Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

The U.S. Takes Steps Toward Charging Raúl Castro Over the Shootdown of the Brothers to the Rescue Planes

Cuban José Basulto, founder of Brothers to the Rescue, remains “skeptical” about the charges against the former president of the island.

Raúl Castro and his grandson, Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, “El Cangrejo,” [The Crab] in the former leader’s most recent public appearance on May 1 / Cubadebat

14ymedio, Madrid, May 15, 2026 — The United States is preparing a formal indictment against former president Raúl Castro for the 1996 downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, according to sources cited by the Miami Herald.

The CBS had already reported on Thursday that the Justice Department was considering filing charges against Fidel Castro’s younger brother in that case, one of the most tense episodes in the relationship between Washington and Havana in recent decades.

According to the Miami Herald, the indictment will be announced during an event at the Freedom Tower in Miami commemorating Cuban Independence Day, following approval by a grand jury. The event will also include a tribute to the four victims of the incident.

Asked about those reports on Friday while returning from China aboard Air Force One, US President Donald Trump declined to comment, saying he did not want to make a statement.

So far, the US government has not officially confirmed the possible indictment.

The case dates back to February 1996, when Brothers to the Rescue aircraft were shot down by Cuban forces in an incident that killed four people and led to a serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries.

Donald Trump declined to comment, saying he did not want to make any remarks.

Florida Governor Ron DeSantis reacted favorably to the information published by CBS and wrote on the X network: “Go ahead, it was about time.”

The possibility of bringing charges against Raúl Castro arises amid the hardening of Washington’s policy towards Cuba since Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025.

Raúl Castro, 94, formally stepped down as head of the Communist Party of Cuba in 2021, although he is still considered an influential figure within the Cuban political apparatus.

His grandson, Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, alias El Cangrejo [the Crab], has been mentioned in recent contacts between representatives of both countries. continue reading

The information about the possible indictment comes a day after the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), John Ratcliffe , met in Havana with Cuban leaders, including Castro’s grandson, according to reports divulged about the meeting.

According to these versions, Ratcliffe conveyed Washington’s conditions for handling relations with Cuba, amid pressure exerted by the United States on the island, which includes an oil embargo imposed since last January.

For his part, Cuban José Basulto, founder of Brothers to the Rescue, remains “skeptical” about achieving justice and change on the Island despite reports about the indictment of Castro.

“I am confident that justice will be achieved, a justice that is long overdue, because, I repeat, they have let so much time pass.”

“I remain skeptical until the point where action is taken, and the action to be taken is the criminal prosecution of Raúl Castro, who gave the orders, and of all those who cooperated with Raúl Castro in the assassination,” Basulto said in an interview with EFE in Miami.

The dissident, one of the leaders of the exile community in the US, pointed out that “justice delayed is justice denied” in response to reports that the Administration of Donald Trump is preparing a formal indictment against Castro, then Minister of the Armed Forces of Cuba, for shooting down Brothers to the Rescue planes on February 24, 1996.

Basulto, who founded the organization to help rafters fleeing the island, survived the attack, but has since sought justice for the deaths of American pilots Mario de la Peña, Carlos Costa, and Armando Alejandre Jr., and legal resident Pablo Morales, all of Cuban origin.

“I trust that justice will be achieved, a long-awaited justice, because, I repeat, they have let so much time pass: delegated justice, denied justice. And what can I say? I believe this should have happened a long time ago,” the founder of Brothers to the Rescue insisted.

The Cuban leader responds that “everything is possible” amid the expectation that Castro will face the same fate as the deposed Venezuelan ruler Nicolás Maduro, captured by the United States on January 3 in Caracas following a formal accusation by the Department of Justice.

“Anything is possible, but you’d have to ask the administration of Mr. Trump, who is the one who makes these decisions. I hope the United States decides to take action against this vile act against the pilots,” Basulto replied from his home.

“Anything is possible, but you’d have to ask the administration of Mr. Trump, who is the one who makes these decisions.”

The 85-year-old activist doubts the productivity of the negotiations between Washington and Havana, which include Raúl Castro’s grandson, opining that change would only occur with a “unilateral action” by the United States against the Cuban government.

Meanwhile, the indictment against Raúl Castro must be approved by a grand jury, CBS notes, framing the information in any case within a context of maximum pressure from the US, with an oil blockade that has Cuba on the verge of energy collapse, surviving thanks to the import permit for private entities issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury Department.

Because of the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier opened a statewide criminal investigation last March against Raúl Castro, now 94 and then Minister of the Armed Forces of Cuba, who was identified as responsible for ordering the attack.

That day, two twin-engine Cessnas flying over the Florida Straits were shot down by Cuban Air Force MiG-29 fighter jets. Three Americans and one Florida resident, all of Cuban origin, died: Carlos Costa, Armando Alejandre Jr., Mario de la Peña, and Pablo Morales. The tragedy triggered a diplomatic crisis between Washington and Havana and led, weeks later, to the tightening of the embargo with the passage of the Helms-Burton Act.

Brothers to the Rescue was a non-profit organization founded in Miami in the early 1990s. Its members patrolled international waters in search of Cuban rafters attempting to flee the island. Havana accused them of violating its airspace and carrying out political provocations. Washington always maintained that the downed flights were in international airspace, and this was confirmed by reports from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an autonomous body of the Organization of American States.

The reopening of the case, however, faces legal and practical obstacles.

Subsequent investigations revealed that at least two Cuban agents infiltrated into Brothers to the Rescue provided detailed information about flight routes and schedules to the Cuban government, facilitating the military operation. In 2003, a U.S. federal court indicted a Cuban general and two fighter pilots for the downing. However, no formal charges were ever filed against the Castro brothers.

The 1996 downing marked a turning point in bilateral relations and solidified the perception that the Cuban government was prepared to use lethal force against civilians in the context of the migration conflict.

he reopening of the case, however, faces legal and practical obstacles. Raúl Castro does not reside in the United States, and although an old bilateral extradition treaty exists, it has not been enforced since 1959.

In a social media post Thursday night, responding to the information revealed by CBS, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis wrote: “Let ‘er rip, it’s been a long time coming!”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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A Transition for Cuba Cannot Be Based on Secular Saints

Reflections on Rolando Gallardo’s proposal for the republican refoundation of Cuba

There is exhaustion, disillusionment, anger, and a desire for escape, but the desire for change does not automatically equal the capacity for insurrection. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Málaga, José A. Adrián Torres, May 15, 2026 — I read with great interest Rolando Gallardo’s article on the need for a republican refoundation in Cuba. I agree with much of the diagnosis: speaking of a conventional transition may be insufficient for a country where the regime has degraded not only institutions, but also social trust, personal initiative, public responsibility, and collective hope. Cuba is not facing merely the problem of replacing one government with another; it is facing the much more arduous challenge of rebuilding a political community after decades of fear, dependence, simulation, and moral impoverishment.

Precisely for that reason, the author’s proposal seems lucid in its starting point but overly confident in its development. The idea of a civil council made up of jurists, intellectuals, and figures of proven integrity may be desirable as a goal, but it risks resting on an excessively idealistic premise: that a group of morally qualified individuals, without immediate political ambitions and motivated by patriotism, will be capable of managing a transition of enormous complexity without becoming trapped by interests, factions, external pressures, or internal power struggles.

That assumption recalls, despite all differences, another form of anthropological faith: the belief that a political process can produce new men, selfless, virtuous, and devoted to the common good. Castroism turned that fantasy into revolutionary dogma, and reality ultimately showed something far older and less epic: human beings do not cease to have interests, vanities, fears, loyalties, and appetites simply because they are assigned a historic mission.

