Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

Death of Ramiro Valdés, Historic Enforcer of Repression in Cuba

A central figure of Castroism for more than six decades, he survived every purge.

He never expressed regret; on the contrary, he defended violence as a political and moral principle. / EFE

14ymedio, Havana, June 21, 2026 – Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel announced this Sunday the death, at age 94, of Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, Commander of the Revolution and one of the main architects of the Cuban regime’s repressive apparatus. “The physical departure of Commander of the Revolution Ramiro Valdés Menéndez hurts deeply, like that of a father. That is how I always loved and respected him,” he wrote on social media. Díaz-Canel also recalled “his support and advice, his discreet collaboration, and his exemplary dedication in service to the Homeland.”

Díaz-Canel highlighted Valdés’s “absolute loyalty” to Fidel Castro and Raúl Castro and linked his death to the celebration of Father’s Day in Cuba this Sunday. “Every act in the life of Commander Ramiro was marked by his absolute loyalty to the leadership of Fidel and Raúl, to his comrades in struggle, and to the Moncada Program, whose quest for justice he defended from the assault on the dictatorship’s fortress in 1953 until the last breath of his exemplary life,” he stated.

No details have been provided regarding the cause, time, or place of death. His passing closes the biography of one of the most feared men of Castroism, known inside and outside the Island by the nicknames “Pool of Blood” and “The Butcher of Artemisa,” a reputation forged through his role in repression and the memory of thousands of victims.

With his death, the small group of historic leaders who still maintain a public or institutional presence is reduced even further

Valdés was one of the central figures of the so-called Historic Generation, made up of the leaders who accompanied Fidel Castro before the revolutionary victory of 1959 and who occupied the highest positions of power for decades.

He participated in the assault on the Moncada Barracks in 1953, traveled aboard the Granma in 1956, and was part of the column led by Ernesto Che Guevara during the invasion toward the center and west of the Island. He was the only member of the Castroist leadership who took part in all three episodes and lived into this century.

With his death, the small group of historic leaders who still retain a public or institutional presence is reduced even further, including Raúl Castro, José Ramón Machado Ventura, Guillermo García Frías, and Ramón Pardo Guerra. The rest of that first leadership circle has either died or disappeared from political life.

His supporters affectionately called him Ramirito, just as some referred to Machado Ventura as Machadito. When he headed the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications, he was credited with the phrase, “We must tame the wild colt of the internet.” He also described himself as a “Cerberus of the Revolution,” an expression that summarized the role of ideological watchdog that he played for decades.

His last official public appearance was on October 3, 2025, during the ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of the first Central Committee of the CCP. / Presidency

In recent months, Valdés had disappeared from public view. His absence was especially noticeable during the funeral ceremonies for the 32 Cuban military personnel who died in Venezuela on January 3. At those ceremonies, the regime deliberately displayed almost all of its historic leadership. Valdés, however, was absent from the continue reading

reception of the remains at José Martí International Airport, did not appear in the honor guard at the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and also failed to attend the burial ceremonies and events related to the national tribute.

Nor did he participate in the Council of Ministers meetings held between October and December 2025, according to official broadcasts, in which his seat remained empty. One of his last verifiable public appearances took place on October 3, 2025, during the ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of the first Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. A month earlier, he had been seen at the inauguration of a solar park in Sancti Spíritus.

From then on, the silence was almost total. He also missed the December session of the National Assembly, a forum traditionally attended by the historic figures of Castroism. His absence was equally striking on June 5 during the ceremony marking the 65th anniversary of the Ministry of the Interior, the institution he founded and first led.

That void fueled persistent rumors about his health. Some versions spoke of a prolonged hospitalization and severe physical deterioration. As is customary in Cuba, official secrecy replaced public information. Valdés’s death confirms that those absences were not accidental but rather the prelude to an ending managed in silence.

Valdés was born on April 28, 1932, in the Artemisa neighborhood of La Matilde, from which a significant number of the young people who participated in the assault on the Moncada Barracks emerged, despite it being located on the opposite end of the country. His mother had sworn that none of her five children would become a stepping stone for any politician, but she could not prevent the second-youngest son from serving as a rung in elevating Fidel Castro’s figure.

Valdés was, according to multiple consistent testimonies, an enforcer convinced that terror was an effective instrument for maintaining power

Coming from a very poor family, with little education and no established trade, he decided to follow Castro to Moncada, prison, exile, and later the Granma yacht. In the Sierra Maestra he became one of Guevara’s trusted men and ended the war as second-in-command of the invading column led by the Argentine revolutionary.

After 1959, he occupied decisive positions in the architecture of control of the new State. He served twice as Minister of the Interior and, from those posts, directed the apparatus responsible for State Security, intelligence, the police, and the prison system.

Under his authority, practices documented for decades by human rights organizations, former political prisoners, and former regime officials became entrenched: arbitrary detentions, violent interrogations, summary trials, prolonged imprisonment for ideological reasons, and a prison system designed as a tool of intimidation.

Valdés was, according to multiple consistent testimonies, an enforcer convinced that terror was an effective instrument for maintaining power. During his first period at the head of the Ministry of the Interior, the State Security organs that would pursue opponents, dissidents, religious believers, intellectuals, and former revolutionaries opposed to Fidel Castro were organized and structured.

In interviews and public statements given at different points in his life, Valdés defended methods of violent struggle. In testimony collected by pro-government journalists, he boasted of having participated in the placement of explosive devices in public spaces during the insurgent period and presented those actions as heroic and necessary. He never expressed regret. On the contrary, he defended violence as a political and moral principle.

His career was marked by at least two moments when he was removed from power. The first occurred in July 1968, when he was removed from the Ministry of the Interior amid internal adjustments within the security apparatus. After several years away from the political forefront, he returned to important positions during the following decade.

The second documented removal occurred in December 1985, when he was again dismissed as Minister of the Interior without any public explanation. Although he lost positions and was assigned other responsibilities, he never suffered a definitive downfall like other historic leaders subjected to purges.

That ability to survive politically was one of the most notable traits of his career. Valdés was displaced, rehabilitated, and reassigned on several occasions, but he always retained the fundamental trust of the Castro brothers.

In 2009, he returned to the visible core of power as vice president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Later, he remained linked to the telecommunications, energy, and strategic investment sectors. Since the entry into force of the 2019 Constitution, he had served as Deputy Prime Minister.

The legacy of Ramiro Valdés Menéndez is another: that of a leader who decisively contributed to turning repression into State policy and fear into a form of government

On a personal level, Valdés leaves behind descendants whose circumstances illustrate one of the regime’s most persistent contradictions. Several of his children live outside the Island, established in countries where they enjoy civil liberties, mobility, and material conditions denied to most Cubans.

That reality, known and discussed for years in opposition and exile circles, contrasted sharply with the official discourse that Valdés defended until the end. While he was one of the principal architects of migration control, ideological surveillance, and punishment of dissent, part of his family chose to live outside the model he helped impose.

During the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021 [’11J’], Valdés was involved in one of the most uncomfortable episodes of his long political career when he was booed in Palma Soriano. Amid social tensions and the deployment of repressive forces, his presence in the streets, intended by the government to project control and authority, provoked hostile reactions from citizens.

Far from being welcomed as a historic figure, some demonstrators responded with shouts, insults, and open rejection. The episode, quickly silenced by the official press, was significant not only because it reflected the loss of fear in public spaces, but also because it showed one of the regime’s most feared men confronting, face to face and without intermediaries, the popular discontent that he himself had helped suppress for decades.

Official propaganda will now seek to cement the image of an “exemplary fighter,” a man of “absolute loyalty,” and a “defender of sovereignty.” Outside that epic narrative, the legacy of Ramiro Valdés Menéndez is another: that of a leader who decisively contributed to turning repression into State policy and fear into a form of government.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuban Foreign Minister Accuses Marco Rubio of ‘Chronic Lying and Contradicting Trump’

Bruno Rodriguez denounces “a total blockade, akin to a military one” while the US “openly calls for the subversion of the constitutional order”

Archive photo of Bruno Rodríguez at the opening of the Cuban Embassy in Washington. / Cubadebate

14ymedio, Havana, June 21, 2026 / The Cuban Government has made Marco Rubio the primary target of its propaganda offensive against Washington. This Saturday, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez again accused the US Secretary of State of lying, concealing the consequences of the sanctions and, above all, of contradicting President Donald Trump.

“When the US Secretary of State speaks of incompetence in Cuba, one would have to ask him why he lies chronically and contradicts the President of the United States and his spokesperson,” Rodriguez wrote on X.

