photojournalist by profession, “swarmed around Spain” for years, especially Barcelona, to look for investments for Cuba.

The third apartment Titolo acquired in 2019, is on Viladomat Street in the Eixample district, “in a building associated with tourist apartments, well-built and with soundproof windows,” El Confidencial reports. Also 32 square meters, the price of this property ranges between 180,000 and 220,000 euros.

El Confidencial reports that Titolo, an Italian national and photojournalist by profession, “swarmed around Spain” for years, especially Barcelona, seeking investments for Cuba. His main occupation, the online publication states, was “managing the businesses” of Américo Ferreira Amorim, who died in 2017. Amorim was once the richest man in Portugal and became friends with Fidel Castro and his brother in the 1960s. Titolo told El Confidencial that a businessman he knows personsally “decided how to invest” the money from the Portuguese magnate, owner of the Amorim conglomerate that sent “six or seven million euros.” At the same time, Raúl Castro’s son-in-law “was involved in other business dealings.”

In Barcelona, the publication reports, “he knocked on many doors, met with businesspeople, and asked to be introduced to elite economic circles to facilitate business deals in Havana. He became a simple commission agent, charging exorbitant fees for his political connections; after all, he was the boss’s son-in-law.” One of the deals he attempted, according to El Confidencial, was to obtain the Nissan dealership in Cuba, which “failed to go through” because “the Japanese wouldn’t budge” and continued to leave it in the hands of a Mexican billionaire.

Gaia Mercado, in Havana, owned by Lisa Titolo Castro, granddaughter of Raúl Castro. / 14ymedio

The online newspaper highlights the paradox that Titolo realized all these operations while the mayor of Barcelona was the leftist Ada Colau, who declared open war on tourist apartments during her administration. Her first deputy mayor, moreover, was Gerardo Pisarello, who to this day maintains close ties with the Communist Party of Cuba. He was, in fact, one of the passengers last March on the so-called Convoy Nuestra América organized by far-left organizations in solidarity with the regime and against the US embargo.

According to reports in the independent press, the Castro Titolo family and their children are among the wealthiest on the island. CubaNet, for example, revealed that Lisa Titolo Castro, owner of the Gaia Mercado local development project, is linked to a network of businesses built on the privileges of her surname, including fuel imports. In addition to Gaia, Lisa manages two agricultural farms, a meat processing company, and two micro-enterprises that supply construction materials, CubaNet asserted .

Residents of Central Havana, for their part, have pointed to Mariela Castro as a shadowy figure in businesses that were once privileged, such as the Tribe Caribe hotel, founded by Andrés Levín, and El Biky, but her name does not appear in them officially.

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For Cuba, Political Change Must Precede Economic Change

The CubanAmerican Voice, Julio M. Shiling , September 25, 2026 / For more than six decades the Castro-Communist dictatorship has survived by weaponizing scarcity, fear, and the patient calculation that democratic nations eventually tire of principle. That calculation is now under pressure. American foreign policy continues to treat the removal of this regime as a matter of national security for the United States, for the West, and for Latin America itself.

Recent evidence is plain: President Trump’s direct indictment at the United Nations of Havana’s role in fostering communist subversion; the Army Reserve’s quiet examination of whether it can supply Southern Command with police, medical, and support units on short notice; and the State Department’s continuous round of sanctions targeting Cuba’s elites, financial channels, and resource-extraction apparatus. These are not gestures. They are the concrete instruments of a long-held strategic judgment.

Cuban exiles have answered in kind. In Miami—the second-largest Cuban city after Havana—an impressive coalition of Cuban-American business leaders has convened to announce the creation of the Cuban-American National Chamber of Commerce and to declare readiness to underwrite the island’s post-communist reconstruction. Their message is clear and welcome: the exiled nation is prepared to foot the bill for a free Cuba. Washington notices. Regime change suddenly looks more fiscally attractive. continue reading

Yet attraction is not the same as wisdom. The central truth that both the American government and the Cuban-American community must keep in mind is this: in Cuba, political change must come before economic change. Under a totalitarian system, the two cannot safely proceed in tandem during the opening phase of transition. A market order does not create democracy; it operates under the political order that already exists. China, Vietnam, and post-Soviet Russia stand as enduring reminders. Capital can flow, private enterprise can flourish, and the same dictatorial structures—or their recycled successors—can remain firmly in control.