The Cuban transition will certainly need valuable people. But it cannot rest on the presumed moral purity of its protagonists

The Cuban transition will certainly need valuable people. But it cannot rest on the presumed moral purity of its protagonists, but rather on rules, limits, oversight, counterweights, and verifiable procedures. The problem is not finding heroes; the problem is building institutions that function even when the heroes grow tired, make mistakes, or begin behaving like continue reading

any ordinary person with a bit of power in their hands.

It is also important not to underestimate the degree of discouragement in Cuban society today. The Cuban people are not incapable, nor do they lack dignity, nor have they completely lost their instinct for freedom. But they are exhausted, impoverished, monitored, fragmented, and for too long accustomed to surviving rather than organizing. To think that a massive, spontaneous, and sustained internal mobilization alone will be enough to bring about change may be as naïve as thinking that a transitional administration led by an enlightened elite will solve the problem from above.

Here emerges a decisive issue that the article does not sufficiently develop: the relationship between internal repression, popular mobilization, and the legitimacy of any external assistance. In other communist regimes with strong police control, such as East Germany or Ceaușescu’s Romania, the fall of the system was preceded by visible, extensive, and difficult-to-hide popular pressure. It was not merely a problem of economic exhaustion or ideological decay: there came a moment when fear stopped functioning as the regime’s cement. The streets, with all their risks, produced an unequivocal image: society had publicly broken the pact of obedience.

The regime no longer convinces, but it still manages fear, fatigue, and social fragmentation. That is no small thing.

In Cuba, by contrast, that rupture has yet to consolidate. There have been significant outbreaks, and the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021 showed that there was a real reserve of protest and exhaustion. But it also demonstrated the repressive effectiveness of the state apparatus and the extremely high personal cost of challenging it. Since then, protest has appeared fragmented, intermittent, and often absorbed by the daily struggle to survive: obtaining food, electricity, medicine, transportation, or simply escaping. The regime no longer persuades, but it still administers fear, fatigue, and social fragmentation. That is no small thing. The Cuban dictatorship may no longer possess epic appeal, but it still retains police, archives, prisons, informants, and considerable experience in crushing wills.

This absence of massive and sustained internal mobilization greatly complicates any hypothesis of decisive external assistance. A U.S. intervention—military, coercive, humanitarian, or presented as a stabilization operation—would require some kind of internal political legitimization: a widespread uprising, a visible fracture within the Armed Forces, an explicit request from recognizable transitional authorities, or a humanitarian crisis impossible to contain. Without such a trigger, assistance would risk appearing not as aid to an uprising nation, but as an external imposition. And there the regime, even moribund, would find its final propaganda fuel: presenting itself as the defender of national sovereignty against the old imperial enemy.

This point is especially delicate when considering current U.S. policy toward Cuba. Certain sectors, with figures such as Marco Rubio and Donald Trump himself, seem positioned within a logic of maximum pressure and strategic waiting: tightening the siege, hardening the rhetoric, and awaiting an internal situation that would make a more direct intervention politically viable. But that expectation requires a fuse inside the Island. Without a clear sign of popular rebellion, without an organized internal demand, and without a fracture within the power apparatus, any external action would be morally and politically exposed. It would not be enough to claim that Cuba is being helped; it would have to be demonstrable that assistance is being provided to a Cuba that has risen up.

Any intervention raises questions that cannot be solved with anti-Castro enthusiasm: who governs the next day? With what legitimacy? Under what international mandate?

From there arises the most uncomfortable question: the role of the United States and the Cuban diaspora. It is reasonable to admit that any real transition in Cuba will require external backing, economic assistance, security guarantees, technical support, and intense participation from the exile community. To deny this would be to repeat the old nationalist reflex that the regime itself has used for decades to shield itself. But something very different is turning that support into opaque political tutelage or, worse, into a military intervention born from a provoked or instrumentalized crisis.

An intervention by force might appear, in the abstract, to be the quickest solution. But every intervention opens questions that cannot be resolved through anti-Castro enthusiasm: who governs the next day? With what legitimacy? Under what international mandate? For how long? What is done with the Armed Forces? How are looting, revenge, mass flight, or the emergence of new mafia powers prevented? How can wounded nationalism be prevented from turning former oppressors into supposed defenders of sovereignty?

Cuba is not Iraq or Libya, certainly. It has a history, a diaspora, a cultural and family proximity to the United States, and a unique relationship with Miami that make the scenario different. Nor does there seem to exist in Cuba a deep and majority identification with the regime comparable to what other authoritarian systems managed to preserve for longer. There is exhaustion, disillusionment, anger, and a desire to leave. But the desire for change does not automatically equal the capacity for insurrection. Between wanting something to fall and assuming the risk of pushing it lies an enormous distance, especially when the person pushing knows they may end up in prison, in exile, or with their family ruined.

It will not be enough to expel Castroism from power; it will be necessary to prevent it from surviving in practices, fears, corruption, dependence, and the culture of simulation.

For that reason, the solution cannot be conceived solely as the overthrow of the regime. It must be conceived as the reconstruction of legitimate authority. And legitimacy is not imported wrapped in humanitarian aid, nor does it disembark intact at a port under military protection. It is built, negotiated, recognized, and subjected to limits. The exile community can contribute resources, vision, international pressure, and economic experience; the United States can offer guarantees, assistance, and deterrent capacity; but the ultimate legitimacy of Cuba’s refoundation will have to arise, in some way, from Cubans on the Island themselves. Without that anchor, the transition risks appearing as a replacement of tutelage: from Castroist tutelage to external tutelage, even if the latter comes wrapped in flags of freedom.

Therefore, rather than an administration of notables or a military takeover, Cuba would need a transition architecture with international backing, decisive participation by Cubans both inside and outside the Island, security guarantees, institutional purging, transitional justice, orderly economic opening, and a realistic political timetable. It will not be enough to expel Castroism from power; it will be necessary to prevent it from surviving in practices, fears, corruption, dependence, and the culture of simulation.

The Cuban problem, therefore, does not consist solely in designing a transition architecture for the day after. The prior problem is how to reach that day. The author seems to trust that the collapse of the regime will naturally open a space for a supervised civil administration. But that collapse may not occur in a clean or heroic way. It may take the form of prolonged degradation, dispersed social protests, mass migration, energy collapse, internal fractures within the apparatus itself, or a chaotic combination of all these things. In that scenario, the question is not only who will rebuild Cuba, but what type of event will grant legitimacy to the beginning of that reconstruction.

The great difficulty will not only be toppling an exhausted structure. The great difficulty will also be preventing the vacuum from being occupied by the same reflexes that made it possible: caudillismo, clientelism, external dependence, redemptive epic narratives, and contempt for institutions. In this, the article is entirely correct: Cuba needs architecture, not romanticism. But that architecture will have to be designed for real human beings, not administrative heroes or republican saints. And it will have to begin from an uncomfortable truth: without a sufficiently strong, visible, and sustained internal signal, any external assistance risks becoming, in the eyes of many, an intervention. And any intervention without internal legitimacy may end up giving Castroism its final disguise: that of the patriotic victim of foreign aggression.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Notes for a Transition Towards a Functioning Republic in Cuba

The question is not whether the regime will fall; it is whether Cuba will survive its own fall.

The result is profound fragmentation. Internal opposition exists, but it thrives in extreme vulnerability. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Rolando Gallardo, Huesca (Spain), May 13, 2026 / There is a recurring fantasy in exile circles and in certain Washington offices: that of a people who one day awaken, take to the streets, and, with the sheer force of their weariness, restore democracy. It is a powerful and understandable image. It is also, at this point, dangerously naive.

The greatest obstacle to change in Cuba is not the longevity of a gerontocracy clinging to power, nor the loyalty of its generals. It is something more difficult to quantify and even more difficult to repair: the damage that 67 years of totalitarianism have inflicted on the very fabric of Cuban society. The regime not only destroyed institutions; it destroyed trust among neighbors. It replaced the social fabric with a network of surveillance and denunciation. It transformed envy of those who prosper into a civic virtue, and collective failure into proof of equality.