For months, Havana’s propaganda apparatus has been attempting to portray Trump as a leader manipulated by Rubio and by Cuban-American politicians from Florida. According to this narrative, the president would not be the main party responsible for the measures against the Island, but rather the victim of the deceits of a subordinate obsessed with bringing down the Cuban regime.

The official State newspaper Granma went as far as stating, last November, that Trump was “being used, led and steered by his close associate Marco Rubio.” In other articles, the Communist Party newspaper has portrayed the Secretary of State as the operator who “tightens the screws” of US policy and drags the president towards a confrontation that he supposedly does not fully understand. continue reading

Even more uncomfortable for the regime is that this external pressure has forced it to dismantle some of the bureaucratic obstacles which Cubans themselves have for decades identified as the “internal blockade.”

Rodriguez himself has now revived that formula by accusing Rubio of denying the existence of “a total fuel blockade” which, according to the foreign minister, the White House does acknowledge. The post casts the Secretary as the architect of a meticulous plan to prevent the arrival of oil, spare parts for thermoelectric plants, tourism investment and technology for mining.

However, the argument contains a contradiction that is difficult to conceal. The main measures that Rodriguez attributes to Rubio’s manoeuvres were not adopted behind Trump’s back, but were signed, endorsed or publicly deployed by the president himself as instruments of pressure against Havana. Even more uncomfortable for the regime is that this external pressure has forced it to dismantle some of the bureaucratic obstacles, prohibitions and restrictions which Cubans themselves have for decades identified as the “internal blockade.”

Havana’s insistence on separating the two officials serves another purpose. It allows the conflict to be presented as the result of the personal obsession of a Cuban-American politician, thus sidestepping any debate about the regime’s own responsibility for the economic deterioration.

Rodriguez lists the hardships caused by the sanctions, but says nothing about the decisions taken over decades by the Cuban authorities. He makes no mention, for example, of the billions spent on building hotels while the thermoelectric plants aged without adequate maintenance, the water system collapsed and the housing stock continued to deteriorate.

The foreign minister also makes no reference to the workings of Gaesa, which controls hotels, banks, ports, hard-currency stores, petrol stations, remittances and a large share of foreign trade.

The emblem of that policy is Havana’s Torre K, the tallest hotel in Cuba, linked to the military conglomerate Gaesa. The 42-storey building with some 600 rooms was erected in the midst of one of the worst economic crises in the Island’s recent history and remains practically empty.

Hotel occupancy had already fallen to 21.5% during the first half of 2025, long before Trump signed, in January 2026, the executive order to intensify pressure on Havana following the capture of Nicolas Maduro in Caracas – the Cuban regime’s principal benefactor. Cuba closed that year with a mere 1.8 million visitors, compared with the 4.7 million recorded in 2018. Despite the collapse in tourism, the State continued to prioritise property and hotel investment over essential sectors such as agriculture, industry, housing and electricity generation.

The foreign minister also makes no reference to the workings of Gaesa, the conglomerate controlled by the Armed Forces that dominates hotels, banks, ports, hard-currency stores, petrol stations, remittances and a large share of foreign trade. Its accounts are not public, it is not subject to citizen oversight, and its real weight in the economy remains hidden even from many state institutions.

Rodriguez also presents Cupet as a company with the infrastructure and capabilities needed to manage fuel supplies. But he offers no explanation of how a supposedly efficient state company allowed the country to reach a state of chronic shortage, with deteriorated refineries and near-total dependence on political benefactors such as Venezuela, Mexico and Russia.

Havana appears to trust that it can pit Trump against his own Secretary of State, convincing the president that Rubio exploits Cuba policy for his own ends.

US sanctions undoubtedly aggravate the crisis and reduce the possibilities of importing oil, obtaining credit or carrying out international transactions. However, that pressure alone does not explain the empty hotels, the lack of transparency at Gaesa, agricultural unproductivity or the decades of neglect of the electricity infrastructure.

By attributing the entire disaster to Rubio, the regime avoids answering the accusation that most unsettles it. The incompetence denounced by Washington does not consist merely in the inability to obtain fuel, but in having built a centralised, monopolistic economy that privileges the business interests of the ruling elite over the needs of citizens.

Havana appears to trust that it can pit Trump against his own Secretary of State, convincing the president that Rubio exploits Cuba policy for his own ends. So far, however, there is no sign whatsoever of a rift between the two. What does exist is a country where food, transport and electricity are in short supply, while the Government keeps its monopolies intact and points towards Washington every time anyone asks where Cuba’s resources have gone.

Translated by GH.

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The Cuban Railway Terminal Where Trains No Longer Come

The fuel crisis and the disappearance of state-run routes turn every journey between San Jose de las Lajas and Guines into a battle

14ymedio, Julio César Contreras, San José de las Lajas (Mayabeque), 21 June 2026 / Although Fernando and Marianne were both born and raised in Guines, they met at the old train station in San Jose de las Lajas, in the daily struggle to travel back to their municipality. The two often find themselves together beneath the potholed roof of the platform, where no locomotive whistle is heard any more, nor the screech of carriages on rails. In their place predominate the resigned conversations of those waiting, the shouts of private taxi drivers calling out their destinations, and the murmur of a crowd that seems to have taken up permanent residence there.

The old railway terminal has become a kind of improvised refuge for travellers caught between the lack of fuel, the disappearance of state-run routes, and the constant rise in the cost of private transport. The rails still cut across the ground, but they jut up through the grass like a relic of better times. Sitting on the walls of the building, dozens of people wait under the midday sun with shopping bags, backpacks, plastic buckets, and even sacks of root vegetables. Some have been there for hours.

“With all this fuel shortage, even private cars are nowhere to be seen. Sometimes hours go by without anything appearing for us to get on,” says Marianne.

A specialist at the Mayabeque Electric Company, the young woman admits that she can rarely complete her full working hours. The problem is not the work itself, but getting home.

The young woman admits that she can rarely complete her full working hours

“After two in the afternoon it’s practically impossible to get on anything heading to Guines. Right now there’s only one lorry leaving from there at six in the morning, which is the same one I take at midday. If I miss that chance I have to pay 600, 700, even 1,000 pesos for a car. At that rate my salary wouldn’t last me a week, and it’s 5,200 pesos that have to cover everything for the whole month.”

As she speaks, she watches the road anxiously. Every time a cloud of dust appears or the engine of some vehicle is heard, several people leap to their feet thinking that the lorry has finally arrived. Almost always it is a false alarm.

The same scenes repeat themselves every day at the station. / 14ymedio

The waiting has something of a collective ritual about it. An elderly woman continue reading

shields herself from the sun with a red umbrella, worn out by the years. A young man holds a bicycle wheel he has just repaired. Several students in uniform sit chatting on their backpacks. Near them, a pregnant woman searches for shade while shifting the weight of her body. All share the same uncertainty.

The most the sole employee who remains in the old building can do is try to manage the queue.

“In their desperation to get on, people resort to the law of the strongest, pushing and shoving included”

“In the end, there’s no point getting in last, because when the lorry arrives, people in their desperation to get on resort to the law of the strongest, pushing and shoving included,” Marianne complains, growing worried as she realises she should already be on her way home. “Today I really can’t take a shared taxi. I’ve got just enough money.”

The same scenes repeat themselves every day. When a lorry adapted for passengers finally shows up, people cluster around the door even before the vehicle has finished stopping. Boarding becomes a silent competition where every second counts. No one wants to be left behind to face several more hours of uncertainty.

When it comes to economic hardship, Fernando has his own stories.

“I was moved by an elderly woman who had just asked me for 100 pesos to make up her fare. In just a few days the cost has gone up four times, from 200 to 500 pesos. If the driver arrives today and charges more, there’s no choice but to pay whatever he asks. It’s true that diesel is hard to come by, but it’s also true that we poor people are being squeezed from every direction.”

Fernando travels daily to San Jose to care for his father, bedridden with a chronic illness. Every journey brings an added worry for his budget.

A trained industrial engineer now working for himself, Fernando travels daily to San Jose to care for his father, bedridden with a chronic illness. Every journey brings an added worry for his budget.

It is lunchtime and in front of the terminal, several kiosks are selling pizzas and soft drinks. Few people, however, go up to buy anything. For most, every peso must be kept back for transport. Eating has become a secondary expense when there is a chance that the next journey might cost even more.

