Translating Cuba

Cuban ophthalmologists traveled to Uruguay to select patients who were then transported to the Island for eye surgeries. Between 2005 and 2007, some thirty flights carrying 2,037 Uruguayans were recorded, according to data from the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

The president of Uruguay’s Social Security Bank (BPS), Jimena Pardo, confirmed in mid-September the disbursement of $250,000 annually from the institution’s budget to Operation Miracle. The official clarified that the money does not correspond to the salaries of the 21 Cuban professionals currently working at the José Martí Eye Hospital, which is part of the Gustavo Saint Bois Hospital Center and under state administration, but rather “is a stipend, a reimbursement of expenses.”

Pardo emphasized that payment of the doctors’ salaries is the responsibility of Havana. The BPS transfers the funds to an account belonging to the brigade established by the Ministry of Public Health. She also indicated that it is stipulated that they remain in Uruguay for three-year periods.

There is no official information on the salaries received by these specialists. In May 2020, Uruguay’s Ministry of Public Health refused to disclose the remuneration and number of Cuban professionals collaborating at the José Martí Eye Hospital due to the “nonexistence of data held by this State Secretariat.”

In 2015, Uruguay’s Senate forgave a debt of $31.5 million plus interest ($55 million in total) that Cuba had incurred in 1986. The decision, they argued, was made in consideration of the “numerous instances of cooperation” that Montevideo had received from the Island “in different areas.”

Between 2008 and 2022, the presence of seven brigades in the South American nation was recorded, with around 160 professionals.

Honduras, Guatemala, and Antigua and Barbuda, as well as Guyana, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, have ended their medical cooperation projects with Cuba following pressure exerted by Washington.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Although the update does not affect the price of passports issued in Cuba, which remains at 2,500 pesos, procedures within the Island are far from simple

The increase will be more pronounced for Civil Registry certificates. Birth, marriage, common-law union, death, criminal-record, divorce, last-will, declaration of heirs, and single-status documents will cost 110 dollars or euros, to which another 30 will have to be added for the application.

For those who pay in euros, for example, obtaining one of these certificates had until now cost 100 euros: 25 to request it and 75 for its issuance. Starting in October, it will cost 140, a 40% increase, not including possible legalizations. In the other countries, the previous fee varied: issuance cost 80 dollars, and in the United States 100 dollars.

Although the update does not affect the price of passports issued in Cuba, which remains at 2,500 pesos according to Annex 4 of Law 113 of the Tax System, modified by Decree-Law 21/2020 and still in force, procedures within the Island are far from simple.

Long waits at Civil Registry offices to obtain birth, marriage, and death certificates have worsened with the increase in requests related to emigration. In 2023, the Ministry of Justice itself acknowledged a “notable increase” in requests for criminal-record certificates, which are required by numerous consulates to issue visas.

The graduate certificate and certificate of a valid, non-invalidated degree will increase from 185 to 240 euros, plus the 30-euro application fee

Academic documents are also becoming more expensive. For those who process them in euros, transcripts, study programs, and subject plans will increase from 225 to 290 euros, while the application fee will rise from 25 to 30. The combined cost thus increases from 250 to 320 euros, before legalizations. The graduate certificate and certificate of a valid, non-invalidated degree will increase from 185 to 240 euros, plus the 30-euro application fee.

Other procedures may be added to those amounts. The legalization of teaching documents in those countries will increase from 95 to 110 euros, legalization at a foreign embassy in Havana will rise from 55 to 70, and legalization, now handled by Cuba’s Ministry of Justice, will increase from 35 to 50 euros.

The increase in the price of the Cuban passport comes after confusion generated at the beginning of this year by reports that put the price at 234 dollars. The Foreign Ministry then denied that the consular fee schedule had been changed. That figure corresponded to another legal service associated with obtaining the document and not to the price charged directly by consulates.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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However, he committed the U.S. Administration to providing assistance and support if “they are open to it.” Rubio did not specify a subject for the phrase, but it was unnecessary. “The people who speak on behalf of the Government are directed by others who, at least publicly, are quite recalcitrant. But the reality of their situation is that things are not going to improve in Cuba without their making very substantial changes,” he added. In his view, the Island is facing “a golden opportunity to put itself on an irreversible path toward a better future.”