The result is profound fragmentation. Internal opposition exists, but it lives in extreme vulnerability, not only to state repression, but also to an environment where suspicion is the everyday language and where any organized alternative is crushed before it can take root. Cuba today does not have an independent civil society. Instead, it has an institutional desert.

What Cuba needs is not a transition, in the conventional sense of the term, but a refounding

Recognizing this is not pessimism. It is the honest starting point for any serious analysis. And from that starting point comes a conclusion that makes many uncomfortable but that the history of the last 130 years clearly demonstrates: what Cuba needs is not a transition, in the conventional sense of the term, but a complete refounding.

The difference is not semantic. A transition implies institutional continuity, which simply does not exist in Cuba. What occurred was not the evolution of a republic toward another form of government: it was the hijacking of a state by a dynasty that administered it as a family patrimony for more than continue reading

six decades. The constitutional thread was severed. Restoring it requires more than elections; it requires rebuilding from scratch the foundations upon which those elections can have any meaning.

This implies accepting an uncomfortable truth: that Cuba, in the period immediately following the regime, will not be able to govern itself without external support. Not because its citizens are incapable—they are, in fact, extraordinarily resilient—but because the institutions that would make such self-government possible have been systematically destroyed. A country without an independent judiciary, without a free press, without parties with real roots, without a recent tradition of peaceful transitions of power, needs time and structure before it can sustain a functioning democracy.

To prevent the power vacuum from being filled by the same actors who oppress the country today, or by others who are equally violent.

The alternative to external support is not immediate sovereignty. It is chaos. Examples abound and are instructive in their brutality: Libya after Gaddafi, Iraq after Hussein, Somalia after Barre. The collapse of a dictatorship without a replacement structure does not produce freedom; it produces violence, fragmentation, and often the return of some form of authoritarianism under a different label.

For Cuba, the proposal that deserves serious discussion is that of an internationally backed civilian transitional administration—with central participation from the United States and the Cuban diaspora—that provides the necessary order and technical legitimacy while institutions are rebuilt. Not an occupation. Not a colonial-style protectorate. Rather, a temporary framework, explicitly defined in its limits and expiration date, designed to prevent the power vacuum from being filled by the same actors who currently oppress the country, or by others equally violent.

To ensure that this framework does not clash with national pride—which is real and legitimate, and should not be confused with the nationalism manufactured by the regime—its day-to-day operations should be entrusted to a Civil Transition Council composed of Cubans. Not politicians seeking office, but jurists and intellectuals of proven technical integrity, without immediate electoral ambitions and without ties to the factions that will inevitably compete for power in the next stage.

Among those who meet these criteria are names well known to the Cuban legal community: Eloy Viera Cañive, whose precision in dismantling authoritarian legislation is exceptional; Julio Antonio Fernández Estrada, one of the most rigorous experts on Cuban constitutional history; and Laritza Diversent, of Cubalex, whose systematic documentation of abuses has already created an invaluable archive for any transitional justice process. These and other key figures could form a transition council comprised of a cultural elite without overt political ambitions.

Outlaw the Communist Party of Cuba, transform the Armed Forces, and create an Economic Emergency Law that guarantees investment.

Two decisions will be unavoidable, and both will be politically costly.

The first: the outlawing of the Communist Party of Cuba. Not as an act of ideological revenge, nor as a proscription of an idea—ideas cannot be outlawed—but as the dissolution of the organic structure through which the dynasty has exercised total control of the State for more than half a century. Allowing that structure to survive the transition would be like trying to build a new building on the same rotten foundations. The national refounding would be flawed from the outset.

The second: the transformation of the Armed Forces. Here, the temptation to demolish everything is understandable but suicidal. A total dismantling of the military apparatus does not produce security; it creates a vacuum that is filled by mafias, traffickers, and paramilitary groups already operating on the fringes of the regime. What is needed is not destruction but surgery: the removal of the business-oriented generals—those officers who have turned national sovereignty into a holding company for personal businesses—and the promotion of mid-level officers, colonels and lieutenant colonels with a technical background, trained in doctrine but without complicity in the crimes of the system. A republican army, overseen by the Civil Council committed to a new constitutional doctrine, is the only guarantee that the transition will not lead to settling of scores or territorial collapse.

But none of these measures – neither the most sophisticated institutional architecture, nor the best emergency economic legislation – will be sufficient if the deepest damage that the regime has caused is not addressed: the damage that lies within people.

Sixty-seven years of indoctrination leave scars that cannot be erased by a decree. The culture of envy toward those who prosper, the distrust of private enterprise, the dependence on the State as the sole source of certainty… These are not individual aberrations; they are rational responses to decades of systematic conditioning. Reversing them requires time, education, and, above all, the concrete experience that personal effort produces real results.

Therefore, an emergency economic law that provides legal guarantees for investment and eliminates obstacles for small and medium-sized enterprises is not just a technical measure. It is a psychological and cultural intervention. It is the instrument through which Cuban citizens begin to learn, in their own lives, that individual success is not a betrayal of the collective but rather the possible foundation for shared prosperity.

The road from dictatorship to a restored republic will not be short or smooth. It never is. But the first step is to honestly name what Cuba needs: not illusions, but a solid foundation. Not romanticism, but rigor. Not a return to an idealized past, but the patient and deliberate construction of something Cuba has never truly possessed: a functioning republic.

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The Gas Cylinders That Aren’t for Everyone in Cuba

Residents of a street in Guanabacoa watch the Supermarket23 delivery truck with longing

The gas cylinders it carries are not for everyone, and even less so for the impoverished pockets of most residents on that block. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, Darío Hernández, May 15, 2026 — A liquefied gas delivery truck passes through Guanabacoa, in Havana, under the longing gaze of most of the neighbors. The gas cylinders it carries are not for everyone, and even less so for the impoverished pockets of most residents on that block of Delicias Street, between Potosí and Gloria.

It is liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) that can be purchased through the online store Supermarket23, in dollars and from abroad, at a price of 29 dollars per cylinder, including home delivery. The recipient is a woman whose son lives in the United States. On the same street, people have no choice but to cook with charcoal, or eat only bread.

The sale of gas cylinders in Cuba recently took a turn when, for the first time, Supermarket23 began offering the product in dollars / 14ymedio

The sale of this fuel in Cuba recently took a turn when, for the first time, the digital sales platform began offering the product in dollars and outside the rationed system, amid this unprecedented energy crisis. This has marked a turning point in the commercialization of a product that, until now, had been tied to a state-regulated distribution system and available only in pesos.

It has also created a new social divide between those who have relatives abroad, who can avoid the long lines and uncertainty of the domestic supply system, and the rest of the population, forced to depend on a completely ineffective system. On this street in Guanabacoa, only one family is privileged.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The U.S. Considers Cuba a Threat to Its Security Because It Hosts Russian and Chinese Military Activities

Díaz-Canel replied that “not a single offensive action” against his neighbor’s national security “has ever come” from his country.

Almost two years ago, the Russian submarine Kazan visited Cuba, drawing plenty of attention from people in Havana. /14ymedio

Agencies/14ymedio, Washington / Madrid, May 13, 2026 – U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated this Tuesday that Cuba represents a threat to U.S. national security because, among other reasons, Russian military vessels — including a nuclear-powered submarine — have repeatedly docked at ports on the Island.

During a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, which was marked by warnings about alleged Russian intelligence operations — and suggestions that China could be doing the same — with Cuba providing logistical support, Republican Congressman Mario Díaz-Balart asked Hegseth whether Russian military ships had used Cuban territory.

“That’s correct,” Hegseth replied, adding that Washington has long considered it “highly problematic” for “a foreign adversary to use that kind of location,” so close to the United States.