“From five daily bus routes that at one point existed between Guines and San Jose, we’ve ended up with none,” Fernando recalls. “The worst of it is that in this country, things that disappear never come back. I myself am lucky enough to earn more than any professional’s salary, and yet I can’t afford to hire a taxi regularly, not even to ride one throughout the whole week.”

Many workers leave in the small hours to guarantee their return journey / 14ymedio

The transport crisis has ended up reshaping habits, schedules, and even family relationships. Many workers leave in the small hours to guarantee their return journey. Others have cut back on visits to sick relatives or have given up jobs that involve moving between municipalities. The distance between Guines and San Jose de las Lajas has not changed on the map, but for those who depend on public transport it seems today far greater than it did a few years ago.

The distance between Guines and San Jose de las Lajas has not changed on the map, but for those who depend on public transport it seems far greater today

Both Fernando and Marianne are working out ways to travel less and less. Logic has won out over desire.

“State buses are already out of service and the price of fares in private cars is going to keep rising without limit. So the best thing you can do is go as little as possible beyond the area where you live, because even with the money in your hand you can’t be sure of getting where you’re going in peace.”

As she speaks, the long-awaited lorry finally appears. The crowd gets to its feet almost all at once. Conversations break off, shopping bags change hands, and the queue dissolves into disorder within seconds. At the old train station in San Jose de las Lajas, where trains stopped coming years ago, there are still people waiting. They are no longer waiting for a train. They are waiting for something far more basic: the chance to get home.

Translated by GH.

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An Investigation Warns of Cuban Regime’s Influence in Colombia During the Petro Government

The study by Sergio Arboleda University reveals that vaccines promised by Havana and a rice export project never materialized.

Havana seeks to replicate in Colombia a model of influence already applied in Venezuela and Mexico. / Estudios Revolución

14ymedio, Madrid, June 21, 2026 — During the government of Gustavo Petro, the Cuban regime expanded its influence over various Colombian institutions through cooperation agreements in sectors such as health, agriculture, education, and culture, according to an investigation by the Cuba Program of Sergio Arboleda University, based in Bogotá.

The study, titled The Silent Co-optation of the Colombian State by the Cuban Regime During the Government of Gustavo Petro, argues that these ties are part of a strategy of gradual interference by Havana, publicly presented as “bilateral cooperation.”

The research, which began in 2025, has already produced two installments, with a third containing the complete findings currently in preparation. Sergio Ángel, director of the Cuba Program, explained in an interview with Martí Noticias that the team requested information from various government agencies through formal public information requests.

One of the most significant findings concerns the 2,000 yellow fever vaccines that the Cuban regime announced it would donate to Colombia continue reading

during a public health crisis.

“One out of every three institutions in Colombia entered into some type of agreement with some type of Cuban institution,” Ángel stated, describing the figure as “alarming” when compared with previous governments and after analyzing the content of the collaborations.

The researcher noted that the rapprochement between Bogotá and Havana was less visible than in other countries in the region because Colombia did not receive the usual Cuban medical missions during these four years. Nevertheless, ties developed through other programs and institutional agreements.

One of the most significant findings concerns the 2,000 yellow fever vaccines that the Cuban regime announced it would donate to Colombia during a public health crisis. The offer was publicized by the Cuban Embassy and publicly celebrated by Colombia’s then-Foreign Minister, Laura Sarabia.

However, a response from the Ministry of Health obtained by the researchers confirmed that the vaccines never arrived. The Cuban Embassy also provided no explanation when questioned by the newspaper El Espectador, according to Ángel.

For the director of the Cuba Program, the announcement allowed Havana to project an image of solidarity and create the appearance of reciprocal cooperation, even though the aid never materialized.

“What matters is not sending the vaccines, but demonstrating that they have a cooperative relationship,” Ángel said. In his view, such announcements serve to justify the subsequent transfer of Colombian resources to the Island.

The investigation also examined an alleged export of 300 tons of Colombian rice to Cuba

Colombia shipped a 100-ton cargo of humanitarian aid from Cartagena containing non-perishable food, medicines, hospital supplies, solar panels, electrical materials, and household goods. The operation was managed by the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation.

“There is no reciprocity in this type of relationship,” Ángel argued, maintaining that the Cuban regime obtains resources, diplomatic support, and political legitimacy in exchange for contributions that, in some cases, amount only to propaganda announcements.

The investigation also examined an alleged export of 300 tons of Colombian rice to Cuba. The Rural Development Agency promoted the operation on its social media accounts and presented it as a commercial opportunity for producers in the Meta department.

However, an official response indicated that the Cuban importer was never authorized, meaning the export never actually took place. Despite this, according to Ángel, the Colombian producers received the corresponding payment.

“Who paid for that rice?” the researcher asked. According to the study, the funds may have come from the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation, which is attached to the Presidency.

The publication coincides with the second round of Colombia’s presidential election taking place this Sunday

The case, he added, suggests that an operation presented as a commercial export may have ended up diverting Colombian public funds for unknown purposes, while the Cuban regime obtained propaganda benefits without bearing the cost of the purchase.

Another agreement examined involves Cuban participation in CampeSENA, a program of the National Learning Service aimed at farmers and rural workers. Ángel questioned why Cuba, a country that imports most of the food it consumes and is experiencing a severe agricultural crisis, is being presented as an “agro-industrial reference” for Colombia.

The study also identifies collaborations in education and culture, although details will be included in the third installment. The researchers state that several government agencies responded incompletely and that they had to file additional requests and legal actions to obtain the information.

Ángel argues that Petro’s government represented only the first stage of Cuba’s strategy in Colombia. According to his analysis, Havana seeks to reproduce a model of influence already implemented in Venezuela and Mexico, based on political alliances, state agreements, and economic assistance.

The publication coincides with the second round of Colombia’s presidential election taking place this Sunday. More than 41 million citizens have been called to choose Gustavo Petro’s successor between left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda, who represents continuity with the current administration, and right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. According to the study’s authors, the outcome will also determine whether the agreements established with Havana during the past four years are maintained or reviewed.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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‘Superficial Smoke Signals,’ Says U.S. About the Cuban Regime’s Economic Reforms

Washington’s criticism, which demands much deeper changes, contrasts with the enthusiastic assessment of Mexico’s Sheinbaum.

Havana has once again resorted to a “typical strategy” of announcing “supposed reforms to create the illusion of a commitment to change.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 20, 2026 — The United States described the economic reforms approved this Thursday by the Cuban regime as “smoke signals” and called for much deeper political and economic changes. Washington’s reaction contrasts with the support expressed by Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, who considered the opening to be an “important change.”

“These gradual ‘economic reforms’ are modest, long overdue, and ultimately amount to superficial smoke signals from the Cuban regime,” a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department told AFP.

U.S. authorities believe that Havana has once again resorted to a “typical strategy” of announcing “supposed reforms to create the illusion of a commitment to change, only to quickly reverse them whenever the regime’s total control appears threatened.”

Washington demanded “much more substantial economic and political reforms that make Cuba attractive to investors” and that provide its citizens with “the freedom, dignity, and opportunities they deserve,” added the official, whose identity was not disclosed.

The reaction is a cold shower for Havana, which presented the 176 measures as a profound economic transformation while insisting that the Government will not abandon socialism or allow the market to replace continue reading

state planning.

Sheinbaum offered her support to Havana, although Mexico has complied with Washington’s demand not to send fuel to Cuba.

Among the proposals are the entry of private banks, direct investment in Cuban businesses by citizens living abroad, the possibility for a single owner to manage more than one company, and the elimination of the current limit of 100 employees for small and medium-sized private enterprises (mipymes).

The package also opens the door to the sale of state-owned properties to individuals and legal entities, domestic or foreign, and to the transformation of some public enterprises into commercial corporations with capital participation. However, the timelines, legal mechanisms, and specific conditions for implementing many of these measures remain unknown. Their similarity to Russia’s transition has raised concerns about a concealed appropriation of state assets by members of the current regime’s leadership.

Prime Minister Manuel Marrero stated during the extraordinary session of the National Assembly that the market will be recognized as “an instrument for the efficient allocation of resources,” an unusual formulation in official Cuban discourse. Meanwhile, Miguel Díaz-Canel made clear that the changes do not represent a break with the political model. “We are not renouncing socialism,” the ruler said before lawmakers unanimously approved the program.

While Washington received the measures with skepticism, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum praised the regime’s decision on Friday. “It is an important change in a decision that Cubans themselves are making to open their economy,” the president said during her daily press conference.