The press insisted on the military option in the Venezuelan manner, a path that is clearly far from the explicit intentions of the United States, although they refuse to rule it out publicly. “The United States – and I say this as a general answer, not even specifically for Cuba – if there is a national security threat, the president has both the power and the obligation to address it,” he began. “That said, our preference is always to address these things in a negotiated manner, in which progress is achieved through substantial changes in a country that do not involve the use of military force.”

Rubio tried to settle the matter, but had to return to the subject just six minutes later, when he was asked about the possibilities for U.S. businesspeople to enter privatized sectors in Cuba. The Secretary of State pointed out that the Helms-Burton Act limits the entry of Americans into the Island’s economy and directly pointed to Congress, which would be responsible for any eventual lifting of those restrictions.

Nevertheless, he was firm in assuring that he believes “U.S. commercial interests could play a positive role in a future Cuba with a free and open economy, where people can work for themselves or for whomever they wish.” He also stressed that there is a large number of Cuban exiles in the United States, a very prosperous community that will be in a position to contribute greatly when the situation is favorable, as will foreigners.

At this moment, he argued, circumstances are not favorable, and not only because of the embargo laws. “Why would I, for example, as a businessman from Spain, invest $10 million in Cuba if in two years they decide unilaterally to change the rules, take everything away from me, and keep the money without ever returning it to me?” he asked rhetorically. In his opinion, it is true that the Government’s new measures provide certain theoretical guarantees, but he considers it essential to wait for their implementation.

“The Trump Administration feels quite positive about the direction things are taking,” he said

“The lack of certainty is the problem. There simply is no legitimacy or credibility that this regime is going to comply with these conditions because it has never done so before,” he said, summarizing in two key points what he had previously stated: the embargo and the lack of guarantees are the key. “That is why I always come back to the same thing: it is not only about political freedom, which is incredibly important, but about having a model of government on that Island that gives the private sector confidence that, if they invest, they will get their money back with profits and that it will not be taken away from them and never reimbursed.”

Almost in parallel, the president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, John Kavulich, said in an interview with The Christian Science Monitor that negotiations and “business diplomacy” remain active through private-sector actors. “Governments, through private companies, are talking every day,” said the businessman, who mentioned “investment agreements underway.”

Kavulich did not provide details about the companies, sectors, or investment volumes, despite the fact that there are some cases – such as in mining – that are an open secret, but he said that, despite the political relations maintained publicly, things are different behind the scenes.

“The Trump Administration feels quite positive about the direction things are taking,” he said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The article emphasizes that there is considerable disparity in their cases. One said he had been forced to take part in the action; another was remorseful; one believed in the cause but admitted that the strategy was a mistake; and the last repeated that he felt pride

The article emphasizes that there is considerable disparity in their cases. One said he had been forced to take part in the action; another was remorseful; one believed in the cause but admitted that the strategy was a mistake; and the last repeated that he felt pride. They all agreed in their accounts regarding the objective of the initiative and what happened when they encountered the Cuban Border Guards, but not so much in their version of the financing and ties to the Miami exile community. They did point to Maritza Lugo Fernández, a former political prisoner and plantada [Cuban prisoner who rejected political reeducation], and a U.S. resident, who provided them with a small farm in Florida as a training camp.

Raúl Quevedo, interviewed in Florida, appears as a key link in recruiting the participants in the events. He is the administrator of the accounts of La Nueva Cuba [The New Cuba], which promotes anti-communist ideas and armed struggle against the Cuban regime on social media. “They were looking for people who had the courage to join a rebellion,” Rodríguez said.

The plan was to “take over a police station, unleash a rebellion and provoke a U.S. intervention,” says the now-detained man. Another report from Cruz says that Cárdenas, in Matanzas, had been selected. In the official account, Interior Ministry agents were more specific: it was Santa Marta, about 12 kilometers from that town.