Washington considers it “highly problematic” for “a foreign adversary to use that kind of location,” so close to the United States.

Later on, Díaz-Balart directly asked the Pentagon chief whether he considers the Cuban Government a threat to U.S. national security, and Hegseth answered: “yes,” in one of the toughest exchanges of the hearing.

The hearing focused mainly on the defense and national security priorities of President Donald Trump’s administration, but it drifted toward questions about the growing cooperation between Cuba, Russia, and China, as well as alleged intelligence activities and foreign military presence on the Island, located about 150 kilometers from the U.S. coast.

In what appeared to be a response, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel said this Tuesday that “not a single offensive action” against the national security of the United States “has ever come” from his country, adding that the Island “does not threaten or challenge,” but “does not fear either.”

“In more than six decades of socialist Revolution, ninety miles (about 145 kilometers) from the United States, not a single offensive action against that country’s national security has ever come from this territory,” the Cuban leader stressed continue reading

in a social media post in which he also underlined that “Cuba does not threaten or challenge, but neither does it fear.”

By saying “never,” the Cuban leader ignores the many pieces of evidence regarding training camps inside the Island and the delivery of weapons to dozens of guerrilla groups seeking to overthrow governments allied with Washington in Latin America, groups that did not hesitate to kidnap and kill several U.S. diplomats. In addition, Havana offered its territorial waters to Colombian cartels to facilitate cocaine shipments into the United States. It also granted asylum to terrorists wanted by the FBI.

Nevertheless, Díaz-Canel insisted that “every day a new threat comes from the United States toward Cuba,” and that the Island has been subjected to “countless offensive actions concocted” in Washington that have left “thousands of Cubans injured or dead.” The Cuban leader described as “incoherent” and “fantastical” the idea of labeling his country a “threat” while, he claimed, “additional coercive measures are being decreed and its Government is accused of being incapable of minimally sustaining its economy.”

“It is all part of a narrative being built in order to continue suffocating the Cuban people, as well as escalating toward a conflict that could have unimaginable consequences for our peoples and the region,” the leader reflected, referring to Washington’s measures affecting strategic sectors such as energy, mining, and financial services.

Along the same lines, Díaz-Canel said it has been “proven,” “documented,” and even “acknowledged by international organizations and U.S. agencies from previous administrations” that his country “has contributed to preserving U.S. security in the fight against different kinds of transnational crime.”

“Cuba has had to work all this time to confront with firmness and calm the threats coming from the United States, and that is how we will continue to the very end,” he concluded.

“Cuba has had to work all this time to confront with firmness and calm the threats coming from the United States, and that is how we will continue to the very end.”

That same Tuesday, the occupant of the White House said before leaving for Beijing that Cuba “is asking for help” and that both countries “are going to talk,” without giving further details. All this comes amid his repeated and habitual threats against the Havana authorities, including the possibility of a military offensive.

Fifteen days ago, Senate Republicans once again blocked a Democratic initiative seeking to limit Trump’s war powers regarding Cuba. Even so, more and more Republicans are opposing an armed solution that could further damage the party’s chances in the November elections.

Last week, in an interview with Fox News, Secretary of State Marco Rubio hinted at the Trump administration’s displeasure over the use of Cuban territory by its adversaries and described their operations, 90 nautical miles off the coast of Florida, as a threat.

Translated by GH

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Cuban Political Prisoner Sissi Abascal Zamora Arrives in Miami With Her Family

Her mother, the Lady in White Annia Zamora, is traveling with her thanks to a humanitarian visa granted to both of them by the State Department

Sissi Abasca in a 2019 photo. “I VOTE NO”. / Screenshot

14ymedio, Madrid, 14 May 2026 / Political prisoner Sissi Abascal Zamora and her mother, Annia Zamora, also a member of the Ladies in White, are arriving in Miami this Thursday with a humanitarian visa accompanied by other family members, according to activist Ángel Moya, husband of the leader of the women’s organization, Berta Soler.

The release of the young activist, just 27 years old, was reportedly arranged by the regime, as Abascal was being held in the La Bellotex women’s prison in Matanzas, serving a sentence for her participation in the July 11, 2021 protests. Saylí Navarro, daughter of fellow prisoner of conscience Félix Navarro, is also serving her sentence in the same prison. Both rejected, as was learned earlier this month, a proposal to leave Cuba made by the auxiliary bishop of Havana, Eloy Ricardo Domínguez Martínez, who visited them at the prison where they are serving their sentences.

In an audio recording shared by the Cuban Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH), Sonia Álvarez Campillo, Saylí’s mother and Félix’s wife, said that they were not going to leave the country. “Last Tuesday, the auxiliary bishop of Havana and president of the Prison Ministry appeared at the Agüica prison in Matanzas, with the aim of inviting Félix to leave the country,” Álvarez Campillo recounts in the audio.

From there, the prelate went to La Bellotex to present the same situation to Saylí, who refused, just like her father. It’s reasonable to assume the message was also intended for Abascal, and that she would have accepted, although this will surely be one of the questions the young woman will have to answer upon her arrival in Florida. continue reading

It’s reasonable to assume the message was also for Abascal, and if so, she would have accepted, although this will surely be one of the questions the young woman will have to answer upon her arrival in Florida.

Abascal’s release has been arranged by the Fundación Rescate Jurídico [Legal Rescue Foundation], headed by activist and businessman Santiago Álvarez, who announced that the young woman will be available to the press this Thursday from 12 noon at the organization’s headquarters.

Known for being the youngest member of the Ladies in White, as well as a member of the Pedro Luis Boitel Party for Democracy, Abascal was serving a six-year prison sentence, meaning she still had 14 months left to complete. Last September, Annia Zamora denounced the seventh time the authorities had refused to grant her the benefit of a less restrictive prison regime, despite her having just undergone surgery for a gynecological condition.

Abascal, known for her refusal to wear a prison uniform, which has earned her severe punishments, is one of the most internationally recognized prisoners. In early April, it was reported that Washington had given Havana 15 days to release some of its highest-level political prisoners as a goodwill gesture, but the deadline—if it ever was given—passed without consequence.

This Wednesday, USA Today published a brief audio recording of a conversation with Maykel Castillo Osorbo, who told the American media outlet that he had also received an offer of freedom in exchange for exile—though this wasn’t the first time such an offer had been made public. “Either you want to emigrate, tell me if you want to emigrate, or you want to stay in this same situation you’re in now, imprisoned until 2030,” the rapper claims State Security made the offer.

However, his answer was no: “Freedom cannot be bought at any price. That’s clear. I understand. I will always make that clear.”

However, his answer was no: “Freedom cannot be bought at any price. That is clear. I understand. I will always make that clear.”

For his part, Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara also spoke briefly with the media outlet, telling them: “I am an artist, and I believe that both Maykel and I could be in New York right now, in any reality, living our art, fighting as artists to make our mark in the art world. But we decided to sacrifice all that vanity.” The artist, probably the most internationally known political prisoner, who has two months left on his sentence, added: “We found a path in art, a reason to believe that art could change things, and that’s why we put our bodies on the line for change in Cuba. Our responsibility as artists, as Cubans, is that we came as prisoners.”
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Rubio: ‘Wealth in Cuba Is Controlled by a Company of Military Officers Who Keep All the Money’

The U.S. secretary of state again insisted that “additional designations can be expected in the coming days and weeks”

The Gran Muthu Habana was built a few years ago by Gaesa in Playa, Havana. / 14ymedio

EFE/14ymedio, Washington, May 14, 2026 — United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio once again lashed out at the Cuban Government this Wednesday, asserting that the Island is “controlled by a company owned by military generals,” in a new criticism amid Washington’s pressure on Havana, which has intensified in recent weeks.