Sheinbaum particularly highlighted the possibility of attracting private capital and resources from emigrants. “They are doing it for investment, even calling on Cubans who left the Island long ago to invest in Cuba,” she noted.

The Mexican president also offered her government’s support to Mexican companies interested in participating in the opening. Her reaction maintains the line of political and economic support that Mexico has extended to Havana despite increased pressure from the United States, although it has complied with Washington’s demand not to send fuel to Cuba.

The former ambassador recalled that previous partial-opening processes ended up being halted by the official structures themselves.

A very different view was expressed by Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, who served as Mexico’s ambassador to Cuba between 2000 and 2002. The diplomat acknowledged that the measures could represent “a very radical transformation of the Cuban economy” and pave the way toward a market economy, but he doubted that the state apparatus would allow genuine competition.

“The real test is whether state enterprises will truly accept the existence of competition, a genuinely open market,” Pascoe said in an interview with W Radio.

The former ambassador recalled that previous partial liberalization processes were ultimately blocked by the official structures themselves. “The companies that have been created have always been successful, and the reaction of state enterprises is to prevent their continuation,” he explained.

Pascoe said that any real change will depend on whether Havana fulfills its promises and grants autonomy to businesses. He also questioned the possibility of attracting the necessary capital while the current political and legal system remains unchanged. “Who is going to invest under those conditions when there is no legal certainty?” he asked.

The U.S. response confirms that Havana’s economic concessions alone will not be sufficient to bring about a thaw with the Trump administration. Washington is demanding not only greater market liberalization but also political transformations that the Cuban regime has not included in its program.

For that reason, Trump recalled in an interview one day after the announcement of the reform package that he still considered “possible” a U.S. intervention in Cuba similar to the one that led to the capture, on January 3, of then-president Nicolás Maduro.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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“The Situation We Are Living Through Is Unbearable”: Simultaneous Protests in the Cuban Capital

More than a hundred residents marched in Centro Habana, while in other neighbourhoods barricades went up and rubbish bins burned

Remains of a rubbish bin set on fire during Friday’s protests in Regla, Havana. /

14ymedio, Havana, 20 June 2026 / After more than 40 hours without electricity, more than a hundred residents took to the streets on Friday afternoon to protest in the San Leopoldo neighbourhood, in Centro Habana.

“They set fire to things right around the corner and everything,” one protester said in a video circulating on social media. “The police came with the ‘securocrats’ and they put the power back on,” she added, though it was cut again within minutes. “The situation we are living through in this country is unbearable and unsustainable.”

The footage shows entire families gathered in the street, in the area around Calle Rayo, between Zanja and San Jose. Some residents remained on pavements and balconies, while dozens of people occupied the roadway demanding answers from the authorities, banging their pots and pans.

“There are children, there are elderly people, and we have no way to cook,” one woman declared. Other protesters chanted “Freedom!” and expressed their rejection of the Government, in a protest that began over the lack of power but quickly took on a political tone. For a moment the gathering recalled the ’11J’ protests of 11 July 2021, with residents marching together, apparently in the direction of the Havana Capitol building.

For a moment the gathering recalled the protests of 11J, with residents marching together, apparently in the direction of the Havana Capitol building.

An increased police presence was reported in the area, though at the time of publication there was no confirmed information on arrests or continue reading

confrontations.

Likewise, during the night simultaneous protests were recorded across several municipalities of the capital. 14ymedio confirmed protests in the municipality of Regla, which have been recurring daily over the past week. On Friday, rubbish bins were overturned and set alight. The previous Thursday, around thirty residents demonstrated outside the headquarters of the Communist Party. Although the Municipal Sanitation Services removed the bins to prevent them from being set on fire, waste continues to pile up in the streets and serves as fuel for the bonfires. Residents of the area confirm that, following the protests, the duration of the blackouts has been reduced.

On Friday, in another neighbourhood within the same municipality of Regla, after 72 hours without electricity, a group of residents blocked the street and gathered in broad daylight to bang pots and pans. Although the protest did not reach the intensity of those recorded in Centro Habana, police arrived quickly at the scene and shortly afterwards the electricity supply was restored, according to a report by CubaNet.

Among the most tense protests of the night was one that took place in the central area of Buena Vista, in the municipality of Playa, where dozens of residents gathered and burned rubbish bins in the street while banging pots, pans, and metal objects, demanding amid shouts that the power be restored.

Notable among the protesters was the presence of women and children, who threw combustible items onto the fire while striking any piece of metal within reach with force.

The situation was equally tense in Centro Habana, on Calle Escobar, between Neptuno and Concordia, where a group of residents lit bonfires to block the road. In the videos circulating online, the presence of women and children among the protesters stands out; they threw combustible items onto the fire while striking any piece of metal within reach with force. The police, who were watching without intervening, did not stop the minors from surrounding the officers while continuing to bang their pots.

Other spontaneous protests were reported in San Miguel del Padron, where residents burned tyres in the street after more than 24 hours of blackout. In El Cotorro, several rubbish bins were also set on fire. According to videos circulating on social media, in Barbosa, an area of the municipality of Playa bordering La Lisa, a number of protesters lit bonfires on Calle 23.

Protests have spread across different parts of the country as the duration of the blackouts has increased, in some cases exceeding 30 and 40 consecutive hours in the capital. Combined with the summer heat, food is spoiling and disease-carrying insects are proliferating. The prolonged power cuts are also affecting the supply of drinking water and the functioning of public services, including hospitals. Indignation increasingly appears to be overcoming fear of reprisals.

Indignation increasingly appears to be overcoming fear of reprisals.

In the early hours of Friday, after a week of consecutive blackouts lasting more than 24 hours, residents of the Valle Grande community in La Lisa – a neighbourhood surrounded by Ministry of the Interior and State Security installations – took to the streets and banged pots and pans until the electricity was restored, according to a report by 14ymedio.

Last Thursday, residents of Alamar took to the streets to protest in broad daylight after 28 hours without power, according to information from Alas Tensas. After a police deployment that cordoned off the area, the electricity came back on.

According to the information bulletin issued by the Electrical Union (UNE), a deficit of 1,989 megawatts (MW) was reported on Friday at 20:50 hours. Saturday night is also ex
pected to be difficult. With nine thermoelectric units out of service – among them the Antonio Guiteras plant, which has left the grid on 14 occasions so far this year – and 1,203 MW offline due to fuel shortages at distributed generation plants, an impact of 1,935 MW is estimated for peak demand hours, against a national demand of 3,050 MW.

Translated by GH.

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Trump Sees as ‘Possible’ an Operation Like the One in Venezuela: ‘Cuba Is Just a Step Away From the US’

The US president says that Marco Rubio plays a central role in the policy towards Havana

The question about Cuba came immediately after Trump claimed that the United States is “running Venezuela.” / Screenshot / Axios

14ymedio, Havana, June 19, 2026 / Donald Trump considers it “possible” that a US operation in Cuba could unfold similarly to the military incursion that led to the capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. The US president left open this possibility during an interview on Thursday with The Axios Show.

“Do you see the operation in Cuba unfolding in a similar way?” journalist Marc Caputo asked, referring to the U.S. operation that culminated in the arrest of the Venezuelan president in January. “Possibly. It’s possible,” Trump replied.

The question about Cuba came immediately after Trump asserted that the United States is “running Venezuela” together with the authorities who remain in the country. The president immediately justified his response by citing the geographical proximity of Cuba and Venezuela, in contrast to the distance separating the US from Iran, the scene of another of the military operations he claimed responsibility for continue reading

during the conversation.

“Venezuela has oil. Cuba doesn’t. Cuba has good properties and a beautiful coastline.”

“Well, there’s something else. Those places are close. On the other hand, if you look at Iran, it’s a very long trip. I’ve flown to that area several times, for reasons unrelated to this, but it’s an 18-hour flight, that’s a long time. Venezuela is relatively close and Cuba is just a hop, skip, and a jump,” he said.

The president also compared the resources of Cuba and Venezuela. “Venezuela has oil. Cuba doesn’t. Cuba has good properties and a beautiful coast,” he declared, reducing the island’s economic appeal to its territory and coastline.

After discussing a possible operation, Trump asserted that Secretary of State Marco Rubio would play a central role in the policy toward Havana. “We’re going to get Marco involved with Cuba. Cuba is very eager to talk,” he said.

When asked about the strong support he receives among Cuban Americans, Trump stated that approximately 95% of that community had voted for him. “I love them,” he added after Caputo mentioned that a significant portion of his political base is among Cuban exiles.