The group was formed, they all say, through TikTok, a network that served to put these and other people with similar ideological views in contact, and they eventually met at Lugo Fernández’s farm on multiple occasions. There they practiced shooting but were unaware of possible details of a planned operation. “[The leaders] kept the plans secret for security reasons, to prevent leaks,” Rodríguez said. In January, however, things began to take shape, starting with preparations for the boat.

“For something like that, you need a plan, a structure, a Plan B, a Plan C and an escape plan. If you don’t have that, being only 10 people, you’re lost”

Quevedo, contacted by telephone, said he knew everyone involved, but flatly refused to say whether he participated in the planning. “The more you talk, the more your enemy knows about you,” he said. He believes it is easy to bring down the regime but dismisses the February operation. “For something like that, you need a plan, a structure, a Plan B, a Plan C and an escape plan. If you don’t have that, being only 10 people, you’re lost. And it’s a shame because they were good young men,” he maintains.

The interviewees are aware of this. Most agree that it was far from being something solid, but they hoped to trigger something. Some had actively followed similar groups in exile and nothing ever happened, but they saw an opportunity with Maduro’s capture in January, growing pressure from Donald Trump, and the population’s desperation. “It is illogical to think that 10 men can declare war on a country. That would be absurd. But we were aware of the social discontent. We knew people wanted something to happen. Maybe a spark,” Cruz said.

The account of the day of the events, February 24, is very similar to the one offered by the Cuban authorities. One of them said the first shot came from the boat; the other three say they are not sure. They were carrying 14 long guns and 11 handguns; 13,000 rounds of ammunition; more than 100 magazines; homemade pipe bombs packed with fragments of nuts, bolts, and black powder; Molotov cocktails; bulletproof vests; camouflage uniforms; helmets; knives; night-vision equipment; a drone; a Starlink satellite internet terminal; and medical supplies.

Around 7 in the morning – as the participants feared, admitting that they were afraid dawn would expose them – a Border Guard spotted them, and although they tried to flee, the boat ran aground in the middle of a low tide. They got out to free it and then climbed back aboard to start it up at maximum speed, which was insufficient. “That’s when Leordán Cruz Gómez shouted: ‘Get ready. They’re going to shoot. Get the magazines,’” Acosta recalls. None of them expected to shoot their way onto the Island, two of them said, but that is what happened, although all the interviewees deny having fired and blame the others.

Galindo says the wounded Cuban captain was the one who ordered his men to stop. “If he had let them continue, they would have killed us all”

“Amijail grabbed a magazine for the Chinese-made AK-47 he had and opened fire on the Border Guard troops. That’s when the shooting started. I don’t know exactly what happened, because at that moment I got scared and threw myself onto the floor of the boat so the bullets wouldn’t hit me,” Acosta specifies. According to the Cuban authorities, the Cuban coast guards had five small-caliber weapons and none had seen combat.

The exchange lasted minutes, according to both sides, until the survivors surrendered. Galindo says the wounded Cuban captain was the one who ordered his men to stop. “If he had let them continue, they would have killed us all,” he says.

Ledián Padrón Guevara, Héctor Duani Cruz Correa and Pavel Alling Peña died at the scene. Michel Ortega Casanova died during the evacuation, and Roberto Álvarez Ávila died in the hospital a week later.

The investigation contains statements from exiles in Florida who defend the initiative from a certain distance. It also includes explanations from Ministry of the Interior agents who have linked these groups to terrorism on more than one occasion, as well as a review of similar attempts in the past. Beyond the detainees, the team of journalists managed to speak with one of the key figures in the events: Maritza Lugo.

“The Castro regime has constantly accused me of being a terrorist, of paying for things. What could I possibly pay for? I live on Social Security. I receive $700 a month, which is not enough for anything. I try to save. I do odd jobs. My family helps me if I need something extra. But I don’t have money to finance absolutely anything,” she maintains. Lugo did, however, create the Facebook page called 10 Cuban Patriots in support of the group.