“Wealth in Cuba is controlled by a company owned by military generals who keep all the money,” Rubio stated during an exclusive interview with Fox News, broadcast Wednesday night and recorded aboard Air Force 1 en route to China.

The head of U.S. diplomacy, who has Cuban roots, also warned that people in Cuba are currently “literally eating garbage off the streets” while at the same time the “company” that controls the Island has “16 billion dollars” at its disposal.

The head of U.S. diplomacy, who has Cuban roots, also warned that people in Cuba are currently “literally eating garbage off the streets”

Last week, the United States announced sanctions against the Cuban military conglomerate GAESA, its director, and Moa Nickel, a joint venture with the Canadian company Sherritt International, as part of actions aimed at strangling the Island’s economy amid threats by President Donald Trump to take control of the country.

These new “decisive measures” by Washington seek “to protect the national security of the United States and deprive Cuba’s communist regime and military forces of access to illicit assets,” Rubio said.

“Just 90 miles from U.S. territory, the Cuban regime has continue reading

driven the Island into ruin and auctioned it off as a platform for foreign intelligence, military, and terrorist operations. Additional designations can be expected in the coming days and weeks,” Rubio added.

According to the State Department, the military company GAESA “constitutes the heart of Cuba’s kleptocratic communist system,” controlling “an estimated 40% or more of the Island’s economy” for the benefit of “corrupt elites,” while the Cuban people endure one of the most severe economic crises in the country’s history.

Last March, however, an official close to talks between the United States and Cuba affirmed precisely that the precarious economic situation of GAESA could serve as leverage for change. The information was published by The Economist, which argued that Gaesa’s collapse is due to having invested 70% of its resources over the last 10 years in a tourism sector that is now practically at zero.

“Before the United States tightened restrictions, Gaesa barely had one billion dollars in reserves”

“Before the United States tightened restrictions, Gaesa barely had one billion dollars in reserves. That figure is rapidly declining, as its luxury hotels remain empty,” the article said, estimating Cuba’s international reserves at around 3 billion dollars.

Trump signed a new executive order on May 1 extending the scope of sanctions against Cuba to include almost any non-U.S. person or company doing business with the Island, especially in the energy, defense, security, and financial sectors.

This adds to the oil blockade imposed in January by the American president, who has said he will “take control” of Cuba “almost immediately” and could deploy the USS Abraham Lincoln to Caribbean waters.

On Tuesday, before departing for China, Donald Trump said that Cuba’s situation was that of “a failed country” that “is asking for help, and we’re going to talk!”

Translated by Regina Anavy
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Cuba’s Electric Union Announces a 2,200 MW Deficit After a Turbulent Night of Protests in Havana

The system disconnected early this morning from Ciego de Ávila to Guantánamo, and the Antonio Guiteras thermoelectric plant broke down again

Protests in Marianao, Havana, after more than 20 hours without electricity. / Mario Pentón/Facebook

14ymedio, Havana, May 14, 2026 – The night was turbulent in a Havana abandoned even by the breeze, and dawn does not look any better. Cuba’s Electric Union has announced the largest projected deficit in history for today, with 2,202 megawatts of outages expected during peak hours. For that time, and if nothing worsens, generation is estimated at 976 MW against a demand of 3,150.

The Antonio Guiteras thermoelectric plant disconnected again due to a boiler leak, adding its shutdown to that of Felton and creating a perfect storm that only lacked one more aggravating factor: at 6:09 a.m., a partial collapse of the electrical system occurred from the province of Ciego de Ávila to Guantánamo, and recovery efforts are currently underway through isolated energy islands.

All of this comes after a night of widespread protests in the capital, during a month of May already registering high temperatures. In the newsroom of 14ymedio, despite being on the highest floor, the heat was already unbearable yesterday, and summer, which is expected to be intolerable, has not even arrived yet. Even so, in Nuevo Vedado the many pot-banging protests that multiplied throughout the city during a blackout lasting more than 20 consecutive hours were not heard.

The fuse had been lit in San Miguel del Padrón, where in broad daylight yesterday and after 24 continuous hours without electricity, residents took to the streets banging pots and pans, demanding “electricity” and “food” and calling for solutions that ultimately arrived almost simultaneously with arrests. But tensions began spreading from neighborhood to continue reading

neighborhood.

Under cover of darkness, when identifying demonstrators becomes more difficult, the protests intensified. So much so that in the municipality of Playa, a police truck arrived at improvised barricades and bonfires, as shown in a video published by journalist Mario Pentón, to disperse the large group of people occupying the street.

In Diez de Octubre, several piles of garbage were also set on fire while horns blared and pots clanged. “My neighborhood, there’s no fear anymore. We want freedom, they won’t be able to stop an entire people,” wrote a resident in Santos Suárez, where the pot-banging protests were equally loud.

Cubans both inside and outside the Island proudly commented on the many videos circulating on social media when they recognized streets where they live or once lived. “My neighborhood heating up. Fire against the PNR [National Revolutionary Police],” urged a former resident of Lawton and Dolores in response to other images in which only the defiant noise and the powerful chiaroscuro of the bonfires amid another black night without power could barely be distinguished.

Chants and demands were also heard on San Lázaro, near the famous staircase of the University of Havana where, on a very distant day, Fidel Castro railed against Batista’s dictatorship. The same occurred in Guanabacoa, where it is difficult to find a place to charge a phone and even harder to charge a motorcycle in order to get around. “The 4G signal appears, but there is absolutely no connection,” one resident said.

The fact that Nuevo Vedado was calm last night does not mean its residents’ patience is immune to what is happening. On the contrary, the loud pot-banging protests heard Tuesday in the area around the Ministry of Transportation, even if they did not last very long, drew attention. The noise spread toward the area around the 14ymedio newsroom, surrounded by buildings where state officials reside, giving these protests added significance.

It is precisely the Ministry of Transportation that is one of the most effective blackout detectors in the area, since the noise from its generator begins instantly every time the electricity goes out.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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At Havana’s State Bodegas: Plenty of Slogans, No Products

The dilemma Cubans face every day is that whatever they can afford doesn’t exist, and whatever does exist they can’t afford.

Empty of products, but not of slogans, was the ration store this Tuesday.

14ymedio, Havana, Juan Diego Rodríguez, May 13, 2026 – The old state-run bodega next to the market at 19 and B, in Havana’s Vedado district, has never really been able to compete with the bustling produce market. Well stocked with every kind of fruit and vegetable, the market stands in stark contrast to the shop reserved for ration-book purchases, which has increasingly become the very symbol of the country’s shortages.

When, at the end of December 2023, the private home-delivery business Zona K’liente set up shop in half of the premises, the contrasts became even sharper. But never to the extent seen now, as the crisis has worsened due to the fuel shortage and the ration-market stores have been left completely empty.

Meanwhile, not only is the small private business Zona K’liente thriving, but so are the stalls in the adjacent market.

This Tuesday — the first day of the week when the market at 19 and B reopens after the Sunday and Monday break — the shelves contained only a tiny quantity of fruit purée, intended for children up to two years old in each household. Empty of products, but not of slogans. “We Are Continuity,” “Thinking as a Country,” are some of the phrases written continue reading

in capital letters across the front of the green-painted counter, as if big, strident lettering were enough to feed people.

Meanwhile, not only is the small private business Zona K’liente thriving, but so are the stalls in the neighboring market. Prices*, however, are another matter. Imported mandarins at 1,500 pesos a pound, soursop at 1,000, red cabbage at 2,000, pork leg at 950, a single mamey fruit at 400 pesos…

Both places lay bare the dilemma ordinary Cubans face every day just to survive: whatever they can afford doesn’t exist, and whatever does exist they cannot afford.

*Translator’s note: The monthly retirement benefit in Cuba is roughly about 3,000 to 4,000 pesos a month.