Axios reported that Trump declined to set a timeline for potential action on Cuba, stating only that his position remains “flexible.” The report also indicated that Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants and a leading advocate of a maximum pressure policy against the Havana regime, is “deeply involved.”

“We’re going to get Marco involved with Cuba. Cuba is very eager to talk.”

The outlet itself noted that Trump has not authorized an invasion and that, at least publicly, he has expressed his preference for a peaceful transition to a free Cuba. However, his words constitute one of his most direct allusions to the possibility of replicating the model applied in Venezuela on the island.

In the interview, Trump again boasted about the speed of the operation against Maduro. “Look at Venezuela. It was all over in 48 minutes,” he stated. He later insisted that U.S. troops entered the country in less favorable weather conditions than anticipated and that the mission concluded in that same amount of time, despite Venezuela having a large number of soldiers.

The comparison comes after several reports about Washington’s preparations for a possible collapse of the Cuban regime. In late May, Axios revealed that Washington had analyzed various military response plans for a scenario of chaos on the island, which some officials considered possible as early as this summer.

Meanwhile, the administration has intensified economic and political pressure on Havana, with the stated intention of depriving the regime of resources. The capture of Maduro and the disruption of oil shipments from Venezuela have exacerbated Cuba’s energy crisis, characterized by prolonged blackouts, fuel shortages, and a sharp contraction in economic activity.

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The Cuban Regime Denies the Obvious by Rejecting Claims That It Yielded to “Yankee Pressure”

Díaz-Canel stated that Cuba “is living through the most difficult hours of this century, and we have the historic responsibility to save it.”

Díaz-Canel stressed that under the current circumstances, “it is time to change everything that needs to be changed in order to move forward.” / EFE

14ymedio/EFE, Havana, June 19, 2026 – Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel denied on Thursday that the package of economic reforms recently approved on the Island is a response to pressure from the United States, asserting instead that it is a “sovereign” decision by his country.

“We are not doing this because of pressure from the Yankees, but because we have reached a moment of maturity and reflection,” Díaz-Canel emphasized in the speech that closed the extraordinary session of the National Assembly of People’s Power, where the measures were approved after receiving the green light from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba the day before.

Díaz-Canel maintained that “Cuba decides without any permission other than that of its people” and “sovereignly designs and proposes the changes it needs.” continue reading

Díaz-Canel maintained that “Cuba decides without any permission other than that of its people” and “sovereignly designs and proposes the changes it needs”

He also reiterated that his government is willing to discuss all possible issues with Washington “without hatred, but without fear,” adding that this willingness has been “historically proven.”

The president added that “Cuba is ready for a civilized and respectful relationship that benefits both peoples,” and said, “if they truly want to help the Cuban people, let them live.”

He also described the energy blockade and the latest U.S. sanctions against the island as a “barbaric, undeserved, and unbearable punishment,” worsened by what he called the United States’ “real, daily” financial persecution of his country.

On the same day, U.S. Vice President JD Vance said that if the Cuban authorities make “smart decisions,” Washington could have “a much better relationship” with the Island.

Díaz-Canel stated that Cuba “is living through the most difficult hours of this century, and we have the historic responsibility to save it.” He also stressed that under the current circumstances, “it is time to change everything that needs to be changed in order to move forward.”

Regarding the package of measures, he said that “it had to be done anyway,” although he acknowledged that “it is not easy” because the changes will be implemented “under very complex conditions.”

Regarding the package of measures, he said that “it had to be done anyway,” although he acknowledged that “it is not easy” because the changes will be implemented “under very complex conditions”

The economic reforms first announced last Friday by Díaz-Canel include allowing “new actors” into the tourism sector, promoting foreign direct investment, and introducing changes intended to stimulate agriculture and foreign trade, while decentralizing decision-making in order to grant greater “autonomy” to state-owned enterprises and municipalities.

Since last January, the Trump administration of has imposed an oil blockade on the Island and has threatened to “take control” of Cuba to force economic and political changes. Cuba has responded that it will defend its sovereignty and has accused Washington of preparing a military action against it.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Dissident Academic Alina López Detained Again While Parliament Was Voting on Economic Reforms

The academic spent ten hours under arrest and will provide more details this Friday.

This Thursday marked two years since the protest that has left the academic awaiting trial. / Facebook

EFE/14ymedio, Havana, June 19, 2026 – Academic and dissident Alina Bárbara López Hernández was once again detained this Thursday in Matanzas during her customary peaceful protest held on the 18th of every month, according to a family source.

“Alina has just been detained in Parque de la Libertad while attempting to exercise her right to peaceful protest,” confirmed Cecilia Borroto López, the intellectual’s daughter, on social media.

Borroto also indicated that her mother was allegedly taken to a police station located in the Playa district of Matanzas.

Borroto also indicated that her mother was allegedly taken to a police station located in the Playa district of Matanzas

Later that night, Borroto reported on social media that the academic “was released after ten hours” and advised that on Friday she herself would provide more details about the detention.

Hours earlier, the historian, essayist, and editor had published a message on social media commenting on the package of economic reforms approved the previous day by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba.

“They are trying to buy time. That is an old stratagem of the ruling group,” López commented, arguing that the proposals are “more or less the same” as those put forward but never implemented nineteen years ago, referring to the “Updating of the Cuban Economic and Social Model” promoted in 2007 by then-President Raúl Castro. At that time, the proposals were not known in such detail; the measures ultimately do involve economic changes, but not political ones.

“So much reform, and today they took away Alina Bárbara López Hernández under arrest. So much reform without releasing the political prisoners. So much reform, and repression continues. This is the real fraudulent change,” commented activist Adriana Ryukiyoi. continue reading

The academic has been detained several times in recent years for carrying out symbolic protests, and as a result of those actions she was sentenced at the end of 2023 to pay a fine for the offense of disobedience, which she refused to do.

The academic has been detained several times in recent years for carrying out symbolic protests, and as a result of those actions she was sentenced at the end of 2023 to pay a fine for the offense of disobedience, which she refused to do

She is also awaiting trial since late 2025 after prosecutors charged her with the alleged offenses of disobedience, contempt, and assault in connection with a detention that occurred exactly two years ago yesterday, on June 18, 2024. Prosecutors are seeking a sentence of four years of corrective labor.

The events occurred when López and fellow academic and dissident Jenny Pantola, for whom prosecutors are seeking one year less of corrective labor, were traveling by taxi from Matanzas to Havana with the intention of participating in a protest event.

According to López, she asked about the legality of the detention and the reasons for it, to which a police officer responded with multiple acts of violence. Prosecutors, for their part, stated that it was López who struggled with and insulted the officers, and that the physical injuries alleged by both women “were not real.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Under Pressure from the US, the Cuban Regime Extends Privatisation to Banking and Other Sectors

Prime Minister Manuel Marrero presents the National Assembly with a programme of free-market-oriented reforms

The breadth and urgency of the measures make clear that they are also a response to the enormous pressure exerted by the United States to force changes on the Island. / Cubadebate

14ymedio, Havana, 18 June 2026 / The Cuban Government will open the financial system to private banking, allow the opening of foreign-currency accounts without prior administrative authorisation, and remove restrictions on foreign-currency payments between domestic businesses and foreign suppliers.

Cuban Prime Minister Manuel Marrero presented the National Assembly on Thursday with a broad package of economic reforms that includes the entry of private banks into the financial system and the opening of foreign-currency accounts without prior authorisation. “We wish to reiterate that these transformations do not constitute a departure from our socialist project; on the contrary, they respond to the inherent logic of its development,” the official stated, although the breadth and urgency of the measures make clear that they are also a response to the enormous pressure exerted by the United States to force changes on the Island.

The decisions form part of the package of economic reforms presented before the National Assembly on Thursday, having been approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in an extraordinary session. These measures are due to be adopted that same Thursday by the deputies in a vote that is usually an uncontested formality.

“Private banking will operate under the supervision of the Banco Central de Cuba on equal regulatory terms with state banking”

According to the measures announced, “private banking will operate under the supervision of the Banco Central de Cuba on equal regulatory terms with state banking.” The text does not specify when these entities may begin to be established, who may own them, or what minimum capital they will be required continue reading

to contribute. The opening will also allow the private-capital banking sector – whether national or foreign – to finance microcredit.

Private participation in the Cuban financial system had been practically excluded until now. Last March, however, the Government had already authorised Cubans resident abroad to participate – subject to a licence from the Banco Central – in investment banks, non-bank financial institutions, and other entities recognised under Cuban legislation.