“The Castro regime has constantly accused me of being a terrorist, of paying for things. What could I possibly pay for? I live on Social Security. I receive $700 a month, which is not enough for anything”

She is the promoter of the November 30 Party, an ally of Auto Defensa del Pueblo [Self Defense of the People], a group that views violence as a means of ending the Cuban regime, founded by Amijail Sánchez, the fifth detainee, who did not grant an interview. Lugo and Sánchez were romantically involved for more than a year, she says, although she distances herself from any action of this kind. “They went far beyond the limits of what is normal because what they did was truly crazy. Who in their right mind could think that ten men could accomplish anything against a dictatorship like that?” she exclaims. In her view, the military initiative must have come from the United States.

Lugo admits that shooting practice took place at her Florida farm, although for hunting animals. “Anyone who trained at my farm, who said they trained, that’s their problem. Here in the U.S. that is against the law. It is a crime,” she maintains. County officials confirmed to the outlet, however, that this August they inspected the property and noted that there was a design intended to “facilitate training that incorporates multiple shooting angles and directions rather than functioning as a traditional shooting range.”

Regarding financing, Rodríguez says no one paid them for the equipment they used and categorically rules out Lugo. “What she mainly did was handle the political side,” Rodríguez said. In this he differs from the testimony of Conrado Galindo, who says she offered him $500 to film training videos. When he arrived at the meeting, Lugo told him the plan was something else – “You’re going to Cuba” – and threatened him when he expressed reluctance, he says. Two other detainees confirm that there was pressure, while she says they are being coerced. “What are they supposed to say? They want to save their lives, and they are being forced to say those things.”

The detainees’ relatives corroborate that all of them were actively opposed to the regime and reject the label of terrorists.

Currently, the detainees remain in a maximum-security area inside Combinado del Este, the maximum-security prison in Havana

The investigation highlights cooperation between the Border Guard troops and the U.S. Coast Guard. The liaison officers maintain regular contact, related to all kinds of maritime activity, despite the rhetoric of confrontation between the two governments. The Cuban side, however, questions whether U.S. authorities were unaware that this activity was taking place. “Everything is monitored. And yet, a speedboat of this type, carrying ten people, explosives filled with shrapnel, Molotov cocktails and military supplies, and a boat that was coming to sow pain here in Cuba and kill people, was able to make the trip,” says First Colonel Ybey Carballo Pérez, chief of staff of the Border Guard. They also regret the limited exchanges following the events, including the reports. The FBI and the State Department did not respond to the outlet’s questions.

Currently, the detainees remain in a maximum-security area inside Combinado del Este, the maximum-security prison in Havana. Two of them have reported some kicking or stomping, while the other two deny mistreatment. They can receive family visits every three weeks. Rodríguez’s girlfriend visited him in July and found him well, although pale and thin.

Cruz says he still believes in his cause, but that other resources are needed for armed struggle to succeed. “I am convinced that everyone in Cuba wants change,” he said. Galindo says that if he ever returns to the U.S., he will sue Maritza Lugo for kidnapping and threats. Acosta regrets the “insanity”: “The advice I would give other Cubans is to stop consuming so much garbage [on social media]. Keep your jobs and don’t come to do anything, because it isn’t going to turn out well,” he urges.

Rodríguez is the only one who maintains his belligerence intact. He says he feels that he “failed all those Cubans who want a free Cuba” and adds: “If they told me they would send an oil tanker to Cuba in exchange for releasing me, I would rather rot in prison than allow a single drop of oil to enter this country.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Cubalex warns that attributing a death to self-harming behavior or to another inmate “does not rule out examining the actions or omissions by the state that may have contributed to the outcome.”

It also reports that three Cuban provinces show a marked concentration of prison mortality, accounting for more than half of the cases: Santiago de Cuba (29 deaths, or 25.2%), Havana (21 deaths, or 18.3%), and Mayabeque (16 deaths, or 13.9%).

They are followed by Guantánamo, which ranks fourth with 11 deaths (9.6%), most of them occurring so far in 2026 and associated with malnutrition, starvation, and tuberculosis, along with Granma with 7 deaths (6.1%).

The NGO cites cases of death in the Island’s prisons due to “medical denial or negligence,” a mechanism it considers “dominant,” having been identified in at least 80 of the 115 recorded deaths (70%).