Translated by GH

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Born to Cuban Parents, Pere Villacorta is a Defender in FC Barcelona’s Youth Academy

The left-footed player, born in 2010, can also play as a left back and defensive midfielder

Pere Villacorta joined Barça’s youth ranks in 2024 from RCD Espanyol / Instagram La Masia Promises

14ymedio, Andy Lans, Matanzas, May 13, 2026 — FC Barcelona’s youth academy has adorned Spanish football with great defenders. Names such as Gerard Piqué and Carles Puyol were written in the past in golden letters. Other current players like Pau Cubarsí and Gerard Martín inspire confidence for the present and the future. Meanwhile, another center-back of Cuban descent is being polished at La Masía: Pere Villacorta García.

As 14ymedio was able to confirm, the player born in Barcelona in 2010 has Cuban ancestry. His father is from Cienfuegos, and his mother from Havana. In addition to playing center-back, the left-footed player can also perform as a left back and defensive midfielder. On the field, he stands out for his personality, exquisite technique, and tactical maturity.

In his emerging career, he has passed through three prestigious football institutions in Catalonia

Pere Villacorta arrived at Barça’s youth academy in 2024 from RCD Espanyol, which had signed him in 2022 from CF Damm. As can be seen, in his emerging career he has already passed through three prestigious football institutions in Catalonia.

This season, Villacorta has been one of the key figures in Barcelona Under-16’s title in the Catalan Honor Division, with two matchdays still remaining before the championship concludes. Wearing his usual number 4 shirt and the captain’s armband, Pere has played 21 matches so far in the tournament, with the same number of starts and a pair of goals. Due to his strong performances, he has been rewarded with four call-ups and two appearances in the National Youth League with Barcelona Under-19 B.

Could Pere Villacorta join a Cuban national team? In theory, he is eligible through his parents’ birthplace, but he would need to obtain a Cuban passport and be recruited by the Cuban Football Association.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Concern Grows Among Spanish Companies in Cuba Over Helms-Burton

Donald Trump’s poor relationship with Pedro Sánchez increases exposure to reprisals, especially for the hotel chain Meliá, which has 34 establishments on the Island.

Meliá owns nearly 14,000 rooms in Cuba, but according to its latest report, it is keeping just over 700 open. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, May 13, 2026 — Nearly a week after the Canadian mining company Sherritt International withdrew from Cuba over the possibility of U.S. sanctions tied to its operations on the Island, attention has now turned to Meliá. The Spanish hotel chain, which manages 34 properties owned by the Cuban State, has been forced to reduce its available rooms by approximately 50%, and although it has not expressed any intention of ending its business there, warnings are coming from various quarters.

This happened last Saturday, when the U.S.-Cuba Economic and Trade Council (U.S.-Cuba Trade) published an article asking whether the Mallorca-based company would be the next to end its collaboration with the military conglomerate Gaesa due to pressure from Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act, already activated during Trump’s first term, and a possible inclusion on the SDN (Specially Designated Nationals) list of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury Department. This directory includes sanctioned individuals, companies, or vessels, implying a financial blockade and a prohibition on Americans doing business with them.

Although theoretically any company could be exposed to such measures, U.S.-Cuba Trade believes there could be an additional political motivation for acting against Meliá: the stance of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who prohibited the U.S. from using Spanish military bases for operations against Iran. In fact, the organization believes that Sherritt’s withdrawal may have stemmed from a similar situation involving Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who has also been confrontational toward the American president. continue reading

The organization believes Sherritt’s departure may have resulted from a similar situation involving Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister and likewise confrontational toward the American president

Meliá also has a precedent. Its CEO, Gabriel Escarrer Jaume, son of Escarrer Juliá, founder of the hotel chain and closely linked to Fidel Castro, was already sanctioned by OFAC in February 2020. Exactly six years ago, during a visit to Cuba for the Tourism Fair, the businessman said he was indifferent to the sanctions and stated that his intention was to remain on the Island for at least another three decades. “We do not tremble in the face of outside pressures we may suffer,” he insisted.

At that time, the hotel chain had already begun receiving claims under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, although none have succeeded. Meliá relied on the European regulation known as the Blocking Statute, which prevents European Union companies from complying with extraterritorial measures. Companies based in the EU are strictly prohibited from applying legislation or court rulings from other countries listed in an annex that expressly includes the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.

But now, U.S.-Cuba Trade points out, there is the possibility of being placed on the SDN list, which would mean, in addition to losing the two hotels it owns in the United States, the INNSiDE in New York and the Meliá Orlando Celebration in Florida, the possibility that banks could sever relations for fear of being affected themselves.

The Spanish newspaper ABC consulted a lawyer specializing in these matters for an article published Tuesday. “From a legal standpoint, this is a major change, because the United States is giving itself a weapon it can use however it wants. For companies operating in Cuba, their existence in the country is going to become more complicated. There will be much greater scrutiny from banks, insurers, and partners when doing business, and many companies will reconsider whether it is worth continuing,” said José María Viñals, a partner at the international law firm Squire Patton Boggs. In his view, financial institutions will have to conduct “a very exhaustive analysis and review their credit history with the Island,” and the measures discourage investment in Cuba.

ABC also spoke with Ignacio Aparicio, from Andersen Lawyers and head of Cuban affairs, who said several companies have consulted about “the validity and continuity of their contracts with entities linked to Gaesa, the personal risk to their executives regarding entry visas to the United States, and the position of their banks and insurers regarding ongoing operations.” The expert does not believe there will be a total withdrawal of Spanish companies, but he warned: “This is neither a hypothetical nor a distant nor a legally simple risk.”

Among the most visible companies potentially affected, the Madrid daily notes, are also the hotel chains Barceló and Iberostar, Banco Sabadell, and Alto Cedro, the latter linked to Banco Santander, which has a strong presence in the United States.

“Europe will have to decide whether it protects European companies and confronts the United States”

Viñals, in any case, raises an even broader issue in the conflict. “Europe will have to decide whether it protects European companies and confronts the United States,” he said. The Blocking Statute mainly functions as a tool capable of nullifying the legal effects of U.S. court decisions on European soil, but it can do little against an OFAC designation, which would exert coercive pressure on other businesses. However, the EU still has a weapon it has never used, known as the trade bazooka: the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI).

Created in 2023 by the European Commission, this mechanism activates direct trade reprisals if authorities determine that there is a policy attempting to influence the policies of the EU or its member states. Measures can range from tariffs to service restrictions or suspension of U.S. patents in Europe. The first time the bloc of 27 countries considered invoking it was last January, when Donald Trump threatened to take over Greenland, but given the potential for open conflict implied by its use, it was never even formally considered.

Just a week ago, French President Emmanuel Macron again brought the ACI into the spotlight when Trump threatened new tariffs on the EU. Sánchez joined the initiative, supporting its use to block measures against judges of the International Criminal Court. However, even if the EU wanted to use its “last golden bullet” against the United States, activating the measure would take months to move through Europe’s high-level institutions, compared to the immediacy of OFAC measures.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Cuban Government Is Privatizing Fuel Sales, but Will Continue To Control Prices.

This is about circumventing the US measure that only authorizes small private businesses to import petroleum products

A gas station known as the Shell Roundabout in Havana, rented from a micro, small, or medium-sized enterprise (MSME), where state vehicles are served. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, May 12, 2026 / Starting at midnight on Friday, May 15, the fixed price for gasoline purchases will be eliminated. The Cuban regime announced this Tuesday through its media, stating that “the sale prices of fuels in foreign currency will be updated, either upward or downward, according to the actual costs of each specific transaction.”