Another of the proposals consists of allowing natural and legal persons to open foreign-currency accounts without requiring prior administrative authorisation. Restrictions on foreign-currency payments between businesses with foreign capital and their domestic suppliers will also be lifted.

The scope of these decisions will depend on the ability of Cuban banks to actually have access to deposited funds. For years, foreign companies and private businesses have reported difficulties in withdrawing or transferring the foreign currency reflected in their accounts.

Among the measures is also the creation of the figure of the “last-mile payment agent”, through which private actors will be able to formally channel remittances sent to Cuba

The package also envisages the creation of a regulatory framework for virtual assets and the use of financial technologies in domestic and international payments and collections. The Government intends to create financial entities specialised in virtual assets, although it has not explained which cryptocurrencies will be accepted or how such operations will be carried out.

Among the measures is also the creation of the figure of the “last-mile payment agent”, through which private actors will be able to formally channel remittances sent to Cuba. The authorities also intend to seek new sources of capitalisation for banks, review the treatment of external debt, update interest rates, and accelerate the automation of financial services.

The announcement also includes the elimination of limits on bank transfers and cash withdrawals for natural and legal persons, both Cuban and foreign. The measure aims to ease one of the main obstacles faced by businesses, although its implementation will run up against the chronic shortage of cash that afflicts bank branches.

MSMEs will be able to employ more than 100 workers, a threshold that until now legally defined medium-sized enterprises

Beyond the financial system, it was announced that a single individual may now own more than one private company, and that micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) will be able to employ more than 100 workers – a threshold that until now legally defined medium-sized enterprises. The Government will also reduce the list of prohibited activities and allow businesses to carry out various lawful operations, provided they maintain their primary activity.

In the agricultural sector, the package provides for the authorisation of private companies and new foreign investment, allowing cooperatives and producers to import fuel and inputs directly, and reducing state intervention in price formation. Municipalities will also receive powers to approve or wind up companies and to authorise certain national and foreign investment projects.

The Government has not yet published a timetable for the reforms to come into force, nor the legal rules that will govern the operation of future private banks.

Translated by GH

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The Package of Reforms Announced by Havana Meets with Scepticism Among Economists

Experts fear a ‘Caribbean perestroika’ in which only those close to the regime will benefit

One of the major novelties is the opening up of private banking

14ymedio, Madrid, 19 June 2026 / Crony capitalism, Caribbean perestroika, a Sandinista-style piñata, or, as economist Mauricio de Miranda has long been describing it, a “transition from bureaucratic socialism to authoritarian and patrimonial capitalism” – this was the reception given to the avalanche of reforms announced on Thursday by the Cuban regime in its desperate attempt to persuade the Trump administration to lift the energy blockade and other sanctions. References to the Chinese or Vietnamese model recur throughout the reactions of several critical experts, in particular Pavel Vidal.

“Many of the announced measures coincide with proposals that Cuban economists like myself have been advocating for years,” writes the Cuban economist based in Colombia. “Among them are the liberalisation of agriculture, the removal of unnecessary restrictions on the private sector, the dismantling of the state monopoly on foreign trade, the creation of more flexible channels for incoming foreign investment, and the participation of the private sector in the financial system.”

The problem, Vidal adds, lies “in the implementation,” and this represents “another attempt to announce transformations in order to buy time, without fully accepting the political and institutional implications of a deep economic reform.” The expert argues that “no internal reform can produce significant results if it is not accompanied by a negotiation with the United States that makes it possible to lift the energy blockade and ease the sanctions.”

The expert argues that “no internal reform can produce significant results if it is not accompanied by a negotiation with the United States that makes it possible to lift the energy blockade and ease the sanctions.”

This Thursday, Vice President JD Vance referred to the matter, describing the conversations in these terms: “Right now we are talking with the Cuban Government about how they might change their way of acting to achieve that. We’ll see what they do and, obviously, if they do one thing, we will do another. If they make smart decisions, we are going to have a much better relationship with that Island.” A few hours later came the details continue reading

of the measures, but for the moment there is silence from the White House.

Vidal points to another government incapacity: the technical and administrative capacity to provide a legal and theoretical corpus that would put into practice the measures that today exist only on paper.

Among them, one in particular has caught the attention of economists in these first hours: item number 17, which proposes to “transform the socialist state enterprise into a commercial company through shares or participations.” Its implications are so far-reaching that De Miranda Parrondo himself says of it: “Something like this has been approved by the Central Committee of the PCC and the National Assembly. Everyone is responsible in the event that this comes about.”

The expert, also resident in Cali, considers that this point “will be the express route for family members and close associates of those in power to become ‘shareholders’ without anyone knowing where their ‘capital’ came from. And that ‘transition’ will be directed by the Communist Party of Cuba to build the ‘Crony Capitalism’ with which certain politicians from certain powers will have no qualms about doing business,” he censures.

De Miranda Parrondo acknowledges, in realistic terms, that any country in Cuba’s current situation needs to sell state assets, given that so-called “ownership by all the people” has destroyed them, but he considers it imperative that there be “institutional and political changes that are nowhere on the horizon” and “a capital market with clear, transparent rules and equal opportunities,” so that those who benefit are not simply those closest to the elites.

On item 17, legal expert Eloy Viera also focuses – almost exclusively – seeing the set of proposals as, if realised, “a profound transformation of Cuba’s economic model,” one that “would advance towards an economy with far more elements of capitalism, albeit without any political opening or mechanisms for the democratisation of power.”

The expert concentrates on the conversion of state enterprises into commercial companies, considering it a break with what has always been the foundation of the national economy. With this measure, any private investor or otherwise, Cuban or not, may acquire property that until now belonged to the State, although the State would retain a stake in strategic sectors. “The proposal breaks with one of the principles that have traditionally defined Cuba’s business system: the non-existence of a capital market and the impossibility of private individuals or legal entities participating as shareholders.”

All the proposed changes finally contemplate the existence of large-scale private companies, as exist in other countries. For Viera too they resemble “the reform processes promoted by China and Vietnam”; he values the “historic break with the financial model established following the nationalisations” that allowing private banking represents.

“With a non-existent rule of law, the accelerated privatisation of state enterprises without robust legal safeguards tends to end in the capture of state assets by insiders well connected to power. One thing leads to the other. Without exception.”

Pedro Monreal, an economist resident in Spain, has also focused his criticism on the aforementioned item 17, in which he sees “the ‘crony capitalism’ of the Russian transition.” “With a non-existent rule of law, the accelerated privatisation of state enterprises without robust legal safeguards tends to end in the capture of state assets by insiders well connected to power. One thing leads to the other. Without exception,” he concludes.

Michael Bustamante, a History professor at Florida International University, has also commented on this aspect, in which he detects the hand of the White House. “All that would remain would be to also allow the sale of shares directly to foreigners, and we would be looking at an ideal scenario for the ‘soft takeover’ promoted from Washington,” he argues. To which one user replies: “That’s what they’re already doing with Sherritt.”

The specialist, who considers the economic changes to be far-reaching at that level, regrets that they did not come years ago. “Imagine if similar announcements had come 10, or even 5 years ago,” he said.

The only clear political reaction at this stage has come from María Elvira Salazar, while her colleague Carlos A. Giménez has limited himself to retweeting a video by journalist Mario J. Pentón criticising the measures for leading the Island down the Chinese or Vietnamese path, and Mario Díaz-Balart has not even done that. The congresswoman wrote on her X account that “Díaz-Canel is desperate [and] no longer knows what to invent to extend his political agony.” She reproaches him for announcing measures he has previously criticised, and concludes by saying that “the only thing that can save Cuba is the end of the dictatorship and the return of freedom.”

But the true word on the other side of the Straits rests with Rubio and Trump, who for now continue to say nothing.

Translated by GH.

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Reasons to Prohibit the Communist Party in the New Republic of Cuba

Communism has no right to repeat its crime

The future democratic Republic of Cuba must guarantee the right of its citizens to organize politically, express ideas, and participate in public life. / Presidency of Cuba

14ymedio, Jorge Luis León, Houston, June 18, 2026 / Political pluralism is one of the fundamental pillars of any authentic democracy. However, pluralism does not mean naiveté. Freedom cannot become the mechanism that allows the return of those who destroyed that very freedom.

The future democratic Cuban Republic must guarantee the right of its citizens to organize politically, express ideas, and participate in public life. But there is a historical and moral exception that cannot be ignored: the Communist Party of Cuba.