Three provinces show a marked concentration of prison mortality, accounting for more than half of the cases: Santiago de Cuba (29 deaths, or 25.2%), Havana (21 deaths, or 18.3%), and Mayabeque (16 deaths, or 13.9%)

It also adds that at least 21 deaths were documented due to “severe malnutrition or starvation,” another 12 linked to communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, and 9 from extrajudicial execution, characterized by the direct use of force by state agents or by indications of physical violence.

It also mentions 7 cases identified under a “specific pattern,” which is “the granting of releases or extrapenitentiary leave” shortly before the prisoners’ deaths.

In particular, it states that of the 115 deaths, 112 involved men and 3 women, which in its view constitutes a “strongly masculinized” context.

It adds that the overall average age is 41.9 years and, in the section concerning “racial bias,” indicates that people of African descent represent 27% (31 cases).

This situation is taking place amid the profound economic crisis affecting Cuba, the worst in recent decades, evident in shortages of basic necessities such as food, medicine, and fuel, high inflation, economic contraction, growing dollarization, and prolonged daily blackouts.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Among the fervent Republicans is also Jorge Mas, president of the most powerful organization in the exile community, the Cuban American National Foundation and co-owner of the Inter Miami soccer club, who says that Trump once asked him how much it would cost to rebuild the Island. Some $90 billion for the first three years of the transition was the businessman’s answer, adding how easy it would be for them to raise the money.

Time is passing, however, and nerves are beginning to fray. Mas is a personal friend of Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Like most of those cited in the report, he expected to see a change in Cuba by summer, one they had anticipated ever since January 3, when U.S. troops captured Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. Washington has, in practice, taken political and economic control of that country, although Chavismo remains, one of the greatest fears of these exiles.

“However, Havana has proved resilient, and with Trump’s attention consumed by the war in Iran, any plan to focus on Cuba has taken a back seat,” The Wall Street Journal noted. The newspaper says that senior administration officials are already talking about timelines so long that they could extend until the end of Trump’s term in 2028. It also recalls that Rubio was very annoyed this summer when he was asked for an approximate timetable for the end of the regime. “Global affairs are not a miniseries where you go through three episodes and it’s over. Global affairs are difficult,” the Secretary of State snapped at reporters, after saying they were prepared to be “very realistic and patient about how” that change would come.

The Wall Street Journal explains that Rubio has ordered sanctions to be maintained as a constant trickle, less for their actual effects than for the psychological pressure they create and the permanent sense that something could happen, without anything actually taking place. Something the newspaper adds that is also perceived by Mike Hammer, the head of the U.S. Embassy in Havana.

People close to the diplomat’s circle told The Wall Street Journal that, after months of saying in the U.S. and Europe that change was imminent, he has stopped mentioning 2026.

People close to the diplomat’s circle told The ‘Wall Street Journal’ that, after months of saying in the U.S. and Europe that change was imminent, he has stopped mentioning 2026

Similar ambivalence can be perceived in the words of Bryan Calvo, the young mayor of Hialeah. “I don’t think we have ever been this close. But at the same time, if it doesn’t happen now, it will never happen,” he said.

The approaches are, the newspaper report insists, at a standstill. The exile community opposes the dialogue route through Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, El Cangrejo, the general’s grandson. The demands made by U.S. officials on the regime have had very limited success: yes to economic reforms, nothing in the way of political changes.

The Wall Street Journal cites a survey published by The Miami Herald that concluded, after questioning 800 Cuban Americans, that four out of five see military action as the only option, since the Cuban population is not going to protest enough. “The country is completely paralyzed. People walk around like zombies,” says economist Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva. Other analysts told the outlet that it is highly unlikely that Cubans will rise up: they have done so only twice before in 70 years; the opposition is disorganized; young people have emigrated; and older people can’t take it anymore. “We are children of mistreatment. You try to survive and get by,” admitted a day laborer from Havana who was interviewed.

Meanwhile, the CNCCA is not giving up on its efforts and is seeking, through volunteers, to teach the Cuban population how modern capitalism works.

Marcell Felipe, president of the American Museum of the Cuban Diaspora, sums it up: “This is our Berlin Wall moment.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.