Castroism is not merely a set of inefficient policies. It is an institutional, epistemic, and hegemonic system that has colonized every formal and informal structure of Cuban life. Courts, universities, security organs, media, labor organizations, and even the language of daily discourse have been shaped to preserve the regime’s monopoly. Opening investment coffers while those structures remain intact would not liberate Cubans; it would subsidize the very apparatus that has kept them captive. The result would not be a democratic market economy but a hybrid despotism—capitalism without liberty, enrichment without accountability, and a new generation of nomenklatura wearing different suits.

What is required first is a deliberate period of transitional justice. This is essential. It is the systematic uprooting of the toxicity that totalitarianism leaves behind: the purging of compromised institutions, the recovery of historical truth, the dismantling of networks of privilege and surveillance, and the establishment of the rule of law as something more than a slogan. Only after that cleansing can genuine economic reconstruction begin without the risk of communism returning in recycled form. Emergency humanitarian aid and basic measures to alleviate suffering must arrive immediately. But the larger capital flows—the reconstruction that Cuban-American wealth, as well as foreign investors, is prepared to finance—should cautiously wait until the political foundations have been secured.

The belief that capitalism by itself will automatically produce democracy is a comforting illusion that history has repeatedly refuted. Markets are instruments. They amplify the purposes of the political order that directs them. When that order remains totalitarian or even a soft authoritarian variant, markets become tools of elite enrichment and regime longevity rather than engines of popular freedom. The Soviet collapse itself demonstrated the cost of premature economic liberalization without parallel political and institutional purification: the emergence of oligarchic and dictatorial successors that still menace the region.

Cuban exiles have preserved, across generations of departure, the best of the nation’s history, culture, and democratic aspirations. That inheritance now places upon them a dual responsibility: to support the material reconstruction of the homeland and, more urgently, to insist that reconstruction not become the mechanism by which Castroism survives under another name. The American government, for its part, must resist the temptation to treat capital as a substitute for the harder work of supporting genuine political rupture and transitional justice.

The sequence is non-negotiable. Political change first. Institutional cleansing next. Only then the full force of Cuban-American capital and Western engagement. Reverse that order, and Cuba risks exchanging one form of captivity for another—more prosperous for a few, still unfree for the many, and still a strategic liability for the hemisphere. The opportunity before us is historic. Squandering it by confusing investment with liberation would be a tragedy of our making.

Cuba’s Etecsa Users Ask Where the Millions of Dollars from the ‘Tarifazo’ Have Gone

Customers complain about “paying for a service they cannot use” because of the blackouts and because the monopoly has not modernized its infrastructure.

Etecsa has accumulated around 77,000 reports of interrupted fixed-line services. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, September 25, 2026 – On July 15, 2025, Prime Minister Manuel Marrero reported before the National Assembly that the new measures generated by Etecsa — Cuba’s State Telecommunications Company — had generated $24,839,000 in just 46 days, about $540,000 a day, compared with approximately $10,000 it had previously taken in. The head of government said at the time that those resources would be allocated to infrastructure recovery, new investments, and the expansion and development of services using new technologies.

Fourteen months later, Etecsa acknowledges that it cannot guarantee the stability of a large portion of those services and that it has had to reorganize its investments in an attempt to keep the infrastructure it already has operating. The explanation, published Thursday by Cubadebate, triggered a cascade of comments from customers who returned to a question Etecsa did not answer: what is happening to the money of those who pay for a service they cannot use?