This is not about an ideological difference. This is not about a doctrinal dispute. This is about the historical responsibility of an organization that for more than six decades destroyed republican institutions, eliminated fundamental freedoms, imprisoned thousands of opponents, provoked the exile of millions of Cubans, and led the country to economic, social, and moral ruin.

The evidence speaks for itself.

Numerous countries that suffered under totalitarian regimes have taken legal measures to prevent the return of organizations responsible for the destruction of democracy. In several Eastern European states that emerged after the fall of the Soviet bloc, symbols, organizations, and forms of propaganda associated with totalitarian systems were banned. In countries such as Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, restrictions were placed on structures linked to Soviet communism because they were deemed incompatible with the democratic order and with the memory of its victims.

The reason is simple: a democracy is not obligated to finance, protect, or tolerate movements whose stated or real objective is to destroy democracy continue reading

itself.

The Communist Party of Cuba was not a conventional political party. It was the central instrument of a system of absolute domination.

The Communist Party of Cuba was not a conventional political party. It was the central instrument of a system of absolute domination. From within it were organized the mechanisms of social surveillance, ideological persecution, cultural censorship, control of the media, subordination of the courts, and the elimination of all political competition.

Under its direction, the separation of powers, freedom of the press, political pluralism, and basic economic rights of citizens disappeared.

The historical result is visible to all: an impoverished nation, a devastated infrastructure, millions of Cubans forced to emigrate, entire generations educated under propaganda and fear, a profound erosion of civic values and social trust.

Therefore, the future democratic Constitution must establish the permanent outlawing of any organization that promotes the fundamental principles of totalitarian communism or that seeks to restore the political structures responsible for national oppression.

It is not important what name they adopt. It is not important what ideological disguise they use. It is not important what moderate rhetoric they try to present. If the program aims for political monopoly, the suppression of individual freedoms, the subordination of the citizen to the State, or the imposition of a single ideology, it must be declared incompatible with Cuban democracy.

History teaches us that the enemies of freedom often return using new languages and new masks. We Cubans cannot afford such a mistake.

History teaches that the enemies of freedom often return using new languages and new masks.

National reconciliation demands justice. Justice demands remembrance. And remembrance demands preventing those responsible for the destruction of Cuba from ever again occupying positions from which they can repeat their crimes.

The new Republic will have to be generous with people, but inflexible with the criminal structures that destroyed the nation.

Individuals will have rights. Ideas can be debated. But the political apparatus responsible for the greatest national tragedy in our history cannot claim democratic legitimacy.

The Communist Party of Cuba lost that right when it turned freedom into a crime, dissent into persecution, and an entire nation into a hostage of its power.

Cuban democracy must be born with memory. And a democracy with memory will never allow the return of those who murdered it.

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The Cuban Regime Announces the End of Several Prohibitions and Clings to the “Socialist Project”

The list of measures includes eliminating price caps, the ration book, the State’s monopoly over foreign trade, and the State’s monopoly on hiring personnel for foreign companies.
Foreigners will be allowed to invest directly in the domestic private sector, without State intermediaries.

Investors will, in principle, be able to put their money into any business without having to follow the government’s “portfolio of opportunities.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, June 18, 2026 — Pending how and when it is implemented, the Cuban regime finally has proposals for real change. In a lengthy speech before the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel specified on Wednesday several proposals that break with previously untouchable dogmas, beginning with the general elimination of price controls.

“We are going to correct a policy that did not produce the expected results,” the president explained to an audience that did not hesitate to approve everything. “In practice, price caps failed to contain inflation. They often caused products to disappear, encouraged diversion to illegal markets, led to higher prices, reduced tax revenues, and created an impossible race between real prices and administrative decisions that always arrived too late.”

The list contains 23 areas of action and 176 proposals, many of them already known, as this newspaper had previously warned, but also others that, if implemented as announced, would contradict ideological orthodoxy.

The list contains 23 areas of action and 176 proposals, many of them already known, as this newspaper had previously warned, but also others that, if implemented as announced, would contradict ideological orthodoxy

Another of the major measures is allowing direct foreign investment in private companies. Since 2013, when it was first permitted, this type of financing had been reserved for the state sector. Díaz-Canel said it will now be facilitated “with clear rules on ownership, repatriation, reinvestment, and dispute resolution.” This is no minor detail, considering that just over a year ago panic spread among foreign companies when they were prohibited from repatriating foreign currency.

These investors are also finally seeing some of their other demands addressed, including the ability to hire personnel directly without using State employment agencies, which until now kept a large percentage of salaries paid in foreign currency and passed only a small portion on to workers in national currency. This had long been an aspiration, as diplomatic sources confirmed to 14ymedio no less than 10 years ago, stating that the system “hampered investors’ ability to directly select qualified personnel.” In addition, Díaz-Canel guaranteed that foreigners will no continue reading

longer be told where to invest, based on the government’s business portfolio, but will instead be free to pursue their own initiatives.

Less novel is the renewed offer to Cuban Americans, who have already spent years being encouraged to invest in the Island and who will now divide between those who see an opportunity and those who refuse to participate in a project ultimately intended to “preserve the Revolution,” as Prime Minister Manuel Marrero said in a speech that contained little else of substance.

Another change, this one already announced by the president last Friday, is the revision of the list of prohibited activities for the private sector. / Screenshot/Presidency of Cuba

The substance was in the speech delivered by his superior, who outlined several other genuine reforms, though in less detail. Among them, he spoke of exchanging debt for assets, choosing his words carefully. The idea, common in many countries, would be to transfer ownership of properties, which could include hotels, mines, or other assets, to satisfy large debts the government cannot pay. He stressed, however, that this would be done “without permanently alienating ownership of those assets,” implying that the State could eventually recover them once the debt is settled. The qualification is ideologically significant, since the opposite could be viewed as a betrayal of Communist Party principles.

Another change, already announced by the president last Friday, is a review of the list of activities prohibited to the private sector. It remains to be seen how this will be implemented, but the main promise is to “comprehensively review the list with a clear principle: wherever possible, replace prohibition with responsible regulation.”

Plans also call for expanding the permitted activities of small and medium-sized private enterprises (mipymes) and eliminating bureaucratic burdens. Electronic invoicing, digital payments, and interoperable public registries will become mandatory “to combat tax evasion and corruption,” although this will not be feasible—something he did not mention—while internet connectivity and electricity remain in their current condition.

Díaz-Canel also addressed this issue, although there was less new information. Foreign companies supplying solar panels, batteries, and inverters will be allowed to enter the market directly, and additional taxes related to the sale, installation, and maintenance of these technologies will be eliminated. Solar-powered service stations will also be expanded through still-undisclosed mechanisms promoting foreign, cooperative, private, and State investment. “Expedited” licenses will be granted to operators and taxi drivers using electric vehicles, and tax exemptions will apply to parts for collective transportation vehicles powered by photovoltaic energy.

The president renewed Raúl Castro’s promise—Castro reportedly watched the meeting by videoconference and sent a message of approval through an intermediary—to eliminate universal subsidies distributed through the ration book and replace them with “direct support for vulnerable individuals”

The president renewed Raúl Castro’s promise—Castro reportedly watched the meeting by videoconference and sent a message of approval through an intermediary—to eliminate universal subsidies distributed through the ration book and replace them with “direct support for vulnerable individuals.” In addition, the private sector will be required to “sponsor social dining halls and nursing homes,” effectively transferring part of the State’s social responsibilities to private actors. This measure, if implemented, would represent a paradigm shift and a genuine break with the past, but it has been pending since the aging general first proposed it in 2008.

Díaz-Canel listed a series of additional measures, including one of major significance: ending the State monopoly over exports. Others had already been anticipated, including reforms concerning land ownership and the promotion of agricultural production, which were announced in the draft law expected to be approved in July; reducing the number of ministries; promoting municipal autonomy; and creating a Community Youth Network aimed at training, networking, improving neighborhood coexistence, and supporting local community groups.

The speech was heavily infused with political rhetoric. Díaz-Canel detailed what he described as the hostile policy of the United States, although he also admitted: “There are obstacles that do not come from abroad or from the embargo. There is slowness, bureaucracy, regulations that hinder those who want to produce, and decisions we have postponed. What depends on us, we must change ourselves, and we must change now.”

While maintaining the narrative of resisting pressure from Washington, the president said that the Cuban people would not be called upon merely “to resist. We are going to be called upon to create. To produce. To decide. To supervise. To prosper, and to transform.” Even so, he defended the legacy of Fidel Castro and made it very clear that all of the proposed changes are intended to defend the Revolution.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Havana Chronicles: Surrounded by Garbage, Miramar Is No Longer the Glamorous Neighborhood It Once Was.