“The gradual process of social and economic transformations that Cuba, in its legitimate and sovereign right, has been carrying out has allowed multiple actors to import and sell fuel in foreign currency,” states the press release published in official media. The statement does not specify what has “allowed multiple actors” to import and sell fuel; that is, not only the Cuban government’s willingness—which since February has facilitated the purchase of fuel by any company with the means to do so—but also the permit issued by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for Cuban private entities to import fuel from the United States, provided that regime institutions are excluded.

“Different retail fuel prices will coexist, reflecting the actual import costs for each economic actor.”

Without mentioning any of this, the official statement reports that from now on “different retail fuel prices will coexist at service stations, reflecting the actual import cost for each economic actor; this will be influenced by the supplier, freight costs, supply route, insurance, risks and international market fluctuations.”

Until now, it explains, “a fixed price for the sale of fuels was maintained as a policy of protection against the changes and instabilities inherent in a turbulent market, which cannot be economically sustained under the current conditions.”

However, the mere fact that the government issued a statement dictating a price policy supports the hypothesis that Havana is, in reality, circumventing the US regulation by de facto intervening in the newly privatized market. This newspaper has documented continue reading

how Cupet not only leases state-owned gas stations to micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), but also serves vehicles belonging to state-owned companies at these stations , which is expressly prohibited by the OFAC order.

“Cuba demands its inalienable right to import fuels to guarantee the country’s economic and social development and the well-being of its people.”

Far from apologizing, the regime asserts: “Cuba demands its inalienable right to import fuels to guarantee the country’s economic and social development and the well-being of its people.”

US oil sales to Cuba surged in March, reaching $8,788,501 in a single month. According to the latest figures from the US-Cuba Trade Council, the total value of gasoline, fuel oil, diesel, and lubricants in the first quarter of the year reached $11,624,773, indicating significant growth in March compared to the previous month.

In February, US-Cuba Trade already reported a quantitative jump in the figures, with almost 2.44 million dollars – 2.2 in fuel oil and 162,100 in gasoline, which is more complex to transport in isotanks (tank containers of just over 20,000 liters).

Broken down by product, this March, light fuel oil was one of the most purchased items, totaling $3,066,920, although petroleum oils were the star performer, reaching nearly four million dollars. Additionally, $490,223 was spent on gasoline, three times more than the previous month. All shipments originated from Florida, New Orleans, and Houston.

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Havana Chronicles: Sleeping Is Also a Privilege in Havana

While hundreds stand in line to leave the country after sleepless nights, a class emerges capable of shielding themselves from blackouts and sleeping soundly.

Tejas Corner, in Havana, this Tuesday. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Yoani Sánchez, Havana, 12 May 2026 / Everyone on the street is talking about the same thing. “I couldn’t sleep even an hour last night,” a young woman tells an elderly woman she passes as she walks along Calzada del Cerro. I follow behind, with the clumsy gait of someone who spent the night awake, barely blinked the night before, and managed, if anything, a couple of hours of sleep. The constant sleeplessness imposed by the combination of blackouts and heat weighs heavily on all of us in this city.

Before five o’clock in the morning this Tuesday, I’d already had a couple of cups of coffee. By seven, my eyes were wide open, and I headed out, but I made a mistake turning right at Rancho Boyeros instead of going straight, and I ended up at the Ciénaga train workshops. I crossed the avenue and decided to walk to Esquina de Tejas. The oak trees were in bloom all over the city, so with every step I stumbled upon a tapestry of petals on the ground. A soft carpet that got me yawning. All I could think about were pillows, blankets, and a cool room where I could snore for hours on end.

The owner of the most powerful Ecoflow, the longest-lasting battery, and the generator with the most fuel is now the neighborhood ‘big shot’.

Several blocks before reaching the Immigration and Foreigners Directorate office, I see the crowd. There are dozens, most likely hundreds, of people who have spent the night there to apply for a passport. The exodus continues unabated. A woman boasts to others that she spent the night at a friend’s house who has a generator and that she slept “like a log with the air conditioning on.” The looks she gets from those who hear her bravado are like poisoned arrows.

The new class emerging is the one that can isolate itself from blackouts and enter the deep sleep stage, essential for physical recovery. People with resources are no longer identified so much by the designer clothes, the car they drive, or the drinks they toast with. Now, the deepest social divide is between those who can count on an energy supply that allows them to rest during the early morning hours, and those who experience that time of day amidst mosquito bites, sweat, and sudden awakenings.

Our status is written all over our faces. That woman with dark circles under her eyes; she probably doesn’t even have a rechargeable fan to keep cool in the dark. That young man with puffy bags under his eyes; he probably lives in a windowless tenement and has a small child he must fan all night. And those cheeks without a dark spot on their upper part; there we have the nouveau riche. The owner of the most powerful Ecoflow, the longest-lasting battery, and the generator with the most fuel is now the neighborhood dandy.

When the sun starts to beat down, they take refuge in their offices with a certain air of duty fulfilled, while outside, mountains of garbage continue to dominate the landscape. / 14ymedio

I arrive at the Esquina de Tejas. The park benches at the base of the two 20-story buildings are full of families. Some children sleep stretched out on the granite, while their mothers wave cardboard boxes close to their bodies. These towers, which I can see from my apartment, spend a good part of the night in darkness. When I feel that my building’s electricity is being mistreated more than the others, I only have to look toward the horizon at the windows of these darkened buildings to remind me that in this city there’s always someone who might be worse off, much worse off.

I turn onto Infanta Street. Several government offices have been ordered to clean up the mess in front of their buildings. So, several employees, brooms and dustpans in hand, are sweeping up a piece of paper here, some cardboard there, in the middle of an avenue overflowing with filth. As the sun begins to beat down, they retreat to their offices with a sense of accomplishment, while outside, mountains of garbage continue to dominate the landscape. One of the enthusiastic cleaners has forgotten the bin of accumulated waste, which a cart driver accidentally knocks over, and it all spills back onto the street.

The flowers have continued to fall, and her shoulders, skirt, and bag are covered in those fragile petals that are ruined as soon as they fall. / 14ymedio

She bought some coffee from a street vendor. She never drinks it after eight in the morning to avoid sleep problems later, but who cares about a little more caffeine in a city where you can’t sleep anyway? The small dose came with sugar, but she didn’t care; she just wanted to wake up and get to her destination. She reached Parque de la Normal.

In one corner, a woman has fallen asleep leaning against a tree trunk. It’s an oak. The blossoms have continued to fall, and her shoulders, skirt, and bag are covered in those fragile petals that wither as soon as they fall.

Previous Havana Chronicles:

A Desperate Plea in the Middle of the Dark Havana Night: ‘Light!’

The Refuse of Disenchantment

Under a Picture-Postcard Blue Sky, the Country is Crumbling

Fatigue Barely Allows One to Enjoy the ‘Lights On’ in Havana

Dollars, the Classic Card, and a Havana Without Tourists

A Journey Through the Lost Names of Havana

The Shipwreck of a Ship Called “Cuba”

Havana Seen From ‘The Control Tower’

In Havana, the Only Ones Who Move Are the Mosquitoes

Reina, the Stately Street Where Garbage is Sold

Searching for Light Through the Deserted Streets of Havana

The Death Throes of ‘Granma’, the Mouthpiece of a Regime Cornered by Crisis

The Anxiety of the Disconnected Cuban

One Mella, Three Mellas, Life in Cuba Is Measured in Thousands of Pesos

It Is Forbidden To Leave Home in Cuba Today Because It Is a “Counter-Revolutionary Day”

Vedado, the Heart of Havana’s Nightlife, Is Now Converted Into a Desert

Havana, in Critical Condition
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While Attending a Mass for Leo XIV, the Regime Orders the Encirclement of Activists and Independent Journalists

Police arrest Yoan de la Cruz, the young man who broadcast the start of the 11J protests from San Antonio de los Baños

Beyond the ceremonial language and official photographs, the day was marked by reports of surveillance, police cordons, and repression. / Granma

14ymedio, Havana, May 9, 2026 / An unknown man intercepted journalist Reinaldo Escobar at his front door on Friday and asked if he planned to go out. When told no, the man warned him that neither he nor Yoani Sánchez could leave because there was a special mass for the Pope that day. “And what does that have to do with us, if we’re not even Catholic?” Escobar asked. “That’s what I told you,” the unknown man responded, in a phrase that betrayed the existence of orders from above. The man concluded: “Well, you know, stay upstairs and don’t go out.”