The state monopoly acknowledged that during the latest nationwide blackout, more than 80% of radio base station sites and nearly 70% of the cabinets – telecommunications equipment installed at various points throughout the network – were out of operation. Internet traffic plunged by as much as 58%. In addition, Etecsa has accumulated around 77,000 reports of interrupted fixed-line services, which it attributes both to the shortage of resources and to the high cost of maintaining technology that the company itself describes as obsolete. continue reading

Although the infrastructure that makes it possible to use data plans remains out of service, the package clock keeps running

“We are paying for a service we cannot use. Money the customer loses,” summarized Omar Peña Ávila among the comments published by Cubadebate. The user recognizes the severity of the crisis facing the country, but points out that both fixed-line and mobile telephone services remain affected while subscribers must continue paying to keep their lines. “It isn’t reasonable,” he protests.

Leonardo Ruz Revilla raises the same problem with data packages. The customer says that the previous month he stopped using more than one gigabyte because of the lack of access to the network and that, despite this, the package expired when it reached its expiration date. “I am paying for a service I am not fully receiving,” he wrote, before asking that megabytes not used because of interruptions be allowed to accumulate.

The additional data plans established by Etecsa are valid for 35 days. The contradiction is particularly evident during prolonged blackouts, because although the infrastructure that makes it possible to use them remains out of service, the package clock keeps running.

The company, however, does provide adjustments when other services are interrupted. Last February, Etecsa’s Consumer Protection Department acknowledged the case of a customer who had been without fixed-line telephone service and Nauta Hogar since November 2024. After verifying that she had generated no traffic for six months, the company credited her 1,800 pesos for the internet service she had not received.

In addition, the Nauta Hogar postpaid option introduced in December 2025 allows up to 1,080 unused hours to accumulate and provides for adjustments to the bill when service interruptions occur. Etecsa therefore has compensation mechanisms for some products, while users of mobile packages are demanding that a similar principle be applied when blackouts prevent them from connecting.

The complaints published by Cubadebate also show that the problem predates the latest electrical collapse. A resident of Marianao says she has been without a fixed-line telephone for nearly a year, despite having to continue paying and keeping Nauta Hogar active. Another customer responds that he has also gone more than three years without fixed-line telephone service and must continue paying for the service so as not to lose the line.

The company maintains that it is not viable to continue expanding the access network – radio base stations, cabinets, and Wi-Fi zones – without first guaranteeing electrical backup for that infrastructure

Even more serious is the testimony of a reader from Entronque de Herradura, in Consolación del Sur, Pinar del Río. According to his account, following a traffic accident two weeks earlier in which a driver was in critical condition, there were no communications available to request an ambulance. A neighbor had to drive to the municipal center to request one in person. The commenter wondered what would happen in similar circumstances in the event of a heart attack or a fire.

In response to the deterioration, Etecsa has decided to change its priorities. The company maintains that it is not viable to continue expanding the access network – radio base stations, cabinets, and Wi-Fi zones – without first guaranteeing electrical backup for that infrastructure. So far, it has equipped the main centers in 64 municipal capitals with photovoltaic systems, although it admits that the installed capacity does not always allow services to be maintained around the clock. Some generators have had to operate for more than 20 consecutive hours.

Etecsa also says that the recovery of its revenues since the second half of 2025 has allowed it to pay part of its overdue debts and international services, install more than 140 radio base stations, expand frequencies to enable 4G in more than a hundred locations, and acquire licenses to increase the capacity of another 300.

Customers, however, remember the promise made when the new rates were imposed. From San José de las Lajas, one reader says that during the day mobile data speeds do not reach 500 kbps and asks what portion of those millions reached his municipality.

One final comment recalls that the increase in revenue was presented precisely as the means to purchase radio base stations, batteries, and other parts. After now reading that some of the money was used to pay accumulated debts and that the network still cannot be expanded, he leaves Etecsa with a simple warning: “Do the math, because the people are doing their own.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

*See also articles reporting on the “tarifazo” — huge price increases for telecommunications services.

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