Havana has become a hostile and unsafe city, where it is increasingly difficult to sleep and bathe due to the lack of electricity and water.

Upon returning to my building, I had the impression that a memory had been stolen from me. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Yoani Sánchez, Havana, June 17, 2026 / I collapse into bed, exhausted. A stroll through the Miramar neighborhood can be worse now than sprinting along the uneven sidewalks of Reina Street in Central Havana. The once glamorous western neighborhood of the Cuban capital is as full of garbage as any corner of Cerro or La Lisa. Mansions with gardens on one side and mountains of trash on the other. Embassies with their national flags flying behind their gates, the stench of filth seeping through the bars.

I walked to 3rd and 70th from my house in Nuevo Vedado. There are fewer electric tricycles because the long hours of blackouts prevent them from charging the batteries of what has become the most common way to get around Havana. The journey submerged me in an zone I gazed at with wonder when I first visited it in my childhood. From that era, I remember gardens with impeccably trimmed hedges, the tranquility of its side streets, and the cleanliness of the central promenade on Fifth Avenue — a far cry from my neighborhood in Cayo Hueso. But none of that remains now.

My walk this Tuesday was through an area of boarded-up, crumbling mansions, traffic lights out, old markets empty, and small businesses with refrigerators that weren’t cold due to the energy crisis. Life, what is life, I saw only outside a few consulates that receive dozens of visitors every day, desperate to leave this island. Returning to my building, I had the impression that a memory had been stolen from me, that memory of my first time walking down 3rd Street, visiting the National Aquarium, and passing through the tunnel under the Almendares River.

A plume of smoke rises against the sky in front of our balcony, seeming to come from somewhere in the Cerro neighborhood. / 14ymedio

I go to bed early. It’s four in the morning on Wednesday, and I’m woken up by a strong smell of burning. I check the house, but the stench is coming from outside. A plume of smoke rises against the sky in front of our balcony, seeming to come from somewhere in the Cerro neighborhood. They’ve probably set fire to a garbage dump. My eyes are burning, so I grab a mask and put it on. There’s no electricity, so I use my rechargeable flashlight to get to the kitchen.

I make some instant coffee. The night has been long and the mosquitoes never give up. I’m more afraid of dengue fever than anything else. My self-esteem, like that of my neighbors, friends, and acquaintances, is at rock bottom. In the midst of speeches that extol national dignity, everyone I meet seems to have lost all their individual dignity or to have only shreds of self-respect left. Unwashed bodies, sleepless nights, and the smell of food on the plate, which seems to scream that it’s spoiled, are like corrosive acid poured on my self-respect.

The ten commandments of survival include not going out at night, remembering to apply insect repellent before going outside, and having as many bars and locks as possible to protect our homes.

Pride is also at odds with fear. Threats come from all sides. “Watch out for the mosquitoes,” a friend tells me, still unable to walk due to the aftereffects of chikungunya. “I don’t go out without this,” a neighbor tells me, showing me the machete he carries on his motorcycle to defend himself against the increasing number of robberies. “Don’t even think about going into that neighborhood alone,” a neighbor advises when I tell her I have to move south in a few days.

Fear has taken root in our lives. The ten commandments of survival include not going out at night, not forgetting to apply insect repellent before stepping outside, installing as many bars and locks as possible to protect our homes, and trying to calm our racing hearts when we repeatedly call someone and they don’t answer, all the while imagining some tragedy that is later explained away by the poor service of the telecommunications monopoly. We live in a constant state of anxiety, with news of fights, stabbings, murders, and robberies coming from all sides, rarely reported in the official press.

But the greatest fear is that nothing will change. The main terror is that this will drag on for weeks, months, and years, robbing us of what little dignity and peace we have left.

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Previous Havana Chronicles:

A Circus Facing Off Against Power, and a City Growing Increasingly Lonely

Chronicle of a Monday That Feels Like Wednesday

“We Used to Complain About the ‘CUC’, But Now We Miss It”

The Roar of Despair of a Cuban Woman Returning to Her Country After Many Years

The Tulipán Market Closed: “They’ve Given the Order To Go to the March for Raúl”

Along Carlos III Street and towards Ethiopia

Sleeping Is Also a Privilege in Havana

A Desperate Plea in the Middle of the Dark Havana Night: ‘Light!’

The Refuse of Disenchantment

Under a Picture-Postcard Blue Sky, the Country is Crumbling

Fatigue Barely Allows One to Enjoy the ‘Lights On’ in Havana

Dollars, the Classic Card, and a Havana Without Tourists

A Journey Through the Lost Names of Havana

The Shipwreck of a Ship Called “Cuba”

Havana Seen From ‘The Control Tower’

In Havana, the Only Ones Who Move Are the Mosquitoes

Reina, the Stately Street Where Garbage is Sold

Searching for Light Through the Deserted Streets of Havana

The Death Throes of ‘Granma’, the Mouthpiece of a Regime Cornered by Crisis

The Anxiety of the Disconnected Cuban

One Mella, Three Mellas, Life in Cuba Is Measured in Thousands of Pesos

It Is Forbidden To Leave Home in Cuba Today Because It Is a “Counter-Revolutionary Day”

Vedado, the Heart of Havana’s Nightlife, Is Now Converted Into a Desert

Havana, in Critical Condition

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The European Parliament Will Vote on Whether To Demand the Suspension of the Agreement With Cuba Due to the Lack of Democratic Progress

The proposal calls for the release of political prisoners, sanctions against Díaz-Canel, and guarantees for the return of exiles.

The absence of references to U.S. economic sanctions has prevented Social Democrats and Greens from joining the text. / EFE

EFE/14ymedio, Strasbourg, June 17, 2026 – The European Parliament will vote this Thursday on a resolution urging the European Union to suspend the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba if the regime does not adopt concrete and significant measures toward full multiparty democracy in the short term.

The proposal, promoted by center-right groups, currently has the support of the European People’s Party, the European Conservatives and Reformists, and the liberals of Renew Europe. Together, the three groups have 343 Members of the European Parliament, 18 fewer than needed to achieve an absolute majority.

The text calls for a specific plan for a political transition, the immediate and unconditional release of nearly 1,300 political prisoners, and guarantees that exiled Cubans may return to the Island without suffering reprisals.

It also condemns the systematic repression of the Cuban regime, calls for sanctions against Miguel Díaz-Canel, and argues that the only way out of the country’s suffering, poverty, and isolation is through profound political and economic change leading, without further delay, to a democratic transition.

“The European Parliament has the opportunity to deliver another slap, but a real and powerful one, to put an end to the Cuban tyranny”

The approval of the resolution will depend to a large extent on Patriots for Europe, which has submitted several amendments to strengthen the language against Havana. The group has tied its final support to the acceptance of those modifications.

“The European Parliament has the opportunity to deliver another slap, but a real and powerful one, to put an end to the Cuban tyranny,” Jorge Buxadé, head of Vox’s delegation in the European Parliament, told EFE.

Buxadé warned that his party would not accept the European People’s Party continue reading

once again “throwing itself into the arms of the progressives,” referring to possible negotiations with Social Democrats and Greens.

The absence of references to United States economic sanctions and restrictions on fuel supplies has prevented those two groups from joining the center-right text. Social Democrats and Greens have presented an alternative proposal that, in addition to denouncing repression and demanding the release of political prisoners, calls on Washington to end what they describe as “illegitimate practices” against Cuba.

The division over the role of the United States threatens to prevent a common position in the European Parliament

Social Democratic negotiator Leire Pajín stated that her group shares the condemnation of the political rights situation on the Island, the demand for economic and political reforms, and the call for respect for fundamental freedoms.

However, she argued that a resolution on Cuba’s severe humanitarian deterioration should include “all the reasons” that have contributed to the crisis.

Pajín mentioned the long-standing economic embargo and the recent measures by the Trump Administration against oil supplies to the Island, which, she said, have worsened blackouts and shortages of medicines and food.

The Socialist MEP also stressed that Washington’s measures have begun to directly affect European economic interests, after hotel chains such as Meliá Hotels International and Iberostar announced that they would cease operating some of their establishments in Cuba. “When that happens, we have to denounce the situation in all its elements from the beginning,” she maintained.

The division over the role of the United States thus threatens to prevent a common position in the European Parliament, despite the fact that the main groups agree in denouncing repression, calling for the release of political prisoners, and demanding profound reforms from the Cuban regime.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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