In effect, the Cuban regime once again presented its best diplomatic face to the Catholic Church this Friday. In Havana’s cathedral, Cardinal Juan de la Caridad García, Archbishop of Havana, and the president of the Episcopal Conference, Arturo González Amador, celebrated a Mass of Thanksgiving for the first anniversary of the pontificate of Leo XIV. In the front row were Cuba’s Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez and Vice President Salvador Valdés Mesa, both members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party.

However, outside of the ceremonial language and official photographs, the day was marked by reports of surveillance, police cordons, and pressure against independent journalists and activists.

The Apostolic Nuncio, Antoine Camilleri, focused his message on the Pope’s approachability, simplicity, and spirit of service. He also referred to the more than 90 years of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Cuba, which he described as a “constant channel of dialogue, respect, and cooperation.” The official newspaper Granma presented the ceremony as a new episode of “respectful and constructive dialogue” between Havana and the Vatican.

While the government speaks of dialogue before the Church and diplomats, its repressive forces keep under control those who could offer a different image of the country.

Several reports of harassment and police blockades circulated on social media in the hours leading up to and following the mass. Opposition members and independent reporters asserted that State Security agents were stationed around their homes to prevent them from leaving. Among those surrounded were journalist Camila Acosta, opposition member Ángel Moya, and Berta Soler, leader of the Ladies in White movement. According to independent journalist José Raúl Gallego, Moya and Soler were detained.

While the government speaks of dialogue before the Church and diplomats, its repressive forces keep under control those who continue reading

could offer another image of the country: that of political prisoners, those released from prison under surveillance, the mothers of “11J” and the journalists who document the crisis outside the state press.

Adding to this climate was the report about Yoan de la Cruz, the recently released political prisoner who live-streamed the first protests on 11 July 2021, in San Antonio de los Baños. A Facebook post circulated this Saturday alerted the public that the police had arrested him and confiscated money, perfumes, and other items during the operation. “Under what pretext? I don’t know, this is robbery to me,” the post stated, adding that De la Cruz was working and complying with the regulations imposed since his release.

“They seized several items from him, including perfumes, money, a phone, and a computer.”

A source close to the family, consulted by 14ymedio, later confirmed some of the information circulating on social media. “According to neighbors, they confiscated several items from him: perfumes, money, a phone, a computer, and so on. I don’t yet know the reason for his arrest,” the source explained. As of now, it is unknown what charges he was arrested under or whether the authorities have formally informed the family about his situation.

Yoan de la Cruz was first arrested on July 23, 2021, after broadcasting from San Antonio de los Baños the images that sparked the 11J protests across the island. In March 2022, he was sentenced to six years in prison, and in May of that same year, he was released after his sentence was reduced to five years without incarceration.

This system, presented by the authorities as an alternative to prison, functions in practice as supervised release. The offender is obligated to comply with restrictions, subject to police monitoring, and vulnerable to any alleged violation being used as grounds for returning to prison.

The coincidence of the official mass, the reported blockades, and the operation against De la Cruz paints a picture difficult to reconcile with the discourse of openness the regime projects to the Holy See. In the cathedral, officials spoke of respect and cooperation. In the homes of activists and former political prisoners, the police reminded them of the true limitations of that dialogue.

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Opposition Is Growing Among Republican Senators Against a U.S. Military Action Against the Cuban Regime

Several lawmakers believe all efforts should be focused on Iran and that economic sanctions should be enough to force change on the Island

Republican U.S. senators trust that economic pressure will be enough to reach an agreement. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, May 12, 2026 — U.S. President Donald Trump posted a message on his social network, Truth, in which he claimed that Cuba is asking for help and that he will respond through dialogue. The post makes a veiled reference to an article published Tuesday by the newspaper The Hill, which quoted several Republican senators rejecting military intervention on the Island and urging priority be given to the war with Iran.

“No Republican has ever talked to me about Cuba, a failed country that is only going in one direction: downward! Cuba is asking for help, and we are going to talk! Meanwhile, I’m going to China!” Trump exclaimed, just hours before his trip to Beijing, which begins this Wednesday and will last through Friday the 15th.

The Hill spoke with several senators from the president’s party who warned of the mistake it would be to attack Cuba while problems with Iran continue, and who called for continued economic pressure so that the Cuban regime collapses on its own.

The lawmakers are apparently concerned about the political repercussions that presidential decisions could have ahead of the midterm elections in November, when all signs point to a Democratic victory. The war against the regime of the ayatollahs is worsening the already negative polling numbers forecast for Republicans, and senators are asking for the issue to be resolved as soon as possible.

The lawmakers are apparently concerned about the political repercussions that presidential decisions could have ahead of the midterm elections in November.

“I think right now we are focused on what we should be, which is trying to open the Strait of Hormuz,” said Senate Majority Leader John Thune, who considers the matter a national priority. “I’d love to see regime change in Cuba, like everyone else,” he added, but said continue reading

that this may come through the force of events. “I think the things happening in the world are putting more pressure on many of these dictatorial-type governments. Maybe something there will happen naturally.”

James Lankford, Republican senator from Oklahoma and vice chair of the Senate Republican Conference, called for increased sanctions to try to force change, but when asked whether he would support a military operation against the Island, he was blunt: “No, I would not. There is a lot of economic pressure that can be put on Cuba that makes a huge difference by itself.”

Another firm “no” came from Susan Collins, representative from Maine and chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Steve Daines argued that although Cuba is “in our backyard,” he prefers “less conflict rather than more, given what’s happening in the world.”

“I trust,” he added, “the instincts of the president and Secretary Rubio. They are much closer to that situation, frankly, than I am,” highlighting the role of Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky said a military operation in Cuba would be a mistake and suggested that the Cuban regime is open to reforms in exchange for investment. “I want less war, not more. I am not in favor of a war with Cuba, which right now is suffering economically from the embargo, although I think they were suffering even before that because of socialism,” he stated.

“From what I have discussed with their ambassador, I think they are open to negotiations, they are open to better relations. They have told me they are open to U.S. investment. That is really the way societies are transformed,” he argued.

Shelley Moore Capito, senator from West Virginia and chair of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, downplayed the likelihood of military action and insisted that Iran is the priority. “It’s very far down the list, even if it’s on a list. I think we have to focus on what’s happening in Iran,” she told The Hill.

“It’s very far down the list, even if it’s on a list. I think we have to focus on what’s happening in Iran,” she said.

By contrast, Axios sees more signs that Trump may be preparing military action in Cuba, in an article published Monday titled “Trump and Rubio’s escalating rhetoric shows a Cuba invasion could be imminent.” While the outlet does not provide strong indications from government sources pointing toward military intervention — they cite a White House official saying that Cuba “will soon fall, and we will be there to help them” — it does include a relevant opinion in that direction.

That opinion comes from Sebastián Arcos, interim director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University, who told Axios that intervention is more plausible now that “the war with Iran is in a kind of limbo.” “I sense a reorientation toward Cuba, not only in the surveillance flights, but also in the president’s statements to Marco Rubio and the newly announced sanctions,” the specialist declared.

He does not believe the U.S. president will deploy troops on the Island, but rather “undertake a remote military action, similar to what occurred in Iran, that would shock the regime, weaken the ruling leadership, and perhaps create an opportunity for the emergence of new leadership.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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